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Below is an excerpt from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on
19th July 2009.
M3 is sending a false signal, again
During April-June of last year we described the rapid growth in M3 money supply
that was occurring at the time as a "major league false signal". We thought
it was a false signal because it contrasted starkly with the performance of
the monetary aggregate known as TMS (True Money Supply). Whereas TMS was suggesting
that the rate of monetary inflation was relatively slow, and, therefore, that
a deflation scare was a distinct possibility within the ensuing 12 months,
M3 was pointing to an inflationary shock to the system.
M3 and TMS usually trend in the same direction, but on those occasions when
they diverge in a big way -- as they did during 2006-2008 and also during the
early 1990s -- we can safely assume that TMS is providing the more correct
information about what's happening on the monetary inflation front. The reason
is that M3 contains Money Market Funds (MMFs) and Time Deposits (TDs), neither
of which are money*.
We are re-visiting this issue now because another big divergence between M3
and TMS is currently brewing, but whereas last year's divergence encompassed
rapid M3 growth in parallel with slow TMS growth the latest divergence encompasses
the opposite. Specifically, the chart at http://www.nowandfutures.com/key_stats.html shows
that the year-over-year (YOY) M3 growth rate has plunged to around 4% and remains
in a downward trend, while the chart displayed below shows that the YOY TMS
growth rate is high and rising.
The main reason that M3 generated a patently false signal during 2007 and
the first half of 2008 was the moon-shot in Institutional Money Market Funds
that occurred in response to the developing financial crisis and economic downturn.
The main reason it is now generating another false signal is that the amount
of money invested in time deposits has fallen in response to the plunge in
short-term interest rates (the total amount of money in time deposits tends
to follow the short-term interest rate, with rising interest rates prompting
increased demand for time deposits, etc.). In other words, changes in the NON-MONETARY
components of M3 continue to paint a misleading picture.

It may be too soon for the current M3-TMS divergence to have practical investing
implications in that the high rate of TMS growth of the past 9 months probably
won't begin to affect prices until at least the first half of 2010. At this
stage it is just something to keep in mind, especially when analysts begin
citing the slowdown in the pace of M3 growth as evidence of deflation.
*MMFs are investments in interest-bearing securities.
When someone invests in MMF units the investor's money is used by the MMF
to purchase securities from a third party. Money is therefore transferred
from the bank account of the MMF investor to the bank account of whoever
sold the securities to the MMF. Similarly, the sale of MMF units involves
the transfer of money from a third party purchaser of interest-bearing securities
to the former owner of the MMF units. In other words, MMFs are intermediaries
that transfer money between investors; they are not depositories of actual
money. Including MMFs in the money supply would therefore count the same
money twice.
A Time Deposit (TD) is a loan to a bank. In particular, when someone opens
a TD they agree to let the bank have uninterrupted use of their money (they
forego access to their money) for a pre-determined time in exchange for payment
of a certain interest rate. In order to make a profit on this arrangement
the bank will then lend the money to someone else in exchange for the payment
of a higher rate of interest. Therefore, when money is put into a time deposit
it doesn't drop out of the total money supply; rather, it gets shifted from
one of the bank's customers to another. As is the case with MMFs, a monetary
aggregate that counts time deposits in addition to savings and demand deposits
will end up double-counting part of the money supply.
The Japan Inflation Myth
It is commonly believed that Japan's monetary authorities have created a huge
amount of money over the past 18 years in an effort to elevate prices and stimulate
the economy. The fact that the Yen has maintained its purchasing power and
the Japanese economy has remained moribund is therefore considered in some
quarters to be evidence that a high rate of money-supply growth won't lead
to rising prices or meaningful economic growth in a post-bubble world.
Before getting to our main point it is worth noting that nobody with a good
understanding of economics believes that creating money out of nothing can
give the economy a sustainable boost. In fact, the opposite is true. Money
is not wealth and it should be intuitively obvious to anyone with common sense
that creating more pieces of paper money could only damage the economy over
the long-term by distorting prices, re-distributing wealth and prompting additional
mal-investment. In other words, if Japan's monetary authorities had created
a huge amount of new money the end result would NOT be a strong economy.
This brings us to our main point, which is that Japan has experienced relatively
SLOW money-supply growth since the 1990 bursting of its credit bubble. Specifically,
the chart included herewith shows that Japan's year-over-year rate of M2 growth
plunged from 12% to 2% in the immediate aftermath of its credit bubble and
remained in a narrow range around 2% thereafter (note that we using M2 in this
case because we don't have TMS data for Japan).

The idea that Japan attempted to inflate its way out of trouble is therefore
wrong. Japan has experienced very little monetary inflation over the past 18
years, which explains why the Yen has done a reasonable job of maintaining
its purchasing power and also why the Yen has strengthened against the US$
despite the ultra-low interest rates that have characterised Japan for as long
as most of us can remember.
Rather than attempting to 'solve' its problems by promoting rapid monetary
inflation, Japan's Government has relentlessly tried to generate sustainable
growth via massive debt-financed spending on public works. This strategy has
drained much-needed capital from the private sector and consumed it in non-productive
ways, such as in the building of bridges to nowhere. As a consequence, what
would probably have been a severe 2-3 year contraction has been transformed
into a seemingly endless slump that is now into its 19th year.
Japan's sad story has unfolded as predicted by the theories of the great "Austrian" economists,
but the even sadder thing is that the wrongheaded theories of John Keynes,
upon which Japan's policy blunders have been based, are now more popular than
ever. Policy-makers all over the world seem determined to mimic the mistakes
made by their Japanese counterparts on the basis that, to paraphrase Joe Biden
(the US Vice President), governments need to spend like crazy in order to avoid
bankruptcy.
In conclusion, Japan's government has made mistakes that have prevented a
sustained economic recovery from materialising, but the one mistake it hasn't
made to date is to aggressively inflate the currency. Had monetary inflation
been added to the mix then the Japanese people would have been forced to deal
with rising living expenses along with everything else.
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