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Last week I wrote that we could see a drop in the price of oil as speculators
seemed to be storing oil in very large tankers and "slow steaming" them to
port in a bet that prices would rise. When everyone is on the same side of
the trade, the time is right for a reversal. This is especially true when there
is a large potential supply sitting on the sidelines.
This week we briefly look at this prediction, and perhaps even more ominous
problems for commodities in general, at least in the short run. The new turn
our attention to the euro. It will make for an interesting letter.
First off, oil dropped about 4% yesterday and is down almost $10 from its
high only a week ago. Yet supplies of crude oil surprisingly dropped by 8.8
million barrels yesterday. Oil shot up on the news as both those who were short
covered their bets and even more people piled into the long side of the trade.
But then the EIA report gave the rest of the story. It seems the shortfall "was
due to temporary delays in crude oil tanker off-loadings on the Gulf Coast." And
as Dennis Gartman noted this morning, "officials at the Louisiana Offshore
Oil Port (LOOP) said
that some crude oil tankers cancelled scheduled deliveries last week." The
owners of the oil in those tankers are now down about 6-7%, whether it is speculators
in the pits or the actual trading companies.
I talked with George Friedman of Stratfor this morning, and he says that the
supply of tankers is even tighter, which suggests there is even more oil on
the seas looking for a home. Crude oil prices could be under pressure in the
next few weeks and months as whoever holds that oil is going to want to get
it onshore somewhere and out of very expensive tankers.
Swapping out Commodities
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission announced yesterday that they are
looking very hard at possibly closing a regulatory loophole that allowed some
extremely large commodity index funds to get around position limits. For those
not familiar with the concept of limits, it basically works like this. No trader
or fund is allowed to own more than a specific amount of a commodity traded
on the futures exchange. This limit varies from commodity to commodity and
exchange to exchange. The point is to keep one group from manipulating the
price of a commodity, as the Hunts did with silver in the early 80s.
The loophole is one where large investment banks can sell a "swap" for a specific
commodity like corn and then hedge their position in the futures markets. There
is no limit on the amount of the commodity that can be hedged. So, a fund can
accumulate sizeable positions far in excess of what they could do directly
by working with an investment bank. In essence, the swap is a derivative issued
by a bank which acts just like a futures trade, but it is with the bank as
guarantor and not an exchange. Swaps are not regulated as such. And up until
now, the banks were seen as legitimate hedgers so there were no limits on what
they could buy in the futures markets.
This works for very large commodity index funds which try to mirror a particular
commodity index and need to be able to buy very large positions in excess of
the normal limits (and there are scores of them), and for the banks that make
the commissions and profits on the swaps. Remember, the fund gets a management
fee, so growing the size of the fund grows their fees.
These indexes typically have about 26 commodities, with the largest allocation
to oil, but almost anything that is traded has some small portion of the allocation.
As I noted last week, there are some who believe this is working to drive up
the price of commodities beyond the simply supply and demand principles. Whether
or not you believe this to be the case, the CFTC is looking at the loophole.
The key word in the announcement yesterday was the word "classification." Right
now the banks are classified as hedgers and as such have no limits. But they
are not really hedging the actual physical commodity as a farmer or General
Mills might do, but the hedge is their financial position.
If the CFTC decides to look through them to the funds, and they did use the
word transparency in their announcement, they could decide to change the classification
of the banks from hedgers to speculators. While I do no think that might make
a difference in the long run, in the short run it could make commodities volatile
in the extreme, and exert downward pressure up and down the price curve, depending
on how they would decide to unwind the commodity index funds.
For what its worth, I advised my daughter to get out of the commodity fund
she was in for the time being. When the regulators are in the room, anything
could happen. And they are getting intense pressure from Congress to change
the rules. My bet is that the train has left the station and it is but a matter
of time until position limits are put in place for commodity funds, including
commodity ETFs. Is that a good thing? I think not, but that matters not one
whit. The hand writing is on he wall.
Does this mean I am not a long term commodity bull? No, I remain bullish on
a host of commodities over the long term from a supply and demand perspective.
It is just that you might want to consider whether to stand aside for a time
while the congressional elephant is stampeding around the room. Maybe it is
a non-event and someone figures out a way to unwind the positions slowly and
over time. Maybe the grandfather the current funds at the size they are today.
Who knows? As I said, when the regulators are under pressure to do something,
I want to know what the new rules will be before I play in the game.
The Euro at Par with the Dollar
About five years ago, I said that the euro, which was trading at about $.88
at the time would rise to $1.50 and then fall back to $1 over the course of
a decade or more. It would be one huge round trip. By the way, giving credit
where credit is due, that opinion was crystallized over a long dinner with
bond expert Lord Alex Bridport and several companions in Geneva. The logic
was compelling then and it still is now. We are halfway through that decade
long trip and it remains to be seen if we get back to parity. I think we will.
Why would the euro fall? Because the currency is still an experiment in cooperation.
At some point, one or more of the weaker European countries is going to need
more monetary stimulation than the majority of the countries in the union,
for a variety of reasons. Will they pull out to be able to issue their own
fiat currency? Will the EU as a whole slow down as the US recovers?
About 4 times a year, I give myself permission to not write a letter, taking
a little mental vacation. This week, Louis Gave is graciously allowing me to
use a chapter from his latest book, "A Roadmap for Troubled Times" which highlights
some of the problems the euro is going to face, as well as analysis on a host
of topics.
Gentle reader, this is an important topic and Louis says it better than I
can. I highly recommend you get the book and read it. It is only about 200
pages and is a very easy read. The chapters on China are worth the price of
admission, as well as his suggested investment themes. You can order the book
at Amazon.com.
So, without further ado, let's jump into the problem with the Euro.
The Change In Policy
The Divergence in European Spreads - Why Now?
Back in May 2007, we wrote a piece entitled "Part 2-So What Should We Worry
About". In that ad hoc comment, we wrote: "The crux of the thesis
of our latest book, The End is Not Nigh, is simple and goes something like
this: a) Asian central banks continue to manipulate their currencies and
prevent them from finding a fair value against either the US$ or the Euro;
b) this manipulation triggers an accumulation in central bank reserves which,
in turn, leads to low real rates around the world; c) the combination of
low global real rates and low Asian exchange rates amounts to a subsidy for
Asian production and Western consumption; d) in the US, the subsidy has by
and large been captured by individual consumers; e) meanwhile, in Europe,
the subsidy has been cashed in by governments whose debt has skyrocketed;
f) we see little reason why, in the near future, the subsidy should be removed;
but g) if it were removed, the US would most likely encounter a consumer
recession (not the end of the world); while h) Europe could go through a
debt crisis (far more problematic)."
We went on and wrote: "Last week, and against most observers' expectations,
the Indian central bank did not raise rates at its meeting. Instead, it seems
that the authorities are allowing the currency to rise and hopefully thereby
absorb some of the country's inflationary pressures (linked to energy and
higher food prices). In recent weeks, the rupee has shot higher and now stands
at a post-Asian crisis high. And interestingly, the local market is loving
it. While Indian stocks had been sucking wind year to date, the central bank's
apparent policy shift (from higher interest rates to higher exchange rates)
has triggered a very sharp rally.
This of course is an interesting turn of events and we would not be surprised
if Asian central banks were to study developments in India carefully over
the coming quarters. After all, India is blazing a path that a number of
Asian countries may yet decide to follow.
One could argue that a change in monetary policy in Asia could end up being
a "triple whammy" for Western economies. It would mean that:
- Asian central banks would export less capital into our bond markets
and this would likely lead to a drift higher in real rates around the world.
- Asian exchange rates would move sharply higher, which in turn would
likely mean higher import prices in the US and Europe.
- As Asian exchange rates start to move higher, Asia's private savers
would likely start repatriating capital, further amplifying exchange rate
and interest rate movements. This would also likely lead to collapses in
monetary aggregates in the Europe and the US.
Finally, we concluded the paper by saying: As we highlighted in Part 1:
Why We Remain Bullish, we are not worried about valuations. And we are also
not worried about "excess leverage" in the system, or the threat of a "private
equity bubble". We also do not fear an "economic meltdown" or a brutal end
to the "Yen carry-trade" (which we did fear in the Spring of 2006). Instead,
if we had to have one concern, it would have to be a possible change of monetary
policy across Asia and the impact that this would have on real rates around
the world. As we view things, the only reason Asian central banks would change
their policies is if food prices continued to increase (in that respect,
owning some soft commodities -- a hedge against rising real rates -- makes
sense to us; as does owning Asian currencies). Interestingly, such a turn
of events seems to be unfolding in India, yet no one seems to care. Monitoring
changes in Asian inflation, monetary policies and exchange rates could prove
more important than ever.
Nine months after that paper, we have indeed just gone through a period of
a) rapidly rising food prices which have led to b) faster inflation rates across
Asia, which have triggered c) a change in Asian monetary policy, notably a
willingness to let the currencies appreciate faster than they have in the past.
And if Asian central banks are now finally allowing their currencies to rise,
then one thing is sure: Asian central banks will no longer need to print large
amounts of their own currencies and accumulate US$ and Euros. They will thus
also no longer need to buy US Treasuries and European bonds to the extent that
they have.
Is it a co-incidence that, as Asia starts to allow its currencies to rise,
US mortgages have been hitting the wall and spreads amongst European sovereigns
have started to widen? The subsidy that Asian central banks have been giving
to consumption in the US and governments in Europe (see The End is Not Nigh)
is now disappearing.
Indeed, for the past five years, spreads of Italian ten-year government bonds
to German bonds have hovered between 15bp and 25bp. But recently, spreads have
started to break out on the upside.

And, of course, Italy is not alone. All across Europe, we have seen a widening
of spreads between the "stronger" signatures (Germany, Holland, Austria, Finland,
Ireland) and the "weaker" signatures (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, Belgium,
France) including those of Eastern Europe (Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Poland...).
Now as our more seasoned GaveKal reader will undeniably remember (see Divorce,
Italian Style, or The End is Not Nigh), we have argued that spreads
between Europe's sovereigns were set to widen for the past few years. And
yet, nothing happened. Until, that is, we started to see Asian central banks
allowing their currencies to start appreciating faster.
But what happens if Asian central banks now stop buying up European government
debt to the tune of recent years? For a start, European money supply growth
should decelerate rapidly and with it, economic activity. A bigger problem
will then be the ability of European governments to raise further financing.
Indeed, as economic activity tanks in Europe, and the Euro starts to fall,
it is likely that investors will all of a sudden realize that governments only
go bust when they issue debt in a currency that they cannot print.
In the past fifteen years, France government debt to GDP has moved from 35%
in French Franc (i.e.: a currency the government could print at will) to 70%
in Euros (i.e.: a currency that only the ECB can print). No wonder that Francois
Fillon, the current French Prime Minister recently declared: "I run a state
which now stands in a situation of financial bankruptcy, which has known deteriorating
deficits for fifteen straight years and which has not voted a balanced budget
for twenty-five years. This cannot last."
More importantly, the tightening-up of Europe's financial situation, and the
widening of spreads between the "good borrowers" such as Austria, Finland or
Germany and the "poorer borrowers" such as Italy, Greece, or Portugal, could
have a devastating impact on Europe's commercial banks. Consider this piece
of news from January 2008: "Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany's biggest
state-owned bank, said 2007 profit will be about 300 million euros ($438.9
million) because of a drop in prices of banking and government securities.
LBBW said it doesn't expect any defaults since the securities concerned have
good ratings."
Less profits because of a drop in government securities? The careful reader
may be somewhat surprised by this statement; after all, everywhere one cares
to look across the OECD, government bond yields are close to their 2003 lows.
So how did Germany's biggest state-owned bank manage to lose money on government
securities? The answer, we believe finds its source in the funky regulations
of Basel II. According to Basel II, an OECD country bank can sell a credit
default swap on an OECD sovereign and this CDS:
- Does not have to be marked to market (since it is assumed that an OECD
country will not default on its debt).
- Does not require the selling bank to put aside any capital on its balance
sheet (since, once again, it is assumed that the country on which the CDS
is written will not default).
In other words, for the past few years, clerks all over Europe's banks and
insurance companies have boosted the bottom line with the "free money" that
the sale of CDS provided. Every now and then, a clerk at the Treasury department
of ABC Landesbanken would call up Goldman Sachs or Deutsche Bank and say: "I
want to sell US$ 1bn of protection on Italy at 15bp for five years". And for
five years, ABC Landesbanken would receive US$1.5 million without having to
set aside capital on its balance sheet or take a "mark to market" risk on its
income statement. Or so it thought...
Indeed, as the spreads between Italy and Germany start to widen something
unexpected happens (a CDS will tend to reflect the spread between the issuer's
debt and risk free debt of the same maturity. Otherwise an arbitrage could
be made. If Italy's debt traded at 100bp over Germany and a CDS on Italy only
cost 20bp, one could buy the Italian bond and buy the CDS and capture a "free" 80bp):
ABC Landesbanken receives a margin call from Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank
and, all of a sudden, what was a "risk and capital free" trade turns out to
impact liquidity. Needless to say, this is the situation we are now in and
this probably contributes further to the widening of spreads. All of a sudden,
Europe's commercial banks are no longer keen to sell the spread as they have
been for the past decade... in fact, they are most likely trying to buy back
some of the contracts they wrote before they move too far against them.
In other words, a widening of spreads represents the worst of both worlds
for European banks. For a start, it puts their balance sheets under pressure.
For seconds, it cuts down their income as the writing of CDS on Europe's weaker
sovereigns slows to a crawl.
For Europe's policy-makers, the widening of spreads poses a serious challenge
which, if left unchecked, could cut to the very credibility of the Euro and
the European construction exercise. It could also trigger a negative spiral
such as the one we saw in the US whereby as the cost of borrowing increases
on the weakest signatures, rolling over debt becomes more problematic, hereby
inviting higher spreads etc... So how will Europe's politicians respond to
this new challenge?
The widening of credit spreads across Europe reflects an economic reality.
It makes no sense that say, Belgium and Ireland should borrow at the same rate.

The Euro 100bn question for investors should thus now be whether a) the recent
widening is a one-off event and spreads are set to soon tighten again or b)
the recent widening is the beginning of a more fundamentally-based re-pricing
of risk across Euroland. The quandary now is whether politics can get us out!
In the mid 1990s, Europe's leaders got together and, in essence, said: "wouldn't
it be great if we all got to borrow at the same rate as Germany?" And everyone
around the table agreed that this would be a good thing. The decision was thus
taken to a) create a currency which would resemble the DM, b) that this currency
would be managed by a central bank with a mandate very similar to the Bundesbank's
and c) that countries around the Euroland would strive to harmonize their fiscal
policies (Maastricht Treaty rules and Stability and Growth Pact) to ensure
the long term survival of the Euro. At the time it was also envisaged that
the collapse in interest rates in certain countries (Italy, Belgium, Spain...)
would give a tailwind to growth which would allow governments around the more
indebted EMU countries to tighten their belts and clean up their fiscal houses.
The collapse in interest rates happened, as yields converged to the German
rate... but unfortunately, the clean-up in fiscal houses did not. In fact some
countries like France cashed in the "growth dividend" and voted themselves
greater benefits such as the 35-hour work week.

Which brings us to today and the recent widening of spreads across Europe.
This widening is a sign that the market is starting to acknowledge that the
promises have not been kept. Thus, the best thing for Europe's governments
would be to start keeping the promises that were made ten years ago. But
of course, the main problem with that solution is that it implies that Europe's
governments will have to tighten their belts over the coming quarters, i.e.:
at the worst possible time in the cycle. After all, it is always hard for a
government to pull back and shrink its size of the GDP cake... but in an economic
slowdown, it is close to impossible.
It is all the harder to do when there is little political will for far-reaching
reforms. As a former German central banker once told us: "I use to think that
France needed a Margaret Thatcher, I now realize she needs an Arthur Scargill" (Scargill
was the Trotskyite leader of the Miner's Strike). In other words, to get
a government to shrink its size, you first need a serious crisis (or a scarecrow
a la Scargill); only then do people accept real sacrifices.
And we should make no mistake about it: reforming Europe's welfare states
will take real sacrifices. Take pensions as an example: for years, most European
countries have run a pay-as-you-go system whereby people of my generation will
pay directly for the retirement benefits of my dad's generation (actually,
this sounds like what I do at GaveKal every day). In other words, Europe's
pension systems are usually massive pyramid schemes; they work as long as the
base grows and ever more people contribute to the bottom of the pyramid. The
problem, of course, is that in a growing number of European countries, the
base is no longer growing.

As such, the off-balance sheet liabilities assumed by the government in matters
of pensions which, until recently, had always been self-funding, are now set
to come back on the governments' balance sheets. Now the last time Europe ran
a comprehensive survey of pension liabilities was in 2003... and the data back
then was scary. We guess the situation does not look any better today.

Europe's deteriorating demographic and pension situation alone means that
Europe's governments do need to contemplate serious pension reform. Or, failing
that, to open their borders to workers from all horizons in order to keep expanding
the tax-paying, pension- contributing workforce. Needless to say, neither of
these options is very enticing politically. As such, rather than convince millions
of pensioners to cut their benefits, or work longer, Europe's politicians may
be tempted to try and convince a small minority of central bankers sitting
in Frankfurt to massively ease monetary policy and print a bunch of money to
help the governments meet their liabilities.
In essence, the scenario we are painting is a simple one: the credit crunch
which has thus far mostly only engulfed the US is starting to make its way
into Europe. And soon enough, Europe's banks will likely be reporting losses
and write-downs, and investors will flee to the safety of the highest government
bond paper. Unfortunately for Italy, Greece, Belgium or Portugal, their paper
does not qualify as "high quality".
Now as we highlighted earlier in this book, a credit crunch typically invites
a "three-step" plan policy response. First, one collapses the currency (to
make one's assets and goods more attractive to foreign capital and invite inward
capital flows). Secondly, one needs to see the banks recapitalized (if the
market can not do it, then the banks need to be nationalized). Thirdly, one
puts in place a very steep yield curve in order to force the banks to start
lending again and the private sector to take risk.
It is obvious today that this course of action is very much the preferred
path of, for example, President Sarkozy. Hardly a day goes by without the French
President taking the ECB to task for doing so little to help Europe's liquidity
crunch. But each time he does, his comments are increasingly met by responses
from Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, for whom the independence of the
ECB is sacrosanct.
The possibility of a massive easing from the ECB is nonetheless an interesting
one and raises the question of how the market will respond to a more activist
ECB. Would an ECB that did the bidding of politicians be seen as less of a
Bundesbank and more of a Bank of Italy/Banque de France? And if so, would long
bond yields across Europe be below 4% and the Euro at 1.55/US$? Would the foreign
central banks that have been piling into European government paper remain keen
to finance Europe's welfare states?
Another question, of course, is what would happen in the event of a bank bankruptcy
in Europe? Would the ECB bail out the failing bank? Would the government of
a failing bank be allowed to bend the EU's competition rules and nationalize
the troubled financial institution? These are all questions with answers that
remain unclear.
Of course, there is another way to go about dealing with a credit crunch:
bitter infighting. This is what Japan did throughout the 1990s when the MoF
would tell the BoJ that massive monetary easing was needed, only for the BoJ
to turn around and say that the MoF needed to stop financing the construction
of bridges that went from nowhere to nowhere. And as the infighting ensued,
the Japanese banking system wrote off its entire capital base not once, but
twice, over the course of the decade. Meanwhile investors shied away from all
asset classes save the highest quality government bonds.
Could the same thing unfold in Europe? In Japan, there were only three sets
of players (the BoJ, the MoF and the LDP) and over fifteen years, they could
not seem to get the three-step plan (currency devaluation, bank recap, steep
yield curve) right. In that regards, when considering the numbers of players
involved in Europe, one may fear that the same policy paralysis could easily
grip Europe. And, in this case, the recent break-out in the spreads that has
now started will prove to have marked the start of a revolutionary trend for
our financial markets: the end of the convergence trades and the start of the
divergence trades.
A few years before his death, Professor Milton Friedman declared: "It seems
to me that Europe, especially with the addition of more countries, is becoming
ever-more susceptible to any asymmetric shock. Sooner or later, when the
global economy hits a real bump, Europe's internal contradictions will tear
it apart." Today, one should question whether the "real bump" is being
hit and whether Milton Friedman will end up being proven right. But regardless
of where one falls on the answers to these questions, one thing is sure:
selling the bonds of Europe's weakest signatures and buying protection on
Europe's weaker banks continues to make sense. It is some of the cheapest
protection available against what remains a massive "fat- tail" risk to our
financial systems. That's why we love this trade so much: the potential rewards
are huge and the upfront costs still marginal. More importantly, it is a
very good hedge against what would be a nightmare scenario for many financial
institutions.
A Final Thought
In the next chapter of A Roadmap for Troubled Times, Louis goes into detail
into how Italy might be the country to push the European Central Bank to take
steps it might not otherwise want to take. Again, I
strongly suggest you get the book. It is very thought-provoking and one
of the better reads that I have had this year.
Laguna Beach, Montreal and Las Vegas
I leave with my daughter and partner Tiffani to fly to Laguna Beach in about
an hour to be with Rob Arnott at his annual Research Affiliates Symposium and
party. Rob arranges for some of the brighter economic minds in the country
to give presentations. Harry Markowitz, Burton Malkiel, Peter Bernstein, Paul
McCulley and Jack Treynor, among others. On Saturday evening, my good friends
Vernor Vinge and David Brin, who have both won every award you can win in Science
Fiction several times over, as well as being in the science Fiction Hall of
Fame, will regale us with their views of what the future will look like. I
get to moderate that event, and I am looking forward to it.
I fly to Montreal in a few weeks to speak for a conference put on by Canaccord
and will get to have dinner with Martin Barnes and Pierre Casgrain. And then
I will fly to Las Vegas July 10-12 for the annual Freedom Fest Conference where
I will speak several times, but the line-up of speakers is as strong as any
conference I have been to. Denish D'Souza will debate Christopher Hitchens,
Steve Forbes, Ron Paul, Stephen Moore (Wall Street Journal) Charles Murray,
George Gilder, John Goodman and about 100 other speakers, each impressive in
their own right, will be there as will 1,000 freedom loving attendees. You
can go to www.freedomfest.com and
click on the list of speakers and register. Mark Skousen is the driving force
behind the conference, and he does it right. I hope to see you there.
This will be a good weekend, as the food is always great and the intellectual
stimulation is better. But the best part is being with friends and enjoying
it together. Have a great week.
Your having more fun than ever analyst,
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