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Today, the Administration is sharing its vision for the future of the financial
system. To us, it seems more like a job creation program for Lawrence Summers,
the Director of the White House's National Economic Council. It's long been
rumored that he wants the top job at the Federal Reserve (Fed) should Fed Chief
Bernanke's term not be renewed in early 2010. Summers, a former Treasury Secretary,
and known for his hands-on, at times confrontational approach, seems an odd
fit for what is traditionally a job for calmer spirits. The proposed overhaul
of the financial system sheds light on this: the Fed may be converted into
the nation's top regulator. Naturally, it will then require someone with executive
experience; a prerequisite Lawrence fulfills well and who other than Lawrence
Summers should be taking this job? We respect Mr. Summers, but should the most
important reform of the financial system in 80 years be designed around one
person?
We are most concerned that reform efforts are shooting in the wrong direction.
Most notably, we are concerned about the independence of the Fed. Traditionally,
while the Fed has an important regulatory function, it is primarily concerned
with its dual mandate of price stability and maximum sustainable growth. It
traditionally fulfills this function through monetary policy, influencing things
like money supply, interest rates, and the cost and availability of credit.
As part of the financial crisis, the Fed has veered into fiscal policy, providing
credit to specific sectors of the economy; Bernanke calls these activities credit
easing. By providing specific funding for mortgages, credit card portfolios
and car loans, amongst others, the Fed is deciding on issues that should be
decided by Congress. The Fed has already shown how it completely underestimates
the political repercussions of engaging in such programs, practically with
no oversight. Congress has started to ask tough questions. These questions
are likely to intensify and, in our view, will undermine the credibility and
effectiveness of the Fed. For the Fed, the appropriate way to avoid the political
minefield is to stay out of fiscal policy.
The Fed was never set up to deal with as many programs as it is engaged in
right now. Possibly, the fact that the Fed lost members (banks) in recent decades
as these moved to national charters subject to regulation by the Office of
Thrift Supervision, may have played a role in the Fed's willingness to introduce
programs to increase its influence over financial institutions. The proposed
reforms will rectify that temptation as the Office of Thrift Supervision may
be dissolved.
The proposed reforms are turning the Fed into a regulatory conglomerate. Without
a doubt, the Fed would then be faced with many politically sensitive decisions.
The Fed is setting itself up for failure; the day will come that its decisions
will be questioned.
We welcome a consolidation of regulatory oversight. If policy makers want
to move more power to the Fed, then come up with a structure similar to how
FINRA and the SEC are structured. FINRA, the regulator for brokers, is a self-regulatory
organization that reports to the SEC. Make FINRA report to the Fed if you wish
to tighten the communication channels. Then you don't need to create another
monster infrastructure, topped off by the additional proposed counsel to coordinate
amongst agencies that is to be created; look no further than the Department
of Homeland Security to see what happens when bureaucracies are blown up with
the best of intentions.
There have certainly been regulatory shortfalls in recent years. However,
it is doubtful that they will be addressed by piling on additional regulatory
bodies and further eroding the independence of the Fed further. Some of the
reform proposals are extremely helpful, such as moving derivatives onto regulated
exchanges. The main problem in this and just about any financial crisis in
history has been that too much credit has been available. Let's focus reform
efforts on how to ensure that the availability of credit does not cause systemic
risk. Taking the opposite approach, to limit systemically important financial
institutions from engaging in certain businesses leads to conflicts of interest,
possible corruption and endangers the competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions.
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Axel Merk
Author of Sustainable
Wealth
President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments
This report was prepared by SustainableWealth.org, and reflects the current
opinion of the contributor. It is based upon sources and data believed to be
accurate and reliable. Opinions and forward looking statements expressed are
subject to change without notice. This information does not constitute a solicitation
or an offer to buy or sell any investment product, nor provide investment advice. SustainableWealth.org is a trademark of Merk Investments, LLC.
Copyright © 2009 SustainableWealth.org
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