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(April 27, 2008)
Dear Subscribers,
Let us begin our commentary with a review of our 7 most recent signals in
our DJIA
Timing System:
1st signal entered: 50% long position on September 7, 2006 at 11,385;
2nd signal entered: Additional 50% long position on September 25, 2006 at
11,505;
3rd signal entered: 100% long position SOLD on May 8, 2007 at 13,299, giving
us gains of 1,914 and 1,794 points, respectively.
4th signal entered: 50% short position on October 4, 2007 at 13,956;
5th signal entered: 50% short position COVERED on January 9, 2008 at 12,630,
giving us a gain of 1,326 points.
6th signal entered: 50% long position on January 9, 2008 at 12,630, giving
us a gain of 261.86 points as of last week at the close.
7th signal entered: Additional 50% long position on January 22, 2008 at 11,715,
giving us a gain of 1,176.86 points as of last week at the close.
As of the close last Friday, both our latest buy signals in our DJIA Timing
System are in the green. Readers who are interested in the historical performance
(as of March 31, 2008) of our DJIA Timing System can refer to our comments
from a couple of weeks ago (The
End of "Market Fundamentalism"). Excluding dividends, our DJIA Timing System
returned 13.76% over the last 12 months, beating the Dow Industrials return
of -0.74%, and with lower volatility. Again, our next update would be for the
period ending June 30, 2008 - with a move to a semi-annual update schedule
thereafter.
Let us now begin our commentary. The events over the last year or so have
been a surprise for many - and are certainly worth reflecting on. While we
all know that a "black
swan" will pay a visit to the financial markets more often than most financial
models suggest, the latest liquidity crisis - once it came - took many of us
by surprise in terms of its ferocity. As our former Fed Chairman Greenspan
stated in late 2005, "History has not dealt kindly with the aftermath of protracted
periods of low risk premiums," the swing, once it did came, swung to the other
side of the pendulum very quickly from the historical lows in junk bond, emerging
market bond, mortgage-backed, commercial mortgage-backed, and asset-backed
securities yield spreads in early 2006.
Over the past 15 months, many companies whose business models have depended
on cheap financing have either floundered or gone out of business altogether.
An example is First
Marblehead (FMD) - a company that has been featured in both Value Investors
Digest and in the Motley Fool over the last couple of years. The company had
been dependent on access to financing in the student loan asset-backed security
market, and with the decimation of the asset-backed security market late last
year, has effectively seen its core business shut down about six months ago.
At the time of this writing - despite the fact that Congress is now trying
to revive the student loan market - the credit markets for student loan asset-backed
securities is still effectively closed. First Marblehead has been a small cap
value investor's favorite over the last couple of years (except that of Barron's)-
but only in hindsight did many value investors 1) realize that its long-term
business model was shaky at best, and 2) found out that they did not really
understand its business model and strategy. I believe this is a good lesson
for us all!
The first obvious lesson here is the necessity of diversification - especially
for the majority of us who do not have the stock-picking prowess (or the ability
to directly influence the capital structure or improve the solvency of a company)
of Warren Buffett. Keep in mind, however, that one can still run a relatively
diversified portfolio with 10 to 15 positions (disclosure: my personal portfolio
has 14 (all long) positions). The second lesson here is "don't be a hero" -
especially so in an environment that is deleveraging. If one wants to be a
hero (on the other hand, this is the only way one could expect to make tremendous
gains in the stock market without managing money for others), then:
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Only do so in blue-chip names (GM doesn't count), such as American Express
in 1964, IBM in 1993, or Phillip Morris in 2000;
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Only in names where most players (most importantly, the US government)
have a vested interest in seeing the companies in question survive, such
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac today;
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Only do so if you have the ability to directly improve the capital situation
of the company (for most of us, this would not apply), such as the recent
capital injections into investment banks by sovereign wealth funds and
private equity investors.
Both of these "lessons" are valuable - as long as one learns from them and
don't make the same mistakes in the future (we could all wish, can we?). However,
there is really no fun in discussing one's mistakes, so let us know discuss
our take on the financial markets today and over the next 12 to 24 months.
What pessimists on the U.S. stock market today miss is that the performance
of the stock market is not directly tied to the performance of the economy
in the short and intermediate term. According to JP Morgan, since 1900, the
U.S. stock market returned on average +1.4% during the times the economy was
in recession (+2.1% if we ignore the sell-off from the stock market's severely
high overvaluation during the 2001 recession). In addition, the U.S. economy
actually grew faster in the 1970s than the 1980s, and yet the stock market
enjoyed significantly better returns (an understatement) in the 1980s than
the 1970s. Over the long run, the U.S. stock market is directly tied to earnings
and more importantly, projected future earnings power. Today, this earnings
stream is just not relegated to income from US customers, but all over the
world, as about 50% of all income from members of the S&P 500 now comes
from overseas markets. This makes projected future earnings power much more
difficult to model, but we can always try.
I would argue that projected future earnings power (on an EPS basis -
this is very important, as will be evident later) is directly based on:
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Projected corporate profit margins, or more specifically, corporate pricing
power and expenses (wages, pension expenses, etc.);
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Projected corporate tax rates around the world;
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Projected financing costs, or cost of capital;
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Projected "float" of the global stock market (given that capital is very
mobile today) - as expressed in the dollar value of shares that are available
to investors today;
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Projected productivity, employment, and population growth - all of which
have a direct impact to the build-up of global wealth;
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The ability and willingness of governments around the world to protect
private capital and to allow capital to move freely around the world;
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The freedom to trade and the projected increase in trade flows around
the world (Ricardo's law of comparative advantage).
Each of the above has a more direct impact on U.S. and global stock prices
than projected GDP growth alone. More importantly, the effects of each of the
above could be more easily quantified, unlike the "mixture of stuff" that is
ever changing in every GDP computation (or in China's case, a make-believe
number).
Furthermore, each of the above is not independent of each other. For example,
both the cost of capital and corporate tax rates has a direct impact on corporate
profit margins. I included corporate tax rates as a separate line item simply
because it does not have a uniform effect on all companies. One example is
corporate tax breaks for certain industries. When it comes to cost of capital
- it is important to note that in a credit "seizure" such as what we are having
now - the cost of capital for certain (highly credit worthy) companies will
eventually decline as the Federal Reserve lowers rates, while increasing to near
infinity to those which are assumed to be at the margin, such as First
Marblehead, Bear Stearns (before its announced takeover by JP Morgan), or Thornburg
Mortgage (it had to do an equity offering of around four times its market cap
in order to survive). As some of these marginal companies go out of business
due to the lack of financing options, corporate profit margins for the companies
that survive would dramatically increase as competitors are taken out in their
respective industries.
Secondly, the above seven points are meant to be sweeping in nature. For example,
the ability of governments to project private capital does not only mean protection
from government confiscation or theft, but from foreign invasion as well. Through
the U.S. central bank and FDIC, our system has also built in a significant "safety
net" that prevents private bankers from seizing our deposits or mortgaged-assets
during a liquidity or a solvency crisis in our financial system (the latter
of which is a far cry from the 1970s). Another example is projected productivity
growth. Embedded within this statement is the assumption that capitalism will
not only survive, but will continue to thrive. The reason is this: The best
economic system that allows for sustained productivity growth is capitalism,
and nothing else (Joseph Schumpeter went as far as associating technological
advances directly with capitalism).
It is to be said here that investors' perceptions of future earnings power
are almost as important as actual future earnings power, at least in the short
to intermediate term. This is one factor that drives P/E contraction or expansion
- and which also determines the cost of capital of companies via equity offerings
(IPOs or secondaries). Note that this perception also takes into account financial
transparency - as investors' perceptions of future earnings power will be clouded
if company's balance sheets or income statements are perceived to be deceiving
in nature. Another factor that drives future P/Es is, obviously, today's P/Es,
as well as the valuation (and availability) of other liquid asset classes that
are available to investors around the world, such as corporate bonds, government
bonds, cash, REITs, commodities, etc. Speaking of "availability," the "supply" of
equities (measured by the dollar value of the global equity market "float")
is also important. A recent example was the significant divergence in the value
of the Chinese "A shares" relative to their "H share" counterparts in Hong
Kong, or ADRs being traded on the U.S. stock exchanges last year. The "poster
boy" was the debut of PetroChina's shares in the Shanghai stock market in November
2007. At the time of the debut, only a little more than 2% of its shares were
listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. Driven by the bidding frenzy in Shanghai,
the stock traded debuted at a P/E of around 55, versus 22 in the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange.
Where Are We Right Now?
Using the above "model" as a basis, we now have a clearer picture of where
stock prices may go over the next 12 to 24 months. Moreover, following are
some trends that I believe could have an impact on the U.S. and global stock
markets (especially individual stocks in certain industries) during this timeframe:
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The general deleveraging in the U.S. economy that began in early 2007
is set to continue. While credit spreads have declined tremendously over
the last few weeks, the major leading economic indicators, as well as the
trend in housing prices, suggest that both US corporations and households
will continue to deleverage for the foreseeable future. Sure, commercial
bank credit has continued to increase over the last few months, but most
of it is probably due to "forced lending" to companies that have established
lines of credit prior to the credit crisis early last year.
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The threat of protectionist policies or increase in corporate tax rates
or capital gains taxes should a Democratic candidate win the Presidency
later this year. Note that even the perception of a less business-friendly
Administration is enough to drive stock prices lower. Given that most analysts
have not discussed this potential threat to stock prices, I would argue
that this is more of a danger to stock prices than either the subprime
crisis or the general deleveraging in the U.S. economy.
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One of the main trends that we have witnessed over the last few years
has been the "diversification" away from domestic equities into foreign
and emerging market equities and "alternative asset classes" by pension
plans, endowments, and foundations. With the recent decline in equity prices,
this trend is now accelerating (defined benefits pension plans still have
about 60% of their assets in U.S. and foreign equities) - especially as
it pertains to hedge funds, private equity funds, and "liability-driven" investing
strategies.
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The threat to US and global productivity growth stemming from record high
energy and food prices. The rise in crude oil is especially troubling as
this diverts resources away from the private sector into the many corrupt
and inefficient governments around the world, such as Iran and Venezuela.
On the other side of the coin, there are now several benign trends that are
supportive for the equity markets:
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The Fed's response to the general deleveraging in the U.S. economy, i.e.
lower borrowing rates, will eventually filter through to the businesses
that are left standing after the deleveraging phase is over. Once the general
deleveraging is over, the "survivors" will also enjoy more pricing power
and thus higher corporate profit margins as their weakest competitors scale
back or go into liquidation mode (bankruptcy financing will no longer be
as lax as it used to be either).
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Annualized monthly housing starts are now below the one million mark -
a mark that has marked the end of past housing busts in the US. Moreover,
there are other trends that are supportive for housing prices - trends
that were not in place in the last housing bust in the early 1990s. This
includes demographics (baby boomers continuing to buy second homes, while
the Y-Gens are expected to create an additional 150,000 households a year
relative to the X-Gens), the build-up of global wealth, and the relatively
low U.S. Dollar. Specifically, the latter two trends are spurring significant
foreign buying, especially in coastal areas such as San Francisco, Los
Angeles , New York, and parts of Florida. As long as the emerging markets
economies do not sink into a recession, the latter two trends will continue
to be supportive for U.S. housing prices for the next 10 to 15 years. If
Congress passes a bill that provides tax credits for first-time homebuyers,
this would create a significant (and more importantly, current) amount
of demand among the large pool of Y-gens or those who have sat on the sidelines
over the last few years waiting for a good entry point in residential real
estate. While I continue to expect housing prices to decline this year,
I expect housing to be much less of a headwind for the financial markets
and for the global economy 6 to 9 months from now.
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The unprecedented amount of investable capital sitting on the sidelines
waiting to be deployed into the financial markets once the credit markets
calm down. The $3.5 trillion sitting in U.S. money market funds - as a
percentage of the U.S. stock market's market cap - is now the highest in
history. More importantly, the amount of interest being paid on money market
funds have been declining - and should again decline if the Federal Reserve
institutes a 25 basis point cut in the intended Fed Funds rate this Wednesday.
This build-up in money market assets does not include the significant amount
of capital sitting in the balance sheets of sovereign wealth funds, non-financial
U.S. corporations, private equity funds, and in savings accounts in Japan
(still the second largest pool of savings in the world), China, India,
Western Europe, and many other emerging market countries. This is literally
unprecedented in history. As I previously mentioned, the only industry
that is cash poor is the financial industry - and while the financial industry
is the "grease" that drives the global capitalistic economy, such a cash
deficiency is not the end of the world, as 1) the amount of losses are
not high given the idle capital around the world, and 2) it is in everyone's
interest to quickly reliquify the global financial sector.
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As usual, the death of the U.S. consumer has been greatly exaggerated.
Despite what the official "savings rate" says, U.S. household net worth
actually increased from $42.3 trillion as of December 31, 1999 to $57.7
trillion as of December 31, 2007, despite the U.S. stock market experiencing
one of the worst bear markets in history from 2000 to 2002. No doubt, the
current measurement of the U.S. savings rate is fundamentally flawed. The
bears would argue that the U.S. savings rate was hugely positive 20 years
ago, but what they fail to catch is that the dynamics of the U.S. economy
have changed significantly over the last 20 years. For example, in the
last 20 years, the number of small businesses has risen dramatically -
rising more than three-fold during that time. While it is straightforward
to measure the savings for employees in a typical Fortune 1000 corporation
(wages plus contributions to pension plans, etc.), it is not so straightforward
for entrepreneurs that start their own businesses, since much of their
savings are deployed back into their own businesses. Think about the two
co-founders of Google - Larry Page and Sergey Brin - who worked day and
night at the Stanford campus to develop the groundbreaking search engine
that we call Google today. Today, their combined net worth is approximately
$30 billion, but virtually none of their working hours over the last seven
years are counted as savings according to the official definition - even
though they have managed to build Google from the ground-up into a $170
billion company today. To add salt to the wound - whenever one of them
(or another insider) sell their shares on the open market, the capital
gains taxes are treated as an expense, and therefore is counted as an offset
against savings. That is, there is no corresponding entry on the income
side even though there is an entry on the expense side! This scenario is
consistent with the secular decline in the savings rate since the early
1980s.
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The record amount of company buybacks over the last few years - this has
been the one "saving grace" for EPS growth of the S&P 500 over the
last 12 months. This has also removed a significant amount of "float" or
in other words, supply of common shares on the U.S. stock exchanges. All
else being equal, the removal of floating shares should not only increase
the EPS of the S&P 500, but would also directly impact share prices
as well.
Obviously, we should continue to respect the general deleveraging in the U.S.
economy for the next 12 to 24 months, as well as the potential change in U.S.
public policy towards businesses should a Democratic candidate be elected President
later this year. The continuing "diversification" by institutional investors
away from equities and into hedge funds, private equity funds, and other alternative
asset classes will also continue to be a short-term drag. That being said,
there are now significant countervailing forces that are setting up U.S. stocks
for a tremendous bull market sometime in the next 12 to 24 months. Ironically,
the general deleveraging in the U.S. economy will ultimately prove to be very
bullish for share prices (as long as you pick the right stocks, of course)
- as the marginal companies are liquidated, resulting in higher corporate profit
margins (more pricing power, lower wages, access to cheaper financing, lower
rents, etc.) for the companies that remain.
More follows for subscribers...
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