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"If gold is 'past its day', what of toxic derivatives and today's deluge
of US Treasury bonds...?"
JUST LIKE poor Pip in Dickens' Great Expectations, central banks keep
inheriting unwelcome bequests.
Today's "legacy assets" are toxic derivatives; a decade ago it was gold reserves.
Both are proving hard to shrug off, but for very different reasons. Both legacies
also come thanks to previous central-bank history; the fossils remain only
too livid today.
And 10 years from now, if not sooner, just how welcome the current central-bank
must-have become - freshly printed government debt, bought with money that
doesn't exist until the central bank wills it?
Seeking first to defend against inflation and war, the West's central banks
built up huge reserves of the ultimate hard money - Gold
Bullion - during the early-to-mid 20th century. Long before the turn of
the millennium, however, these hoards grew to look quaint and expensive. Unyielding
and relatively useless to industry, gold simply sat there, down in the vaults,
costing money to store but returning no interest.
Who needed crisis-proof gold when Western Europe (if not the Balkans or Mid-East)
was enjoying its first generation of peace-time in history? And who needed
fine gold when the Nasdaq index of tech stocks was priced for 20% annual earnings
growth over the next decade and more?
In short, who needed gold when we'd got Alan Greenspan, as the New
York Times asked in May 1999. "The argument against retaining gold
is that its day is past," wrote Floyd Norris with uncanny timing, just
two days before Gordon Brown's Treasury announced its ham-fisted sale of
half the UK's gold bullion hoard.
"Once it was useful as a hedge against inflation that would hold its value
when paper currencies did not. Now financial markets have their own sophisticated
ways, using exotic derivative securities, to hedge against inflation."
You could butter your toast with the irony. But it wouldn't taste sweet or
provide much nutrition. Whereas a further glance back at history might.
"With huge gold stocks available for sale, [governments] may discourage excessive
price increases but naturally do nothing to prevent sharp decreases," reported
an investment piece for Medical Economics published in October 1977.
(Our thanks to the author for finding and faxing it to BullionVault this
week.)
"The government specter [over the gold market] can't be expected to disappear
quickly," F.D.Williams continued, some 32 years ago. "Gold will continue to
be part of many national reserves for a long time. The stocks are so large,
they can't all be dumped at once."
Compare and contrast with today's unwanted bequest - those toxic derivatives
the US Treasury chooses to call "legacy assets" as if it played no role at
all in producing them. Unlike state-hoarded gold, it only encouraged their
creation; it didn't want to look after the damn things. And quite unlike the
market for state-hoarded gold, a ready stock of willing mortgage-bond buyers
also looks unlikely to gather.
"The PPIP, which was beset by multiple delays as regulators tried to figure
out the best means of removing many of the troubled assets from banks' books," as
CNN reports, "is still not up and fully running yet." It's not been for lack
of incentives. The $2 trillion Public-Private Investment Partnership, announced
to much fanfare in March, offers huge leverage - entirely at tax-payer expense
- plus some or other hold-to-maturity value to risk-cushioned investors, albeit
as yet unknown. Private investment groups can use up to $1 of non-recourse
loans, plus another dollar of Treasury finance, for every $1 they spend on
taking toxic housing derivatives off the banks' busted balance-sheets. Yet
as a report published this week by the Congressional
Oversight Panel put it:
"Whether the PPIP will jump start the market for troubled securities remains
to be seen. It is also unclear whether the change in accounting rules that
permit banks to carry assets at higher valuations will inhibit banks' willingness
to sell. Similarly, it is unclear whether wariness of political risks will
inhibit the willingness of potential buyers to purchase these assets."
Funnily enough, as the US authorities struggle to sell toxic debt, Western
Europe's Central Bank Gold Agreement has also stalled in 2009. This comes,
however, despite prices and private-investor demand both holding near record
levels. First signed ten years ago this September, back when no one at the New
York Times, Economist, Financial Times or big central banks
could see a use for the metal (simply owning this secure, liquid store of value
is use enough, by the way), the CBGA capped annual gold sales and made them
plain in advance for the coming five years. It aimed to avoid a repeat of May
1999, when the UK Treasury's announcement drove prices down to what then proved
their floor. In contrast to Washington's PPIP, however, central-bank gold sales
weren't arranged in the hope of achieving maximum price, but merely curbing
a rush for the exits instead. And as it is, they needn't have bothered.
Gold Prices have
since risen three-fold and more against all major currencies, even while the
16 signatories to date sold almost one-fifth of their hoard in aggregate. Thus
gold's weighting in their reserves portfolio has doubled regardless, rising
as gold outperformed all other assets from the start of this decade.
Hence the dramatic slowdown in central-bank gold sales since the financial
crisis began in August '07. Because it's tough selling gold when its use becomes
so clear, so present. Here in the fifth and last year of 2004's renewed CBGA, "Net
central banks sales likely to be in the order of 140 tonnes this year, down
from 246 tonnes in 2008," reckons London market-maker Scotia Mocatta. Yet the
annual ceiling for CBGA sales currently stands at 500 tonnes!
The new agreement - just signed and due to commence on Sept. 27th - tips its
hat to the facts, reducing that limit by one fifth. But who's left to sell
any way? Just as in the gold mining sector worldwide, the "easy metal" has
already gone from West Europe's vaults, pretty much emptying Spain, the UK
and those excess Swiss holdings which maintained the Franc's 100% gold-backing
until the turn of this century. The two largest holders, Germany and Italy,
continue to face down political calls for "mobilization", refusing to yield
one ounce so far despite signing all three agreements. France, the third largest
owner, has pretty much sold the 600 tonnes from its hoard announced when it
joined the central-bankers' Cash4Gold party in 2005. That leaves only the International
Monetary Fund's 400-tonne sale, hardly enough by itself to meet the next half-decade's
2,000-tonne limit.
Back at the Federal Reserve, meantime, tomorrow's central-bank legacy - of
freshly printed Treasury bonds bought with magic money from nowhere - continues
to swell. Yes, the Fed's stockpile of T-bonds may be smaller today than it
was back in August '07 before the Great
Inevitable broke, thanks to record Wall Street demand for the safety of
Washington's debt. And yes, the Fed isn't quite collecting new bonds from the
Treasury door directly, waiting instead a few days or so before picking them
up (as Brian
Benton, Chris
Martenson and others have found) from those primary dealers who do bid
at auction, rather than out-and-out monetizing the debt for all to see with
its newly created cash.
And sure, private-sector demand for Treasuries continues to look so strong
right now - what with overnight rates at 0%, plus the ongoing collapse of house
prices, world trade and jobs creation - that the Fed says it will stop financing
Uncle Sam's spending in, umm, October rather than in September as previously
stated.
But hoarding gold looked rather more sensible amidst the violence and misery
of the mid-20th century, and no one at the Fed or Treasury guessed two years
ago that they'd be offering leverage incentives to try and revive the market
in mortgage-backed derivatives. When the global economy gets off the floor...or
risk assets become more attractive to private investment...or China and Japan
find they really don't have any space left for US debt in their central-bank
vaults, the market into which the Fed will want to sell its Treasury hoard
will look very different to the market from which it's currently buying.
Whether a decade from now, in 2010, or perhaps this fall - when the $300 billion
of quantitative easing ear-marked for Treasuries is spent - trying to quit
the Fed's newest "legacy asset" could prove tougher even than finding ready
buyers for today's toxic junk. And given the soaring interest rates and potential
US bankruptcy that in turn might trigger, spurred by whatever's added to the
Treasury's $11.7 trillion of debt between now and then, perhaps Buying
Gold will look a smart move to the Western world's central bankers once
more.
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