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Below is an excerpt from a commentary originally posted at www.speculative-investor.com on
11th October 2009.
It is very likely that two ultra-long-term trends reversed direction over
the past two years, the first being the expansion of private-sector credit
in the US and the second being the contraction of the US savings rate. The
trend reversals are, of course, inter-related, in that the new trends towards
less debt and more savings are being driven by economic hardship in the present
and the revelation that the economic future will not be as rosy as previously
thought.
As discussed at length in many TSI commentaries, the problems that have emerged
over the past two years were not created over the past two years. They were,
instead, the natural and inevitable consequences of the monetary inflation
that occurred during the first half of the decade. To put it another way, the
problems arose during the inflation-fueled boom, but only became visible to
most people after the amount of new money entering the economy became insufficient
to sustain the boom. Illusions have since been shattered and people have been
forced to come to terms with a very different financial future to the one they
were counting on just two years ago.
The increasing desire to save and the reduced desire to take-on debt should
have led to a period of deflation, but governments and central banks decided
that deflation would not be permitted. They decided, instead, to prevent the
natural corrective process from running its course and to tackle the problems
caused by the combination of monetary inflation and government meddling with
even more monetary inflation and government meddling. It is idiocy on a phenomenal
scale, but it is not surprising. Since establishing the TSI web site 10 years
ago we have consistently maintained that after the private sector credit expansion
came to an end, the public sector would 'step up to the plate' and create,
via government borrowing/spending and central bank monetisation, whatever amount
of new money was needed to perpetuate the inflation. Unfortunately, it looks
like we are going to be proven right.
Monetary inflation causes problems regardless of whether the new money is
being borrowed into existence by private operators or by the government, but
the problems will potentially become apparent to the average observer earlier
if the government does the bulk of the borrowing. This is because government
borrowing, and the associated spending/investing, will rarely be motivated
by economic merit, meaning that the effects of monetary inflation stemming
from government borrowing are less likely to be masked by productivity improvements
than would be the case if the private sector were borrowing most of the new
money into existence. In simple terms, government-driven monetary inflation
is more likely to boost the general price level -- creating what most people
think of as "inflation" -- than the private-sector-driven variety.
So, we should reasonably expect more monetary inflation over the years ahead
and for this extra money to have a greater effect on the cost of living than
the money added to the economy during the 1990s and the first seven years of
the 2000s. At the same time, it is likely that the desire to save will continue
to grow. In fact, the more the government and the central bank intervene in
an effort to stimulate the public's borrowing and spending, the greater the
desire to save will likely become. This is because the interventions will create
uncertainty and deplete existing savings. We therefore appear to be heading
towards a situation where the public wants to increase its savings while the
government makes it crystal clear that anyone who saves in terms of the official
currency will be punished.
This is where the "law of unintended consequences", a law that seems
to involve itself with almost all of the government's plans to 'help' the economy,
shifts to centre-stage. People now have a rational and irrepressible desire
to increase their savings, but the government is promising to depreciate the
official currency and has demonstrated that it is capable of fulfilling this
promise. People are therefore prompted to save in terms of something else,
the most obvious "something else" being gold. In other words, one
of the consequences of policies designed to discourage saving won't actually
be less saving; it will be less saving in terms of the official currency and
more saving in terms of gold, leading to a much higher gold value in currency
terms and relative to most other commodities.
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