|
First of all, I would like to call attention to a well written article by
J.S. Kim, The
Coming Consequences of Banking Fraud. It just so happens to mirror my thoughts,
exactly. Those who have been following my subscription services for a while,
or even have just started, should realize that I have been quite accurate in
my fundamental analysis. Although I am not always 100% on the money with everything,
I am within the ballpark 80% to 90% of the time, give or take - which is quite
a strong track record. The problem has been over the last quarter or two, that
accuracy with the fundamentals has meant relatively little in terms of actual
share prices. This means (it always has and always will) that we are in a severe
speculative bubble (or conversely a fear driven post crash lull). I think we
all know which one it is. It has even gotten to the point where some commenters
on the blog claim "fundamentals no longer matter". The last time I heard that
preached consistently was right before the dot.com crash, which was notoriously
hard to time, but was clear as day in the ability to be seen coming by those
who still counted profits and losses.
My research tells me that a large bubble has been blown again, even as the
most recent one was still in the process of popping. Like Mr. Kim in the article
above, I have found it quite difficult to time the coming if the anticipated
bubble pop this 2nd time around (I did successfully and accurately anticipate
the bubble being reblown, but severely underestimated the extent, breadth and
depth), thus have resorted to market neutral strategies to prevent loss of
capital/profits while still keeping my finger on the bearish trigger (see In
this difficult to trade market, you have to be more than just right... ).
Don't get me wrong. I am not a doom and gloomer, or a permabear. I am a realist.
I have absolutely no problem going net long (not market neutral) when I feel
the time calls for it. The problem is that the issues that caused last year's
market crash (which I pronounced loudly in 2007) have not even come close to
being rectified, and as a matter of fact, are in many ways actually worse.
In addition, the share prices of many of the companies that are laden with
these issues have increased several hundred percent, with many currently hovering
at pre-bubble burst prices. This is not the market for a fundamentals guy to
go long in. Momentum investors and those who seek fads are currently having
their time in the sun, but those who astutely followed the fundamentals are
still significantly ahead of the game, by far. It is my belief that if a crash
does come, and investors are significantly positioned, those windfall profits
will return again, and be predictably manageable because fundamentals will
come into play, and not the need to follow stories about high frequency trading,
or to catch up with the rest of the market because you were on the sidelines
while prices shot up.
Look at this chart of American Express.

It is trading right about pre-Lehman implosion levels, despite the fact that
we have 10% unemployment and rising, with no sign of near term reprieve. Credit
card default and charge off rates are near or at historical highs!!! Was Amex
really trading that inexpensively during the most recent credit and stock bubble
that it should return to those prices now? I won't even bother to comment on
the massively insolvent, $183 billion bailout king known as AIG (Worthless
companies now rallying several hundred percent in price - What a market for
stock pickers) where even the government doubts it will get its money back!
This brings me to the continuation of the study of JP Morgan, and more importantly,
not how much it is worth, nor whether it is solvent or insolvent nor too big
to fail - but whether it and its brethren are actually too big to let survive
- at least in their current form! Before we go on, please see "Why
Doesn't the Media Take a Truly Independent, Unbiased Look at the Big Banks
in the US?" to catch up on my findings thus far regarding JP Morgan.
In attempting to fine tune the assumptions of the derivatives portion of the
JP Morgan forensic model, my analysts explained to me that they were having
problems complying with my request that they quantify the losses/gains of JPM
through its counterparty transactions due primarily to a lack of reporting
clarity and differences across industry lines. I suggested the following...
Since the discretion allowed by management is so wide and malleable,
a better tract would be to attempt to ascertain the practical likelihood
of JPM actually being able to offset $1.78 trillion of risk and exposure
through counterparties who are both credit worthy and not already significantly
concentrated in said risk buckets, in addition to those counterparties
not offsetting said risk to another counterparty who would be pretty much
in the same position. My hunch is that the chance of doing such is highly
unlikely. There is just not enough credit worthy capital in the market
place that is not already concentrated to offset nearly $2 trillion of
risk (and this is just for one company, not the entire market), thus creating
an adverse selection scenario. For instance, as the risk started to unwind
from the monolines, where did it go? Was it simply left unhedged or was
it dumped on other banks or insurers or hedge funds? This is a fundamental
question since nearly all participants were deleveraging during this time
when the monolines were trying to expel risk and the banks were looking
for more counterparties.
Do the banks, who are all deleveraging, actually accept other banks
risk? Where is JPM putting $1.8 trillion of hedges? How about the next
ten banks in the list of large exposures? Where are they hedging? The only
practical answer is that they are hedging with each other, for the same,
concentrated risks - which means that those risks are not truly transferred,
they are simply share in one big incestuous pool.
Remember, the monolines and insurers were some of the biggest derivative
hedge for the banks before they started collapsing.
As a result, we have looked into derivative exposure of top commercial banks
to determine if they are hedging with each other to an extent that engenders
systemic risk. We have sourced the data from OCC report (attached for your
reference, see occ_q1_2009_derivatives
10/09/2009,01:37 190.49 Kb). Overall derivative products in U.S have grown
at a staggering pace rising from $41 trillion by 2000 year end to $202 trillion,
or nearly 14.0x of U.S GDP as of March 31, 2009. Of the $202.0 trillion notional
value of derivatives in United States, top 5 banks alone account for 96% of
the total industry notional amount The high concentration of derivatives
among the top five players strongly suggest (this actually being politically
correct, realistically it practically assures us) that they may be subject
to extreme levels of counterparty risk towards each other. JPM is the largest
player in derivative markets accounting for approximately 40% of total notional
value of derivatives in U.S. JPM's notional value of derivatives as of March
31, 2009 stood at 39.0 times its total assets and 959 times its tangible equity.
| Company |
Notional Value of derivatives |
% of Total Notional Value |
Implied market value using JPM's actual as template |
Implied hedged amount using JPM's actual as template |
Total Assets |
Notional Value of derivatives / Total Assets |
Tangible Equity |
Notional Value of derivatives / Tangible Equity |
Implied Counterparty Exposure of Derivatives as Multiple of Tangible
Equity |
| JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. |
81,161 |
40.2% |
1,798 |
1,700.05 |
2,079 |
39.0x |
84.65 |
958.8x |
20.1x |
| BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION |
38,864 |
19.2% |
861 |
814.06 |
2,323 |
16.7x |
65.66 |
591.9x |
12.4x |
| GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., THE |
39,928 |
19.8% |
884 |
836.34 |
926 |
43.1x |
41.91 |
952.7x |
20.0x |
| CITIGROUP INC. |
29,619 |
14.7% |
656 |
620.41 |
1,823 |
16.3x |
29.67 |
998.4x |
20.9x |
| WELLS FARGO & COMPANY |
1,870 |
0.9% |
41 |
39.17 |
1,286 |
1.5x |
30.33 |
61.6x |
1.3x |
| HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS INC. |
3,454 |
1.7% |
76 |
72.35 |
402 |
8.6x |
66.23 |
52.1x |
1.1x |
| Total |
201,964 |
100.0% |
4,316.48 |
4,082.37 |
|
|
|
|
|
*all data as of 1Q09.
** JPM had additional collateral at the initiation of transactions of 18,500
Notice how all of the banks on this list probably have at least 100% of their
tangible equity exposed through counterparty exposure to, at the most, 5 other
highly concentrated, highly correlated and highly incestuous counterparties.
Most of the banks have between 12 and 20 times their tangible equity concentrated
into this close knit pool. That, my friends, is excessive risk waiting to implode.
I am sure there are some of you saying "Well, you don't that they are actually
using each other as counterparties". Yeah, right. Who the hell else would they
be using? Tell me what group of companies will be able to absorb $4.1
trillion dollars (market value carried on the balance sheet, not notional value)
of counterparty risk??? These are the top derivative holding banks
here in this list. The weekend Lehman Brothers was failing, who was called
in to try and sort out the problem? The top Lehman counterparties. What were
their names? Before we go there, note that Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and
Merrill would be in this list, but they are no longer separate or ongoing concerns
as they were before this malaise. As per Bloomberg:
The warning was ominous: "Massive global wealth destruction."
That's what Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. executives predicted before they
filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history. "Impacts all financial institutions," read
one bullet point in a confidential memo prepared for government officials
obtained by Bloomberg News. "Retail investors/retirees assets are devastated."
The message didn't get through. Two dozen of the world's most powerful bankers,
brought together by Treasury Secretary Henry
M. Paulson Jr. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Timothy
F. Geithner the weekend of Sept. 13, 2008, to devise a rescue plan for
Lehman, were too busy saving themselves to see the larger threat.
"The discussion among the CEOs was 'How do we prevent the next firm from
going under?'" former Merrill Lynch & Co. Chief Executive Officer John
A. Thain, who cut a deal to sell his company that weekend, said in an
interview. "There should have been much more discussion about the impact
directly on the markets if Lehman went bankrupt."
...
For Goldman Sachs Group Inc. CEO Lloyd
C. Blankfein, JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s Jamie
Dimon and the rest of the financial chieftains who spent a weekend
trying to unwind derivatives trades and keep bank-to-bank loans flowing,
ignoring the commercial-paper market, the lifeblood of the economy, proved
a catastrophic oversight. Within a week, the U.S. stepped in to halt withdrawals
from money
market funds, leading to a $1.6 trillion industry backstop, part of
$13.2 trillion it has committed to beating back the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression.
...
Inviting 'Catastrophe'
One year later, policymakers haven't learned the lesson of the bankruptcy,
said Richard
Bernstein, CEO of Richard Bernstein Capital Management LLC in New York
and former chief investment strategist for Merrill Lynch.
Rather than break up institutions such as Bank
of America Corp. and Citigroup
Inc., or limit their expansion, the U.S. has given them billions
of dollars in tax incentives and loan guarantees that enabled them to
grow even bigger. To protect against a bank collapse touching off another
freefall, President Barack
Obama has proposed regulatory
changes that rely on the wisdom of bankers and government overseers
-- the same people who created the conditions that led to Lehman's bankruptcy
and were unable to foresee its consequences.
"Designating certain institutions as too big to fail, and not having a thorough
regulatory process to match, practically invites another catastrophe," Bernstein
said.
...
1 Million Bets
On Sunday morning, shortly before noon, Paulson announced that Barclays
wouldn't be buying Lehman on any terms, participants said. By then, the bankers
had turned their attention to their own survival. Cohn of Goldman Sachs said
he led the charge to make sure the banks didn't lose money on derivatives
trades either with Lehman or on Lehman.
Derivatives are contracts whose value is derived from stocks, bonds, loans,
currencies, commodities or linked to specific events such as changes in interest
rates. Lehman had made about 1 million such bets in the over-the-counter
market, according to a person with access to that information.
The unregulated $592 trillion
market for over-the-counter derivatives, 41 times the size of the U.S.
economy, contributed more than half of some banks' trading revenue and
had never been tested by the bankruptcy of a major Wall Street firm.
Unwinding Trades
The Fed had already begun trying to untangle Lehman's credit-default swaps
on Saturday morning, calling in a group of experts in derivatives operations
from Wall Street firms and asset-management companies. They were given one
hour to show up at the New York Fed.
Swaps are a way for investors to gamble on whether companies will continue
making debt payments or for lenders to buy insurance against borrowers who
stop paying. If the company defaults, one side in the bet pays the buyer
face value of the debt in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash
equivalent.
In order to unwind the trades, the team would need to do so-called portfolio
compression, reducing the number of outstanding swaps by eliminating duplication
and combining similar bets made by the same counterparties. The process involves
sending the trades to an outside vendor, running them through a software
program, reviewing the results and deciding which ones to settle.
It couldn't be done, at least not before trading began in Asia on Monday
morning, the person said.
Repo Market
On Sunday, the banks called in their own traders to see if they could minimize
any losses from dealings with Lehman. That also proved impossible. One snag
was that some corporations involved in the trades couldn't get their representatives
to the New York Fed in time, said one participant. Another was that many
of the banks couldn't determine what bets they'd made on or with Lehman.
A last-ditch attempt on Sunday to try to resolve some outstanding derivatives
contracts between Lehman and the other banks at the Fed had little success,
according to two people who were in the room. One reason: The banks were
only interested in resolving the contracts in which Lehman owed them money
and not those where the banks owed Lehman money, said one of the people at
the meeting.
The bankers acknowledged that one of their favorite avenues for borrowing
would be disrupted by Lehman's collapse. Making sure the market wouldn't
freeze for short-term loans called bank repurchase agreements, or repos,
was where the participants had their biggest success -- and their bitterest
disagreements.
'Default Scenario'
In a repo arrangement, a lender sends cash to a borrower in return for collateral,
often Treasury bills or notes, which the borrower agrees to repurchase as
soon as the next day for the face value of the securities plus interest.
When lenders perceived that Lehman might not pay repo loans or be able to
post adequate collateral, they required more and higher quality assets from
the firm.
The presentation prepared by Lehman employees, titled "Default Scenario:
Liquidation Framework," predicted, among other things, that a bankruptcy
would trigger a freeze in the broader repo market.
"Repos default," they wrote. "Financial institutions liquidate Lehman repo
collateral. Repo defaults trigger default of a significant amount of holding
company debt and cause the liquidation of hundreds of billions of dollars
of securities."
Repo collateral caused what might have been the tensest moment of the weekend,
according to two participants.
Rule 23(a)
While poring over Lehman's mortgage portfolio on Saturday, former Goldman
Sachs partner Peter
S. Kraus, a Merrill Lynch vice president and now CEO of New York-based
AllianceBernstein Holding LP, accused JPMorgan's Dimon of being too aggressive
in demanding more collateral and margin from other banks to cover declining
values, according to two people who were there.
JPMorgan, as a so-called clearing bank, holds collateral for other banks
in what are known as tri-party repo transactions. When the value of the collateral
declines, JPMorgan can require a borrower bank to post more or higher quality
assets so the lending bank is protected.
Dimon didn't respond to Kraus, the participants said, and the confrontation
died down. Both declined to comment.
The Fed was sufficiently anxious about a standstill in repo funding that
on Sunday, Sept. 14, it temporarily modified Rule
23(a) of the Federal Reserve Act to allow banks to use customer deposits
to fund securities they couldn't finance in the repo market. That change,
scheduled to expire in January, has since been extended through Oct. 30.
Loyal readers, the risk of total systemic collapse has not been removed. I
know the stock market is going up, and I have been forced to by my SPX calls
and sit in cash not to get beat in the head, but that does not mean that I,
nor you, should ignore the reality of this situation. Things are not as they
should be. I should be releasing a forensic analysis of JP Morgan sometime
next week.
An overview of JP Morgan's Derivative Exposure
| (All figures in $ millions) |
2Q-09 |
|
| Notional amount of derivative contracts ($ mn) |
| Total interest rate contracts |
64,604,000 |
|
| Total Credit derivatives |
6,813,483 |
|
| Total foreign exchange contracts |
6,977,000 |
|
| Total equity contracts |
1,392,000 |
|
| Total commodity contracts |
672,000 |
|
| Total derivative notional amounts ($mn) |
80,458,483 |
|
| Gross derivative receivables |
| Gross value of derivative receivables not designed as hedges |
1,787,991 |
|
| Gross value of derivative receivables designed as hedges |
9,546 |
|
| Total Gross fair value of derivative receivables |
1,797,537 |
| Fin 39 netting - offsetting receivables/payables |
(1,628,843) |
| Fin 39 netting - cash collateral received/paid |
(71,203) |
| Carrying value on Balance Sheet |
97,491 |
|
| Less: Securities collateral received/paid |
(13,796) |
| Derivative , net of collateral |
83,695 |
|
| Derivative receivables |
| Level 1 |
2,998 |
| Level 2 |
1,736,643 |
| Level 3 |
57,896 |
| FIN 39 netting |
(1,700,046) |
| Total Derivative receivables |
97,491 |
| Less: Securities collateral received/paid |
(13,796) |
| Derivative , net of collateral |
83,695 |
|
| AAA |
16,227 |
| A |
5,712 |
| BBB |
4,240 |
| BB |
6,715 |
| CCC |
1,063 |
| Interest rate |
33,956 |
|
| AAA |
12,144 |
| A |
4,275 |
| BBB |
3,173 |
| BB |
5,026 |
| CCC |
795 |
| Credit derivatives |
25,413 |
|
| AAA |
9,008 |
| A |
3,171 |
| BBB |
2,354 |
| BB |
3,728 |
| CCC |
590 |
| Foreign exchange |
18,851 |
|
| AAA |
3,104 |
| A |
1,093 |
| BBB |
811 |
| BB |
1,285 |
| CCC |
203 |
| Equity |
6,496 |
|
| AAA |
6,105 |
| A |
2,149 |
| BBB |
1,595 |
| BB |
2,526 |
| CCC |
400 |
| Commodity |
12,775 |
|
| Total Derivative receivables |
97,491 |
| Less: Securities collateral received/paid |
(13,796) |
| Derivative , net of collateral |
83,695 |
| Additional collateral at the initiation of transactions |
(18,500) |
| Derivatives, net of collateral and additional collateral |
65,195 |
|
| % of derivatives transactions subject to collateral agreements |
89.0% |
|
| impact of a single-notch ratings downgrade |
1,200 |
| impact of a six-notch ratings downgrade |
4,000 |
|
| Breakup of Derivative , net of collateral |
|
| Derivative receivables |
| AAA |
46,589 |
| A |
16,399 |
| BBB |
12,174 |
| BB |
19,279 |
| CCC |
3,051 |
| Total |
97,491 |
|
| Derivative receivables |
| AAA |
47.8% |
| A |
16.8% |
| BBB |
12.5% |
| BB |
19.8% |
| CCC |
3.1% |
| Total |
100.0% |
|
| Derivatives gains (losses) in income statement |
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Interest rate |
(3,451) |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Credit |
820 |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Foreign exchange |
2,348 |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Equity |
(62) |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Commodity |
361 |
|
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in income statement |
16 |
|
|
| Derivatives gains (losses) in comprehensive income |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Interest rate |
(317) |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Credit |
0 |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Foreign exchange |
27 |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Equity |
0 |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Commodity |
0 |
|
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in comprehensive income |
(290) |
|
| Gains (loss) as % of avg derivative receivables |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Interest rate |
-8.6% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Credit |
2.7% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Foreign exchange |
13.7% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Equity |
-0.4% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Commodity |
3.0% |
|
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in income statement |
0.0% |
|
| Gains (loss) as % of avg derivative receivables |
|
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Interest rate |
-0.8% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Credit |
0.0% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Foreign exchange |
0.2% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Equity |
0.0% |
|
| AAA |
|
| A |
|
| BBB |
|
| BB |
|
| CCC |
|
| Commodity |
0.0% |
|
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in comprehensive income |
-0.3% |
|
| % change in gross value of derivative receivables not designed as
hedges |
-27.7% |
| % change in gross value of derivative receivables designed as hedges |
-4.4% |
| % change in gross value of derivative receivables |
-27.6% |
|
| Derivative receivables (change excl writedowns, purchase) |
-25.7% |
| Derivative receivables (change incl writedowns) |
-25.7% |
|
| Derivative payables |
| Gross value of derivative receivables not designed as hedges |
1,747,610 |
| Gross value of derivative receivables not designed as hedges |
1,694 |
|
| Gross derivative fair value |
1,749,304 |
|
| Fin 39 netting - offsetting receivables/payables |
(1,628,843) |
| Fin 39 netting - cash collateral received/paid |
(53,264) |
| Carrying value on Balance Sheet |
67,197 |
| Less: Securities collateral received/paid |
(8,744) |
| Derivative , net of collateral |
58,453 |
|
| Interest rate |
13,583 |
| Credit derivatives |
11,861 |
| Foreign exchange |
19,237 |
| Equity |
12,871 |
| Commodity |
9,645 |
| Total Derivative Payables |
67,197 |
| Less: Securities collateral received/paid |
(8,744) |
| Derivative , net of collateral |
58,453 |
|
| Debt and equity instruments |
56,021 |
| Derivative payables |
67,197 |
| Total trading liabilities |
123,218 |
|
| Income Statement |
| Total Fair value hedges |
(1,448) |
| Total Cash flow hedges |
55 |
| Total Net investment hedges |
(21) |
| Total Risk management activities |
(4,624) |
| Total Trading activities |
6,054 |
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in income statement |
16 |
|
| Derivatives gains (losses) in comprehensive income |
| Total Fair value hedges |
0 |
| Total Cash flow hedges |
(82) |
| Total Net investment hedges |
(208) |
| Total Risk management activities |
0 |
| Total Trading activities |
0 |
| Total Derivatives gains (losses) in comprehensive income |
(290) |
|
|
| Collateral posted |
67,700 |
| Received collateral |
23,500 |
| Delivered collateral |
5,700 |
|
Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who am I?
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I am and our constituency.
I pay for significant information and data, and am well
aware of the value of quality research. I find most currently available research
lacking, in both quality and quantity. The reason why I had to create my own
research staff was due to my dissatisfaction with what was currently available
- to both individuals and institutions.
So here I am, creating my own research for my own investment
activity. What really sets my actions apart is that I offer much of what I
produce to the public without charge - free to distribute and redistribute,
as long as it is left unaltered and full attribution is given to the author
and owner. Why would I do such a thing when others easily charge 5 and 6 digits
annually for what some may consider a lesser product? It is akin to open
source analysis! My ideas and implementations are actually improved and
fine tuned when bounced off of the collective intellect of the many, in lieu
of that of the few - no matter how smart those few may believe themselves to
be.
Very recently, I have started charging for the forensics
portion of my work, which has freed up the resources to develop the site to
deliver even more research for free, particularly on the global macro and opinion
front. This move has allowed me to serve an more diverse constituency, which
now includes the institutional consumer (ie., investment turned consumer banks,
hedge funds, pensions, etc,) as well as the newbie individual investor who
is just getting started - basically the two polar opposites of the investing
spectrum. I am proud to announce major banks as paying clients, and brand new
investors who take my book recommendations and opinions on true wealth and
success to heart.
So, this is how I use my background and knowledge in new
media, distributed computing, risk management, insurance, financial engineering,
real estate, corporate valuation and financial analysis to pursue, analyze
and capitalize on global macroeconomic opportunities. I have included a more
in depth bio at the bottom of the page for those who really, really need to
know more about me.
Visit his blog Boom
Bust Blog.
Copyright © 2007-2009 Reggie Middleton
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