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Below is an excerpt from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on
15th March 2009.
One of the arguments regularly made to support the claim that deflation is
underway goes like this: "While the supply of money is expanding rapidly, the
amount of additional money created is miniscule compared to the reduction in
the market value of assets." In our opinion, this is not a valid argument.
The amount of new money created over the past year is certainly dwarfed by
the reductions in market values, but a rise in market value does not constitute
inflation and a fall in market value does not constitute deflation. Rises and
falls in market value can be effects of inflation and deflation, but only in
those cases when they are rising/falling in response to changes in the total
supply of money. In particular, if asset prices are plunging and the money
supply is rising at an accelerating pace then we know that something other
than deflation is causing the price change.
Just to be clear, even though the money supply is inflating we accept that
the current situation looks and feels as if deflation were occurring. A situation
such as this, which is characterised by rapid monetary inflation in parallel
with the superficial appearance of deflation and rising fear of deflation,
is what we refer to as a "deflation scare". Under the current monetary/political
system deflation scares happen periodically because the combination of falling
asset prices and economic weakness prompts the government and the central bank
to implement counter-measures, including the borrowing into existence of a
lot more money.
Are we just splitting hairs? After all, if it looks and feels like deflation
shouldn't we just say that deflation is occurring and have done with it?
Well, if your investment timeframe is 12 months or less then any difference
between genuine deflation and a deflation scare will probably be immaterial,
but if your goal is to understand the longer-term risk/reward balances for
the various investment alternatives then the difference isn't just academic.
The reason is that every large and sustained money-supply increase in history
has led to significantly higher prices somewhere in the economy. At least,
we aren't aware of any exceptions. Even during the Great Depression of the
1930s prices stopped falling and began to rise after the money supply started
to trend upward in 1933, despite the fact that there were no meaningful increases
in private sector debt and bank lending (the total amount of private sector
credit fell during the early 1930s and was then essentially stagnant until
1945). As is the case today, banks during the 1930s accumulated reserves but
did not loan these additional reserves into the economy. And as is also the
case today, the government from 1932 onwards borrowed so much new money into
existence that prices began to rise even though private sector credit was stagnant.
Another way of stating the above is that a motivated government will always
be able to reduce the purchasing power of a paper currency because the government's
ability to create additional currency supply is, for all intents and purposes,
unlimited. And no one can accuse today's US Government -- and most other governments,
for that matter -- of not being "motivated". (Side bar: Japanese officialdom
didn't increase the broad supply of Yen to a meaningful extent during the years
following the bursting of Japan's credit bubble, which is why Yen-denominated
prices maintained their downward drift).
On a related matter, we feel the need to address some comments made by Mike "Mish" Shedlock
in a discussion
posted at his web site a few weeks ago, because these comments do not accurately
represent our views. In the article of ours that Mish was commenting on we
said "a lot of confusion on the inflation/deflation issue is caused by the
lengthy and variable time delays between changes in the monetary trend and
changes in prices." Mish responded: "Another way of phrasing Saville's
theory is that growth in credit (and prices) follows the creation of money,
with a lag. This is the money multiplier model." By drawing from an essay
written by Steve Keen titled "The
Roving Cavaliers of Credit" Mish then goes on to explain that increases
in "base money" (the fiat currency created by the Fed) generally follow, rather
than lead, increases in credit money.
That's all well and good, except that we were NOT referring to the "money
multiplier model". Furthermore, when we talk about time delays between changes
in the monetary trend and changes in price we are not talking about "base money".
We showed a chart of the monetary base in the article that Mish was commenting
on, but only to make the point that the Fed's response to last year's asset
price crash was very different from its response to the 1929 crash.
Our preferred measure of money supply is TMS (True Money Supply), a monetary
aggregate developed by Murray Rothbard and Joseph Salerno. TMS includes currency
in circulation, demand deposits and savings deposits. It does not include money
held in reserve at the Fed, or, for that matter, time deposits and money-market
funds.
According to the money multiplier model, "base money" is created by the central
bank and then multiplied, through fractional reserve lending, by commercial
banks. We are in agreement with Steve Keen that this is not the way today's
system usually operates. Rather, the private banks usually create additional
credit money (savings deposits, primarily) and the central bank later responds
by adjusting base money to maintain a targeted short-term interest rate. This
is why, when analysing the monetary situation, we don't automatically assume
that bank reserves will be loaned into the economy. It is a virtual certainty
that excess reserves will eventually be loaned into the economy, but there
is no telling how long it will take for that to happen. We therefore don't
count bank reserves as part of the money supply.
The point we were trying to make, as opposed to the point that Mish argued
against, is that major financial-market and economic trend changes can often
be explained by the preceding major trend changes in TMS. For example, the
major upward trend in TMS that extended from the mid 1990s through to around
2004 explains the tech/internet boom and the housing market boom that followed
it (TMS's 'correction' during 1999-2000 preceded the end of the first of these
booms), while the downward trend in TMS that extended from 2004 through to
2007 explains the housing-market bust and its knock-on effects. Due to the
lengthy and variable time delays involved, as well as the impossibility of
knowing in advance exactly how changes in the monetary trend will affect different
markets and economic sectors, the relationship between the monetary trend and
prices is not the "Holy Grail" of the investment world. However, it is certainly
possible to understand what's going on right now without kidding yourself that
deflation is happening.
The following chart shows that TMS is currently about 10% higher than it was
at this time last year. In other words, there is about 10% more money in the
US economy today than there was 12 months ago (EXCLUDING the huge build-up
of reserves at the Fed). Interestingly, the latest "Flow of Funds" report produced
by the US Federal Reserve shows that the total supply of credit within the
US economy is also still expanding (refer to Doug Noland's latest Credit
Bubble Bulletin for analysis of the Q4-2008 "Flow of Funds" report). In
other words, the total supplies of both money and credit are expanding.

The supply of money has grown rapidly over the past 12 months and the supply
of credit has continued its expansion despite what has happened to the banking
system and private borrowers, for the same reason as in 1933-1945: increased
borrowing by government and government-sponsored agencies. In a horribly
misguided attempt to stimulate the economy the government is now borrowing
new money into existence at a fast enough pace to more than offset the retrenchment
in the private sector. The private sector credit bubble has burst, but it is
being replaced by a public sector credit bubble.
It can, of course, be argued that the total supply of money and credit would
appear to be falling if the value of all outstanding credit were marked to
market. This is an argument that can be neither proved nor disproved because
the total market value of all outstanding credit is unknown. Moreover, we don't
see a good reason to invent new and imaginative ways of defining inflation/deflation
when the classic definition (a rise/fall in the total supply of money) continues
to serve its purpose. As an aside, the reason that some analysts wrongly thought
that an inflation problem was imminent during the first half of last year is
that they were, in most cases, using M3 as their preferred measure of money
supply. M3 has a history of giving 'major league' false signals at important
monetary turning points.
The bottom line is that an inflation problem is in the works unless this time
proves to be different from every other time throughout history when the money
supply rose rapidly over an extended period. Due to the typical delays between
changes in money supply and changes in prices we doubt that the inflation problem
will bubble to the surface this year, but it will probably begin to make its
presence felt during 2010.
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