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Who cares about the dollar? It turns out quite a few do, except for those
who could put it on a course to long-term recovery. First of all, you should
care, as the purchasing power of your dollar savings is at risk when the dollar
plunges versus other currencies. Let's examine a couple of groups, what they
have at stake and how influential they may be.
Those who care
Savers. That may well be you and me. Though we hear praise about the "recovery" in
the equity markets, the dollar index is down more over the past year than the
Dow Jones is up. That's not a recovery, that's an illusion. Oil is trading
at around $80 a barrel - that's not a reflection of economic strength, it's
a reflection of dollar weakness - and we have to pay for it, at the pump.
India. Why India? Because actions speak louder than words. While numerous
governments have discussed diversifying out of the dollar, India has put its
money where its mouth is - buying gold, the ultimate hard currency. India's
finance minister exchanged US$6.7 billion with 200 tons of gold (a lot! - about
8% of global gold production) because, in the finance minister's words, "Europe
collapsed and North America collapsed." You can't get much clearer than that.
The gold India bought came from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which
recently authorized the sale of 400 tons. China had been rumored to be the
likely buyer, but wanted to absorb the gold at a discount. The fact that India
stepped up to the plate and swooped up half the amount within just a few weeks
at market rates shows the very real interest some central banks have in diversifying
out of the U.S. dollar.
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China. While China has not (yet) purchased IMF gold, China has been
increasing its gold reserves, while deploying more of its newly acquired reserves
in euro and yen. China is very sensitive to not rocking the markets; as a result,
China has increased its gold reserves mostly by buying up domestic production
as large-scale open market purchases may cause gold prices to spike. However,
because the gold market is much smaller than the currency market, China's gold
reserves as a percentage of total reserves has actually been going down. China
continues to be a contender for the remaining gold the IMF considers selling.
The reason China is concerned about the U.S. dollar is simple: in their own
assessment, they may hold too much of the greenback. Why? Because China has
on the one hand tried to keep a quasi-currency peg versus the U.S. dollar:
when China exports goods, they receive dollars; to keep their own currency
from rising, they keep the dollars rather than sell them to buy Chinese yuan.
And, on the other hand, China has been hamstrung by the lack of liquidity,
not just in the gold market, but also in the money markets outside of the U.S.
dollar. While the currency market is the most liquid in the world (more liquid
than the equity or bond markets), the U.S. continues to be the place of choice
to deploy large amounts of cash. The eurozone's liquidity is a distant second;
and indeed, the eurozone is a primary beneficiary of China's diversification
strategy into a basket of currencies. The Chinese, too, have moved from talk
to action; aside from the euro, the Japanese yen has been another beneficiary
of China's managed basket approach to its reserves.
Soon, China may no longer be able to prop up the dollar; it's not so much
that its massive reserves are beyond the point most would have dreamed possible,
but their domestic money supply has been going through the roof as a result
of a successful domestic stimulus package and the implicit stimulus created
by subsidizing exports through a weak currency; the resulting inflationary
pressures may be best tamed by allowing the yuan to float higher.
Europeans. Europeans care about the strong dollar. While European firms
have extensive experience with volatile exchange rates and have learned to
hedge their currency exposure, the strong euro is hindering a recovery - especially
in Germany, an economy heavily dependent on exports. However, Europeans remember
hyperinflation and stoically resist the temptations U.S. policy makers have
fallen victim to. The European Central Bank (ECB) is foremost critical of exchange
rate volatility while giving thinly veiled criticisms of U.S. policies, urging
the U.S. to - and that is our interpretation - return to a path of sound monetary
policy. While the ECB would not outright criticize U.S. policies, the ECB openly
talks about how its support programs are inherently more flexible; the ECB
also urges the U.S. to pursue a strong dollar policy.
In the U.S., the federal government can launch a trillion dollar stimulus
package; similarly, the Treasury can inject hundreds of billions into ailing
banks. Not so in Europe: fiscal stimuli have to come from regional governments;
the same with bank bailouts: the money comes from regional pockets. As a result,
the Eurozone cannot ramp up spending as quickly as the U.S. Similarly, in our
assessment, the ECB's support programs to the markets carry fewer inflationary
risks than those of the Fed; the ECB programs keep banks alive (by providing
liquidity on an unlimited basis), although they are slower to recapitalize.
As a result, we may see lackluster growth, if any, in Europe, but it may well
be with the backdrop of a much stronger currency. It's a fallacy to assume
that one always needs economic growth to support a strong currency (see our analysis
of the yen) - that's only the case when financing from abroad is required
to support a current
account deficit.
Corporate America. We are told a weak dollar is good for exports and,
thus, corporate America favors a weaker dollar. Not exactly. No country has
ever depreciated itself into prosperity and corporate America is well aware
of that: it is highly unlikely that the U.S. will thrive exporting sneakers
to Vietnam. A weaker dollar may indeed help out corporate America for the next
quarter's earnings in making foreign income look more attractive. However,
with a weaker currency, corporations lack an important incentive to invest
in quality. The Europeans have long learned that they cannot compete on price,
but must produce value added products such as luxury cars or complex machinery;
incidentally, producers and service providers at the higher end of the value
chain have more pricing power. China's industry has also recognized this, allowing
its low-end industries (e.g. toy industry) to fail and move to lower cost countries.
Corporations that have their share prices valued in a strong currency may
go on an acquisition spree; those that are based in countries with weak currencies
get acquired (e.g. Cadbury, the British chocolate maker, is under siege because
the British Pound is even weaker than the U.S. dollar). But possibly most telling
is the sad fact that an increasing number of U.S. corporations are looking
for ways to hedge their domestic currency risk. That's something traditionally
reserved for corporations in developing countries.
Those who seem not to care
Your elected official. A weak dollar is really in no one's interest. The
reason why the U.S. dollar has gained reserve currency status is because the
U.S., over many decades, has pursued reasonably sound policies. But such privilege
must not be taken for granted; at some point, policy makers may be getting
more than they are bargaining for; at that point, it may be very costly to
try to stem a disorderly decline of the dollar.
Policy makers in the U.S. only peripherally care about the dollar: up-and-down
moves in the dollar are a side effect of their policy agendas. For many policy
makers, that may simply be a reflection of their lack of understanding of basic
economic principles. But for others, such Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Bernanke,
it's more than that. Having worked to prevent a financial meltdown, Bernanke
wants to jump-start the economy. He has testified in Congress that during the
Great Depression, moving away from the gold standard was the way to do it:
you "allow the price level to rise." In our assessment, the dollar is a means,
not an end for Bernanke. That's little consolation for savers whose purchasing
power may be destroyed in the process. Think about it this way: when someone
takes away half of your purchasing power, you have a greater incentive to work
- top line economic growth may go up. Bernanke's policies are squarely designed
at pushing home prices higher, which may be an effective way to bail out those
who are 'underwater' in their mortgages. To achieve this goal, low interest
rates are being touted; but the way low interest rates are achieve, through
the purchases of mortgage backed securities (MBS) and government bonds, these
securities are now intentionally overpriced. As a result, rational investors
- both domestic and foreign - may be looking overseas for securities with a
less manipulated risk/return profile. A weaker dollar may also prove inflationary
as the cost of imports may rise. Bernanke seems not to be concerned as he has
stated that, historically, a weaker dollar has not necessarily been inflationary.
Here, we strongly disagree: in the spring of 2008, import prices soared as
Asian producers could no longer absorb the higher cost of doing business with
the U.S. - it wasn't simply the high price of oil, but global inflationary
pressures that could no longer be contained; the credit bust "saved" the world
at the time from what may have been inflationary nightmare. And guess what:
Asian exporters had pricing power and were able to raise prices.
Inflation, of course, may also drive up home prices; although it is difficult
to direct where inflation may show its ugly head. Many policy makers believe
we cannot have inflation when there is no wage pressure. But that's wrong:
think of a room with 10 people, 8 poor and 2 rich; the 2 rich people can drive
up prices even if the other 8 cannot afford the item. The wealth gap in the
U.S. has been widening - in our assessment as a result of too loose a monetary
policy allowing those who understand credit to move ahead whereas many more
fall through the cracks; look at Latin America - the type of society our policies
drives us towards - to see that inflation is possible even when a great part
of the population earns low wages.
But it's not just Fed officials that have a "neglect" of the dollar. When
Congress spends too much money, it's a negative for the dollar - again, the
focus may not be the dollar, but it's the valve of excessive policies. Or think
of entitlement programs: in the absence of reform, an erosion in purchasing
power (through a weaker dollar and inflation - especially inflation that is
not fully reflected in government inflation statistics) appears to be the politically
most convenient solution to nominally deliver on promises, even though in real
terms, less is delivered.
Worst for the dollar may be when trade disputes flare up. One great feature
of the U.S. economy is that it is flexible. Over the years, the economy has
shifted towards one that is focused on trade. When protectionist sentiment
flares up, those who have learned to adjust are the ones who get punished the
most. That's part of the reason why the dollar tends to take a nosedive when
politicians heat up their rhetoric on trade issues.
What To Do?
The world is what it is. There are different ways to address what we believe
may be a continued threat to the dollar.
Warren Buffett. As one of the more famous dollar bears, Warren Buffett,
has in the past exclusively bet against the dollar; more recently, he has emphasized
that he would not bet against America. That may well be, but his Berkshire
Hathaway is selling dollars to engage in his largest purchase yet: Buffett
believes an additional $26 billion investment in railroads is preferable to
holding U.S. dollar cash.
New Zealand. New Zealand's finance minister is reasonably relaxed about
the strength of the New Zealand Dollar, colloquially called the kiwi.
His reasoning why the kiwi is so strong? "One of the reasons that we are high
against the U.K. and the U.S. is because frankly they are in a bit of a mess." Of
the major economies, New Zealand had the most laisser-faire approach to the
credit crisis, allowing market forces to play out. As a currency with a high
current account deficit, the kiwi plunged during the credit crisis, but has
since been a leader in the recovery. While New Zealand is not happy about its
strong currency (it makes agricultural exports less competitive), it realizes
that the currency is an important valve and that excess regulation may cause
more harm than good.
Australia. Similarly, Australia has decided it cannot wait for the
rest of the world to get its act together. Australia has raised rates twice
in a few weeks. The U.S. continues monetary easing through purchases of MBS,
while Australia is well on the way of tightening. Australia does what's right
for its economy; and sure enough, while the Australian dollar is strong, it
cannot be the driver of its monetary policies.
Canada. Canada would be well advised to take a lesson from Australia.
Canada benefits from the global reflationary efforts as its economy benefits
from the rise in commodity prices; but Canada's economy is also highly dependent
on exports to the U.S. As a result, the Bank of Canada has refrained from tightening
because it is afraid a stronger loonie, as the Canadian currency is
colloquially called, would stifle economic growth. Switzerland has fallen
into a similar predicament, even actively intervening to keep its currency
from appreciating versus the euro. Both of these countries are in a better
position than Vietnam which is exclusively dependent on exporting by
focusing on price; Vietnam was in the news just again for engaging in policies
that may lead to competitive devaluation. Both Canada and Switzerland are no
Vietnman, and as a result, their citizens deserve better than a pursuit of
policies that put them at risk of being placed into the same camp. We are exaggerating
here, but do so to make a point: Switzerland and Canada ought to pursue sound
monetary policy and must not be tempted to make their policies dependent on
the U.S. In the eurozone, in contrast, the ECB has long been independent
and decided it cannot join the potentially inflationary path the U.S. is pursuing;
if U.S. policies cause a global inflationary outbreak, the eurozone may not
be immune, but, structurally, the eurozone should then be in a much stronger
position to adapt. That's because European consumers have long stopped spending
and are far less interest rate sensitive compared to their U.S. counterparts;
as a result, a tightening to tame inflation would have less negative implications
on the European economy.
Investors. Investors are caught in the middle of these forces and can
either lament or choose to take action. There is a bright side to the fact
that some don't care about the dollar: it may provide for profit opportunities
- or shall we say, ways to potentially mitigate the negative effects of the
neglect. Aside from U.S. policy makers, the dollar is also "neglected" by direct
participants in these markets: tourists, corporate hedging departments as well
as governments on occasion engage in the currency markets not for the primary
purpose of seeking a profit. As a result, there may be inefficiencies in the
currency markets that do not exist in other fields.
By no means would we want to encourage investors to become arbitrage players
engaging in the types of leveraged bets hedge funds engage in to take advantage
of perceived inefficiencies. But we do believe that it makes sense to ponder
the macro forces of supply and demand and consider putting one's money where
one's mouth is. Central banks are diversifying into baskets of currencies;
we have been promoting that very strategy for years. Ultimately, a managed
basket for a country allows them to pursue a management of their reserves fine-tuned
to national interests. While some may dream of a return to the gold standard,
the trend over the past 100 years has been moving in the opposite direction,
albeit with an increasing gold element in recent years for some countries.
We don't think there will be a world currency sponsored by the IMF - such a
concept looks good on the drawing board, but national interests differ too
widely. And there is no need as governments can manage their baskets of currencies.
Similarly, investors can manage their investments according to what is most
suitable for them, and they may want to consider whether a basket of currencies
is part of that.
We manage the Merk Absolute Return Currency Fund, the Merk Asian Currency
Fund, and the Merk Hard Currency Fund; transparent no-load currency mutual
funds that do not typically employ leverage. To learn more about the Funds,
please visit www.merkfunds.com. Separately,
I just published a new book: Sustainable
Wealth: Achieve Financial Security in a Volatile World of Debt and Consumption that
explains the dynamics playing out in more detail, in addition to being a personal
finance guide to allow investors to take charge of their financial destiny.
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