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Myron S. Scholes of Long Term Capital Management, won one-half the 1997 Nobel
Peace Prize in Economic Sciences "for a new method to determine the value of
derivatives."
In September of 1998 LTCM ran into a glitch as their Laureate's method began
to run amok. At the beginning of 1998, LTCM held capital of $4.8 billion, a
portfolio of in excess of $200 billion (credit facilities) and derivatives
with a notional value (how much capital a given derivative effectively controls)
of $1.25 trillion.
The investors who dared to ask questions were told to "take their money somewhere
else".
On September 23, 1998 William J. McDonough, president of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank enlisted LTCM's counter parties to bail out the fund which was
for all intents and purposes bankrupt. The counter parties provided $3.6 billion
in return for a 90% share in the fund and the promise a supervisory board would
be established
Simply put, a Nobel Laureate's "derivative model" wrought disaster, only to
be bailed out by the very counter parties it had "insured" against risk.
The government's intervention to save LTCM served to expand the "moral hazard" furthering
the expectation of bailouts among speculators with an appetite for risk. I
would suggest this type of intervention only serves to further heighten the
risks.
The leverage employed by LTCM indicates the firm was clearly speculating upon
convergence of interest rates, Alan Greenspan and Bob Rubin's nod gave McDonough
the go-ahead for an arranged bailout as they, in their own words, believed
it could very well bring down the economy due to the magnitude of the "LTCM
shock."
LTCM's notional aggregate of $1.25 trillion implies extreme leverage used
in its pyramid of derivative positions against capital of $4.8 billion.
I believe it is fair to assume the higher the leverage employed, the higher
degree of aggregate risk to a specific portfolio. The leveraged speculators
have recently exceeded $230 trillion in aggregate.
Since the LTCM debacle, Chairman Greenspan has attempted to protect the "real
economy" with even less transparency in this unregulated "over the counter" market.
Derivatives are financial products whose value is "derived" from an perceived "underlying" asset
value.
By example, stock options are based on the underlying value of the stock that
the option enables the purchaser to exercise their "strike price" at a point
in the future. Futures contracts are used by "producers" to protect themselves
from various risks associated with price fluctuations in a specific market.
A commodity contract would be derived from the underlying price of the good
to be bought or sold at a specific date in the future.
In addition to Stocks, Indices and other Market Indices, the term "Asset",
in the derivatives sphere, also includes Currencies and Interest Rates
An important distinct needs between "price" and "value" needs to be addressed
before venturing further into the derivative abyss:
Value: An amount, as of goods, services, or money, considered to be a fair
and suitable equivalent for something else; a fair price or return.
Price: The amount as of money or goods, asked for or given in exchange for
something else.
Derivatives have intrinsic value, meaning they are priced to derive the underlying
value of "something". Clearly we can assume "pricing mechanisms" are subjective
when unbound from the very markets structure via "modeling" or perhaps in today's
global financial pyramid... by "intervention".
By example, derivatives allow investors to partition various aspects of an
asset, and trade those partitions separately, rather than as a whole.
The problem arises when Price / Value matrix fails to conform.
Collateralized Debt Obligations have recently appeared as one of the more
popular types of derivatives. They are certainly one of the most dangerous.
Consider this straight forward exercise:
A mortgage is purchased and then sold with Overnight Rates at historic lows.
Then recognize in excess of 50% of the these mortgages are adjustable. Real
Rates, beyond the control of the Federal Reserve without monetization of the
long end, have risen dramatically, putting many types of derivatives in peril.
Understand that Commercial Banks and Trusts make up the majority of this unregulated
market and then breath deeply.
These mortgage obligations have been purchased and sold, packaged, securitized
and then hedged using various derivative methodologies.
And what we have is a complete mess: grossly overvalued "assets" trading as
collateral in a negative real rate environment, levered beyond reason to insure "safety" of
the financial system.
I'll venture a guess... I would suggest this is nothing more than an LTCM
type speculation by orders of magnitude and keep hearing Bob Rubin's "panic" when
describing the potential for disaster.
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