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Talk to the City Monetary Group.
I am expecting something of a revolution, over the next few years, in the
assumptions that are made about the returns on equity investment. The results
of this will, I assume, have a major impact on share prices. They are currently
extremely over-priced and this has always been followed, in the past, by a
period of marked under-pricing. A revolution in pension fund policy has a high
chance of being the key transmission mechanism this time around.
It has been the habit of pension consultants to estimate the required rate
of pension fund contributions by reference to the returns they expect on equity
investment. There are, as I see it, two problems with this. First they don't
need to and shouldn't do it and secondly they have done it almost unbelievably
badly.
Unless the consultants' reports that I have encountered are all exceptional,
the typical approach of pensions' consultants has been to misuse the Dividend
Discount Model, by assuming that dividends per share grow in line with GDP.
It follows that the expected return on equities is then, more or less, the
sum of the current dividend yield plus the assumed growth of GDP.
There is absolutely no justification whatever for doing this, as even the
smallest acquaintance with history will show. Over the past 100 years UK dividends
per share have grown at 0.4% p.a. and US ones at 0.6% p.a. (The US divergence
is illustrated in Chart 1.)
The way that dividends have grown more slowly than GDP is not just a feature
of the UK and US markets but is, as Table 1 shows, general.
| Table 1. Dividend Growth (Source: Triumph of the Optimists.) |
| |
Real dividend growth % p.a. |
Total GDP growth % p.a. |
Dividend growth minus GDP growth |
| Ireland |
-0.80 |
2.17 |
-2.97 |
| France |
-1.10 |
2.38 |
-3.48 |
| Belgium |
-1.70 |
2.42 |
-4.12 |
| UK |
0.40 |
2.23 |
-1.83 |
| US |
0.60 |
3.11 |
-2.51 |
| Australia |
0.90 |
3.36 |
-2.46 |
| Canada |
1.50 |
3.56 |
-2.06 |
| South Africa |
0.30 |
3.55 |
-3.25 |
It is also a myth to believe that the failure of dividends to grow in line
with GDP is the result of a change in policy whereby buy-backs have replaced
dividends as the preferred way of distributing returns to shareholders. This
can be seen in Chart 2, which shows "cash flow" dividends, which are the total
cash paid out to shareholders including money from buy-backs and takeovers,
net of new issues.
The fact that equity returns have been badly forecast does not mean that the
job is impossible. A rational approach to forecasting equity returns is possible,
provided that three basic points are understood:-
• Equities appear to give a stable long-term real return of around
5.5 to 6.5%, before expenses.
• Values are mean reverting, so that real returns exhibit negative
serial correlation. It is thus incorrect to assume that this rate of 5.5
to 6.5% will be the return on equities bought today. Even over the very long-term
the current value of the stock market will affect the return.
• The volatility of returns is high, even over long periods.
If these points were understood, the current forecasts being made for equity
returns would be very low indeed and companies with large pension deficits
would be downgraded by credit agencies far more fiercely than is currently
the case.
Chart 3 shows one way of illustrating the fact that equity returns exhibit
negative serial correlation. If they did not, their long-term volatility would
be determined by their short-term volatility. It isn't. Equity investment is
much less risky than it would be if returns followed a random walk.
An element of predictability is the counterpart of this comparative safety,
as both points arise from the mean reversion. If returns followed a random
walk, then the most probable return in the future would simply be the past
long-term return. As it is, the most probable return is a function of both
the long-term return and the extent to which medium-term returns have diverged
from the long-term: in other words, the extent to which shares are currently
over- or under-valued.
The high probability of poor equity returns in the future is illustrated by
Chart 4. Even today, after the market is 40% or so off its peak, the returns
for investors who have owned stock for the previous 10 to 30 years, have been
way above average.
There are two fundamental ways in which the value of equities can be approached
based on two basic points about them.
• Equities are financial assets. Their value must therefore represent
the present, i.e. discounted, value of all future economic benefits that their
owners will receive.
• Equities represent a title to the ownership of real assets. As long
as the economy is reasonably competitive the value of these assets cannot for
long deviate from the cost of their production.
If we assume that the stability of real returns shown in the past will continue,
then we know that the long-term P/E will remain around its average. Provided
we adjust current profits to their cyclical level using, for example, Professor
Shiller's approach of averaging 10 year data, we can then use P/Es to value
the stock market.
The fact that equities are financial assets thus leads to the cyclically adjusted
P/E; while the "q" ratio of course follows from the fact that shares represent
real assets.
These possible approaches can then be tested. The resulting values must be
mean reverting and the reversion must be "Granger Caused" by changes in share
prices rather than by changes in net worth at replacement cost or earnings.
Both q and the cyclically adjusted P/E meet these tests. Valid measures must
also of course produce consistent answers. Chart 5 shows they do and that the
US market today is more than 60% over-valued.

Armed with this information, the most likely returns in the future can be
calculated. For example a market which is over-valued by 60% and has a long-term
real return of 6.5% will give an expected future return of around 4%, before
expenses, if you have an infinite time horizon and will most likely produce
a negative real return over the next 7 years.
The same approach to the UK stock market produces similar answers. The data
are not so good, so there is more doubt about the answer, but they suggest
that the London stock market is at least 40% over-valued. Again we get consistent
answers by either using the cyclically adjusted P/E or q, as shown in Chart
6.
The volatility of markets is such that the actual result is likely to differ
quite a lot, even over 7 years, from the most probable return. But the chances
of doing even worse are equal to those of doing better.
Investing in an over-valued stock market has many similarities with playing
roulette. The chances of making money in the short-term are not far from evens,
but the longer you play, the more certain you are to do badly.
One difference is that when roulette analysts correctly forecast a spin of
the wheel, they are not subsequently applauded for their judgment.
The prospect of poor returns is not the only or even yet the main reason why
fashion seems to be turning against holding equities in pension funds. Changes
in tax and accountancy are also having their impact.
| Table 2. The Consequences of Putting Pension Risks on Balance
Sheet. |
| |
Current Position |
Future Position |
| Equity of companies in issue |
100 |
70 |
| o/w owned by pension funds |
30 |
0 |
| Debt issued by companies |
100 |
130 |
| Profits before tax and interest |
13.0 |
13.0 |
| Interest expense 4% p.a. |
4.0 |
5.2 |
| Profits after interest |
9.0 |
7.8 |
| Tax at 33% |
3.0 |
2.6 |
| Profits after tax |
6.0 |
5.2 |
| EPS |
0.6 |
0.75 |
Sponsoring companies must see that promised pensions are paid and these promises
do not vary with the return achieved by the pension fund. Investing in equities
is thus a form of gearing, but it's a most inefficient one in terms of tax.
If companies invested in debt assets in their pension funds, they would reduce
their leverage. They could replace it by putting the debt on their balance
sheet. The net effect, shown in Table 2, would have great tax benefits.
The tax benefit is not the only difference. The systematic risk of having
pension funds invest in equities is more or less the same as having the pension
funds invest in debt assets while sponsoring companies leverage their balance
sheets. Fund managers, who have diversified portfolios, should thus welcome
the change. Companies' management, faced with increases in specific risk, may
feel differently. It seems to me, however, that they are already at least adequately
rewarded.
Another important change is likely to be in accounting. There is growing recognition
that companies take much or all of the equity risk that arises from having
a defined benefits pension scheme. As the results of such risk-taking are shown
annually in company results, the appetite for it will sicken.
As I know from personal experience, the assumption that equities will give
better returns than debt has led some pension consultants to require lower
contributions to funds that run the highest risks. When the FTSE 100 was at
6,000 I insisted that the company of which I was then Chairman should recommend
to the Trustees of its Pension Fund that they sold all the shares in the portfolio.
We eventually got out at 5,400 rather than 6,000 because, according to the
company secretary, the pension consultants threatened to require an increase
in the rate of funding "to compensate for the lower returns than would come
from being out of equities."
This type of lunacy will, I feel sure, have fewer adherents as accountancy
rules improve.
If markets were fairly valued it would be reasonable to expect equities to
give good returns. It is equally reasonable to assume that companies will,
in the operation of their own businesses, be rewarded for taking risk. It is
not, however, sensible to book the assumed profits from risk-taking either
in companies or pension funds before they have been earned.
Accounting rules should change and I think a change is likely. In time, the
same principles will apply to returns from risk taken off balance sheet, as
are currently applied to those taken on it.
At the moment, CEOs are encouraged to take risks with pension fund investment
because the assumed benefits of higher returns come as lower costs today. In
addition, they can reasonably hope that if the benefits do not arise, then
it will be their successors who have to deal with the situation.
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