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As Obama assumed the presidency an economic broadside was fired across his
bow when the financial markets plunged to new lows. The banks remain in a parlous
state and unemployment is still rising. Economist Nouriel Roubini said that
if the banking system's losses hit $3.6 trillion -- as expected by quite a
few financial observers -- then the "the US banking system is effectively
insolvent because it starts with a capital of $1.4 trillion."
What Mr Roubini overlooked is that a fractional reserve banking system is
always insolvent. This was known from the very beginning of fractional reserve
banking. The system rests on the belief that withdrawals will never reach a
point where the banks cannot meet them. In other words withdrawals will always
be a fraction of the banking system's reserves. In short, banks can never meet
their liabilities in full. This is all well and good -- from the banker's position
-- unless a financial crisis causes a run.
During the 1920s bank failures averaged about 600 a year1. In 1930 there were
1,350 failures. The following figures are for 1931, 1932, 1933: 2,290, 1,460,
4,000. There were about 29,000 banks in 1929. In 1933 there were less than
15,000. From 1929 to 1932 the money supply plunged by about 33 per cent and
wholesale prices by 40 per cent. (During the 1920-21 financial crisis wholesale
prices dropped by 45 per cent).
A little history can certainly go along way to putting the present crisis
in perspective. Nevertheless, things are still grim. The basic problem is that
the monetary lesson of the 1920s and the 1930s was never learnt. Instead the
fallacy that the real problem was that the fed failed to halt the deflation
by pumping out enough money is now the received wisdom. However, the real lesson
is that it was the fed's loose monetary policy during the 1920s that brought
on the depression.
It is forever being overlooked that manufacturing -- a leading indicator of
recession -- was already contracting by at least July 1929. During the extremely
severe 1920-21 crisis the US experienced the most rapid deflation in its history
with wholesale pricing diving by 45 per cent and physical production falling
from 124.5 in 1920 to 103.9 in 1921. By late 1921 the economy was on the road
to recovery. So why didn't this process repeat itself during the 1930s? Because
for the first time in its history politicians decided that they would bring
about recovery and prosperity. The result was the Great Depression.
Although the banking situation is not as dire as 1930 things are still pretty
bad. Krugman, for instance, seems to be on the verge of panic, stating that
the "recent economic numbers have been terrifying". Interesting enough he notes
that "Manufacturing, in particular, is plunging everywhere" (Paul Krugman, Fighting
Off Depression, The New Times, 4 January 2009).
But the Austrian school is forever pointing out that a chief characteristic
of the so-called trade cycle is that manufacturing -- particularly the capital
goods industries -- is always the first to be hit. This needs to be stressed
because Krugman is complaining that "consumers aren't spending". But in this
kind of situation, raising consumer spending would prolong the recession, not
shorten it. And there is no point in whining about business not spending when
Obama has added considerably to economic uncertainty with his statements about
taxes and government spending.
Krugman referred -- as have many others -- to Friedman's opinion that the
Fed could have stopped "the Depression in its tracks simply by providing banks
with more liquidity". He then rightly observes that it doesn't appear that
simple -- which it most certainly isn't -- by pointing out that the
Fed has been supplying liquidity like an engine crew trying to put out a
five-alarm fire, and the money supply has been rising rapidly. Yet credit
remains scarce, and the economy is still in free fall.
In Krugman's tidy economic universe -- which exists only in theory -- this
shouldn't be happening. Therefore his solution is to urge Obama to spend and
spend. What the likes of Krugman ignore is that the previous monetary expansion
has created enormous financial and physical imbalances in the economy that
need to be liquidated if there is to be a sustained recovery. Using monetary
expansion to maintain the existence of these imbalances (malinvestments) will
create an enormous drag on the economy.
Austrians have tried to get across that because capital is a heterogeneous
structure and not a homogeneous self-perpetuating fund repetitive attempts
to rescue an economy from the trade cycle by continuing to expand the money
supply must result in ever increasing amounts of money being injected into
the economy because each recession will require a greater amount of monetary
expansion to overcome the malinvestments. If this is correct then monetary
figures will confirm it, which is exactly what the following chart does.

The Ludwig
von Mises Institute. The upper line represents the Austrian Money Supply
(AMS) or the Rothbard Money Supply and the True Money Supply, while the
lower line represents M1. The benefits of AMS over conventional measures
calculated by the Federal Reserve are that it counts only immediately available
money for exchange and does not double count. It consists of the following:
Currency Component of M1, Total Checkable Deposits, Savings Deposits, U.S.
Government Demand Deposits and Note Balances, Demand Deposits Due to Foreign
Commercial Banks, and Demand Deposits Due to Foreign Official Institutions.
[Savings accounts are a matter of dispute. I am inclined to omit them on
the grounds that they are almost immediately loaned out and do not add
to the money supply in the same that checkable deposits do. In other words,
they are straightforward credit transactions].
We can see that while it took from 1958 to 1982 -- 24 years -- for the money
supply to double it doubled again from 1998 to 2008, a period of 10 years.
The result has to be a severe fall in purchasing power and recurring current
account problems. Using the Fed's inflation
calculator we find that an item that cost a dollar in 1958 would
cost $7.27 in 2008, a 627.4 per cent increase which amounts a fall in purchasing
power of about 76 per cent. Once the fed has to keep accelerating monetary
expansion to stimulate output we should expect current account deficit problems
to develop with the trade balance continually blowing out. This is what the
chart below indicates2.
Trade Balance (export-imports)as
a percentage of GDP
1960 through the third quarter of 2000

Whichever way we turn we are confronted with bad monetary policy based on
the fallacy of the stable price level and the neutrality of money myth. None
of this is ever likely to take root with Krugman who thinks we are facing "a
second Great Depression". Nor are we going to get an honest debate on this
matter from the Obamatised media who will do all in their power to blame everything
on Bush. (The other problem is that great majority of journalists are ignorant,
politically bigoted and pretty dense with it).
I fear that Obama and his cronies see the present crisis as a heaven sent
opportunity to make irreversible changes to the American economy and the body
politic. As he himself said: "I won". Indeed he did. However, he seems to have
forgotten that America elects presidents not dictators and that is why the
Founding Fathers invented a system of checks and balances, the system that
the Democratic Party has spent decades trying to dismantle.
But there are economic laws, the defiance of which can have tragic consequences,
something to which the Great Depression testifies. Although I do not believe
for one moment that America is on the brink of another 1930s economic catastrophe
I do believe that Obama's ideologically motivated economic impulses will have
serious consequences if they are not checked, which does not appear likely
at this stage.
My prediction is that the US faces a massive surge in inflation and a run
on the dollar if the fed insists on flooding the banks with monopoly money
and underwriting Obama's economic illiteracy with colossal checks funded with
credit expansion.
The ancient Greeks had a wonderful word for people like Obama, a word for
which there is no English equivalent: Hubris.
1. Most of the banks that failed were small undercapitalized
enterprises serving rural areas. I very much doubt that there would have been
many failures if congress had not made branch banking illegal. It's a little
known fact that during the Great Depression not a single Canadian bank went
under. The Canadian system was based on the British bank branching system.
2. I do not want to give the impression that trade deficits are
bad in themselves. They are not. In a world governned by sound money principles
there would never be any need to worry about current account deficits or the
state of the balance of payments. However, in world based on paper money that
is moored to nothing but the discretion of central bankers trade deficits can
become symptoms of a severe monetary disorder.
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