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After suffering through the biggest stock market correction since the 1930s,
many are wondering if the market - that great discounting mechanism - foresees
depression in 2009.
The thinking behind this interpretation of the 45% correction is that the
stock market envisions a collapse in GDP and the biggest downturn in consumer
spending of the current generation. Could the bear market of 2008 in fact be
warning us of economic gloom next year? Is the U.S. destined to start the path,
in the words of one widely followed observer, to becoming a Third World country
in 2009?
To answer these questions we must forsake conventional wisdom and put all
emotions and personal biases aside. We must remember the words of Plutarch,
who reminds us that "so incapable is human [emotion] of keeping any bounds...but
moderation is best, and to avoid all extremes." Indeed, this discussion requires
the utmost in sagacity and political neutrality, which admittedly is hard to
affect in the prevailing climate of doom and gloom. We'll need to place all
rhetoric aside as we carefully seek to answer this profoundly important question.
Let's begin with the observation that it's generally difficult, if not impossible,
to predict a recession using traditional economic indicators. This refers to
the statistics provided by the government. The reason for this is that the
data are telling you what happened in the distant past and is by definition
a lagging indicator, sometimes with no bearing on the distant future. Any attempt
at economic forecasting using the government's statistics is merely an exercise
in linear extrapolation. In order for an economic forecast to be valid, it
must be based on leading indicators, none of which are to be procured from
the offices of government.
Probably the best leading indicator available for predicting the future state
of the business climate are the cycles. The market cycles are the lens through
which the market typically discounts changes in economic activity some 6-9
months in advance. The market, with its millions of participants, many of whom
have a vested interest in the affairs of the nation and a stake in business,
are in a position to know the business outlook better than even the economists.
These vested interests register their inside knowledge of the business outlook
in the form of votes, either by buying or selling stocks. Changes in the demand
for equities is largely a consequence of tight or loose money, which in turn
is largely governed by cyclical forces.
The sustained selling pressure in equities this year was a consequence of
tight money. Besides being the bane and scourge of stock investors, tight money
is also a harbinger of diminished business activity. Liquidity is the lifeblood
of the markets and with tight money come lower stock and commodity prices and
eventually, diminished economic activity. Thus changes in the financial market
usually precede the economy in heading into a slump since these prices are
more liquidity sensitive and are the first to experience the results of major
shifts in money supply.
Now before we go any further, let's take a moment to remind ourselves that
as forecasting tools go, technical market analysis has a limited scope. It
can't be used to predict the long-term market outlook (contrary to the assertions
of some of its practitioners), but is much more suited to the short-term outlook
for stocks. Nor is fundamental analysis of any use here. To get a picture,
albeit a hazy one, of the distant economic picture we must resort to the yearly
cycles.
The last time the U.S. saw a comparable period in its history was during the
stormy final years of the nineteenth century, which happened to coincide (and
was in no small measure attributable to) the bottoming of the previous Kress
120-year cycle. It would therefore do us well to study closely this epic cycle,
as well as the literature and economic history of the previous 120-year cycle
bottom. The past contains many portents for the future.
This epic cycle last bottomed in 1894. What were the economic conditions leading
into that fateful year? In the wake of the Panic of 1893, here's what one contemporary
newspaper chronicler said of the event: "Never before has there been such a
sudden and shaking cessation of industrial activity. Mills, factories, furnaces,
mines nearly everywhere shut down in large numbers....Hundreds of thousands
of men thrown out of employment." According to H.W. Brands in his book, "The
Money Men," many feared general unrest and even civil war. "In no civilized
country in this century, not actually in the throes of war or open insurrection,
has society been so disorganized as it was in the United States during the
first half of 1894," wrote on editor quoted by Brands. "Never was human life
held so cheap. Never did the constituted authority appear so incompetent to
enforce respect for law."
The present 120-year cycle won't bottom until 2014. Could we be on the verge
of an early onset of a depression similar to the one which gripped the U.S.
in the 1890s? Will modern day America witness another massive deterioration
in civil institutions and personal conduct among citizens? Can we expect riots,
revolutions and industrial revolts just ahead?
Perhaps what we need right now to provide answers to the pressing economic
questions of the times is another "Coin." No, I'm not referring to a new monetary
unit but rather to a person. Back in 1893 this unknown financier made his appearance
in Chicago and took the Windy City by storm. Coin was a boyish looking little
man with a big knowledge of finance and monetary matters. Coin set up a financial
school at the Chicago Art Institute on May 7, 1894 and opened it free to the
public. The school was especially geared toward the young men of the city who
had an interest in the economic affairs of the nation and who would one day
be its leaders.
Coin's amazing knowledge of monetary affairs was soon the talk of the town
and he quickly gained a following as he consistently packed the lecture hall
of his "school" with the leading money men and citizens of Chicago, all of
whom came to hear Coin's ethereal wisdom on the money question. Some of the
older men in his audience were opponents of his monetary views and attended
in hopes of tripping up the little financier during his lectures and putting
him to shame. But Coin answered every one of their questions and objections
with perfect poise and equanimity, silencing his critics and shaming all his
detractors.
Coin was engaged in advancing a popular monetary position through his school,
which at that time was a major point of contention among the rich, namely,
the bi-metallic standard. Silver had been demonetized in 1873 (the "Crime of
'73" as Coin called it) and the gold standard reigned supreme. Coin blamed
the deflation of the 1880s and '90s, as well as the depression of the early
1890s, on the tight money condition that silver demonetization had created.
In many ways, Coin's time wasn't unlike ours.
"Give the people back their favored primary money," Coin thundered from his
platform. "Give us two arms with which to transact business! Silver the right
arm, and gold the left arm! Silver the money of the people, and gold the money
of the rich. Stop this legalized robbery that is transferring the property
of the debtors to the possession of the creditors!" Coin believed that if silver
was remonetized, the economy would be restored to its former glory as both
prices and wages advanced.
"Citizens! The integrity of the government has been violated. A financial
trust has control of your money, and with it is robbing you of your property.
Vampires feed upon your commercial blood....Oppression now seek to enslave
this fair land. Its name is greed...This is a struggle for humanity - for our
homes and firesides, for the purity and integrity of our government."
With every sentence the young financier uttered, the audience cheered enthusiastically.
Coin's monetary position to free silver was the soul of a heartfelt belief
that the demonetization of silver represented a major constriction of the nation's
money supply, and hence, a decline in productive output. At his Financial School
lectures, Coin eloquently proved his proposition and backed up his claims with
myriad statistics and ironclad logic. Among his attendees were the most famous
money men of the day, including economic professors, Wall Street operators,
bankers and Congressmen. As supporters of tight money, they all tried to deflate
Coin's arguments but each one was shot down in his turn by the able little
financier.
Addressing the major economic concern of his day, Coin had this to say about
the deflationary depression of the 1890s: "During these years, all property
gradually declined in value as compared with gold [the money standard of that
time]. The decline was painfully steady. These conditions caused new debts
to be contracted to pay old debts, and the volume of new debts were rapidly
augmented. Those who could make nothing in their business borrowed money on
their property to go into new ventures, and to meet their living expenses.
Old debts were refunded. Falling prices continued, and borrowing continued
until the spring of 1893, when [debt] had grown enormously."
Coin proclaimed, "The history of nations shows that when the debts of a country
are two-thirds of the value of all its property, disintegration sets in: strikes,
riots, revolution, provisional governments, as with our neighbors in South
America at the present time.
"'Ah!' you may say, "Everybody is not in debt; one-half of the people may
be, but let them liquidate and start over, then times will be good.' But everybody,
except the money lender, is in debt. Your city is in debt twenty million, and
you owe your part of it. Your country is in debt. Your state is in debt. Your
general government is in debt. You are paying your part of the interest on
all that; and your taxes in this city at the rate of 8 percent on the assess
valuation is evidence that you are all in debt. Those who are personally in
debt will only become bankrupt the sooner."
The lectures that Coin delivered at his Financial School were a resounding
success and he was given "the biggest ovation ever seen in the city of Chicago,
before or since" for his advocacy of monetary stimulus to combat the depression
of the 1890s. We are told moreover that the audience greatly anticipated an
encore performance from the brilliant financier.
An encore wasn't likely to happen, however, since the first performance never
even took place. Coin was actually the fictional creation of one William H.
Harvey, a die-hard silver standard advocate and a one-time presidential candidate.
The book was written in dialogue form as if Coin was a real person and was
heavily illustrated with cartoons to emphasize his points. "Coin's Financial
School" was one of the best selling books in the early-to-mid 1890s and serves
today as a representative of the deflationary literature of last century's
120-year cycle bottom.
"Coin" Harvey's solution for ending the depression of the 1890s was to remonetize
silver, which was a 19th century argument for increasing the supply of money.
Diminished money supply, Coin argued, played a big part in bringing about the
deflation of those days. And so it is in our day as years of declining money
supply - a veritable bloodletting of our economic vitality - has fostered conditions
that could well end in depression if not dealt with properly.
Returning to our original subject of what of the year-ahead economic outlook,
does 2009 hold forth the possibility of some measure of economic recovery and
stability? Or is it fated to witness a deterioration of business activity to
the point of bringing on a general depression - a depression comparable to
the one of the 1890s? To answer this question we must once again turn to the
Kress cycles.
The yearly Kress cycle configuration for 2008 showed the 6-year cycle bottoming
in October. It wasn't the 6-year cycle alone that contributed to the chaos
of this year; clearly it was a confluence of factors involving the credit crunch
(a consequence of tight money), historic fear and panic among investors and
the attending hedge fund/mutual fund liquidation. The 6-year cycle was leaning
heavily on the financial markets this year until its October bottom. (There
is yet one more significant Kress cycle bottom that must be reconciled before
this year is over but we'll address that in the next installment). Once we
get past the composite weekly cycle bottom in December, the market will finally
have some cyclical "tail winds" instead of harsh head winds. In 2009 the 6-year
cycle will be in the ascending phase, the 10-year cycle will be peaking and
the composite weekly cycle won't be a negative factor.
The final "hard down" phase of the 120-year cycle doesn't begin until after
2010. That should give us at least two more years to prepare before we must
face the harsh headwinds of this powerful cycle. The cycle winds won't be as
harsh in 2009 as they were in 2008 and this should relieve a lot of pressure
from equities, allowing for some significant decompression for it as well as
for the economy. With the 6-year and 10-year cycles up, history shows that
this cyclical configuration is benevolent for the economy if money supply is
increasing. With the bailout efforts of the past few months taking full effect
in 2009 this should mean the U.S. dodges the depression bullet next year.
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