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Financial history is littered with periods wherein a population took a collective
leave of its senses and indulged in delusions of ever-expanding wealth. More
often than not, the speculation has followed a period of great stability and
the introduction of a new technology that has contributed to the ultimately
self-defeating speculation. The wealth usually has turned into a mirage and
a generation has frequently been scarred by the experience returning to more
mundane practices. Asset bubbles, therefore, bring in their wake a very considerable
economic cost and it should be the goal of economic policy makers to understand
their causes and effects better if these costs are to be contained to a manageable
level.
Stock markets are by their very nature volatile. They reflect the collective
fears and hopes of traders and investors as they attempt to discount all the
known factors affecting the traded instrument. Volatility is therefore normally
a healthy and self-corrective mechanism. But just occasionally, excessive liquidity,
coupled with visions of a new era, leads to a massive, largely uncorrected
rise in valuations that discounts not just the present and the near future
but the hereafter as well.
Some historical bubbles
Since the modern concept of the joint stock company began about four hundred
years ago there have been many such exercises. Perhaps the earliest was the
well-documented Dutch tulip craze in the 1600s, in which supposedly rare
bulbs were traded at such increasingly ludicrous prices that some good burghers
were willing to trade the family farm for a single bulb. They may have believed
the bulb was really worth this amount, more likely they did it with the hope
that some bigger fool would give them two farms for the same bulb later.
The bursting of the bubble lead to enormous personal financial distress but
it also led to the birth of the Dutch tulip flower business that remains
an important export business for the country to this day.
Britain as the first country to industrialise on the basis of stock market
finance had a history of bubbles in the nineteenth century based on canal and
railway finance first in Britain and then increasingly overseas as investment
followed the flag. But it is the United States where the largest bubbles have
occurred at regular intervals in its expansion over the past two hundred years.
These major speculative bubbles have usually been related to the introduction
of new technology that promised untold economic growth and riches. In the 1820s
the building of the Erie Canal that opened up northern New York State was financed
largely by British money. That early canal was an enormous economic success
but it led to the speculative building of further canals that had less and
less economic justification. In a pattern common with such speculations, the
first mover may be enormously successful but its very success generates copycats
whose prime motivation is oftentimes solely stock promotion rather than the
establishment of viable businesses.
Some fifty years later, in the aftermath of the American Civil War, the building
of the cross-country railroads and the opening of the West led to the greatest
speculation in the nineteenth century. Once again, unlimited visions of easy
wealth attracted money and people from around the world for financial promotions
that were never viable propositions, in which the small investors were almost inevitably
ruined by the resulting collapse. Some of the railroads survived and are the
backbone of today's US railroads. However, even those survivors that eventually
became successful enterprises were the result of mergers and recapitalisations
in the wake of the crash. The initial investors saw little or no return.
A half century later, in the after math of the First World War, the boom of
the roaring twenties had as it rational the introduction of electric power
utilities and the efficiency dreams that generated for an urbanising and industrialising
population. These utilities were financed through the stock market and their
finance followed a familiar and well- worn path. Although they were essentially
mundane businesses with modest and predictable rates of return, they were increasingly
packaged as high return instruments through an early form of financial engineering
(speculative and leveraged investment trusts) to increase their appeal to a
populace again deluded by the promises of instant avarice.
The internet/telecommunications bubble
The wild expansion and speculation of the 1990s related to the introduction
of the internet and liberalisation of the telecommunications market can therefore
be seen as following in the steps of these earlier infrastructure related
booms and busts. Many companies were nothing but frauds worth no more than
a dream. To be sold the financial establishment had to develop new valuation
methods since the companies had no earnings and no realistic expectation
of earnings. To be sold they were 'valued' at multiples of distant revenues.
Eventually, the whole facade collapsed but, in the wake of the carnage and
wrecked lives, there will still be infrastructure such as broadband in place,
unwanted and excessive in capacity at the moment but likely to be used eventually.
But, once again, the costs will have been hugely disproportionate to the gains.
Losses to the economy from the stock market alone have already reached one
times GDP, and could well go higher. The real initial public investors, as
opposed to insiders, will have gained nothing. As greed consumed the players,
the restraints on the system itself broke down and became increasingly corrupted.
Bankers, accountants, auditors, corporate boards and executives, legislators
and regulators all became affected and are to some degree responsible.
This was probably the first mass global speculative mania and, as a result,
the banking systems, life insurance industries and corporate pension schemes
are weakened on several continents. This will not only impact the lives of
participants directly but lead to slower economic growth and reduced living
standards for years to come.
The Asian experiences
Until the 1980s Asia had been spared these excessive bubbles. But late in that
decade, Japan suffered the so-called 'bubble economy' which was focussed
on real estate and the stock market. Coming as the culmination of a forty
years economic expansion built on the ruins of war, Japan's excess savings
coupled with financial engineering were funnelled into the property and stock
markets driving them to ludicrous valuations. At the peak, the value of the
land in metropolitan Tokyo was supposedly greater than all the land in the
United States. In the stock market, Japan's system of corporate cross holding
artificially restricted supply and caused price to earnings valuations to
soar to previously unheard of levels.
The subsequent losses have led to a lost decade of growth that has successively
crippled the banking in insurance sectors and has depressed economic growth
since the bubble burst. Japan's economy today is probably 20-25 percent lower
today than if a relatively modest 3 percent growth had been maintained since
the markets peaked in 1990. That gap with potential output will grow in the
coming years and are a measure of the costs of failing to manage a bubble.
Developing Asia, especially North East and South East Asia were the global
development success stories from 1950 till the Asian crisis in 1997. In many
ways they were following the models of Japanese success built on export competitiveness,
high savings rates and rapidly growing labour forces that were increasingly
well educated and able to serve their export industries. But their financial
markets together with their legal, regulatory and corporate governance systems
did not modernise at the same rate as their real economies.
Again a long period of outstanding economic growth together with what must
now be seen as ill-timed financial liberalisation led to an all encompassing
over confidence. As a consequence, excessive volumes of property were built
with inappropriate foreign currency borrowings. The subsequent bust wrecked
the financial systems in several Asian countries leading to severe economic
dislocations and years of substandard growth.
Lessons for policy makers
Bubbles, as we have seen, are not a new phenomenon. It seems as if they occur
every two or three generations as economies develop. Presumably, that is
a long enough period for those presently living to have forgotten the causes
of the previous boom and bust and then make go out and them again. If we
take the case of the United States, we see that the interval between the
present bubble and the previous one in 1929 is longer than that between previous
bubbles. That may reflect the relative success of the financial regulatory
mechanisms introduced in the 1930s.
The present bubble, on the other hand, may well reflect a failure to update
and modernise these same regulatory measures as modern practices evolved. Incompletely
thought out deregulatory measures - for local telecommunications companies,
the elimination of the Glass Steagal act separating commercial from investment
banking and the wild growth of the opaque derivatives markets - have all contributed,
as well as a failure to learn properly the lessons of earlier bubbles.
In the case of central banks, new techniques may have to be introduced. The
Bank for International Settlements has been studying this area. It appears
that the sole focus on price indices as the measure of inflation, whilst ignoring
booming asset markets, meant that liquidity conditions were too easy for too
long. Ultimately, all speculations depend on the oxygen of liquidity and easy
money. Greater cognisance of asset markets would seem to be necessary in the
future.
But the tools alone will never be sufficient. There needs to be the political
will to use them It is often said that the duty of a central bank is to take
away the punchbowl when the party is getting merry. In other words, the central
bank should be anti-cyclical not pro-cyclical. But despite their supposed independence,
central banks operate in the political world.
It appears that the Japanese central bank knew it had a bubble on its hands
for several years before it finally acted. Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board
knew there was a bubble brewing in 1996 when the Chairman spoke publicly about
irrational exuberance. Further they knew that raising share margin rates could
have stopped the bubble before it grew to excessive levels. But a combination
of factors: the fear of the domestic political and legislative consequences
of reining-in a bull market and a succession of international events - the
Asian, Russian, Long Term Capital Markets and Y2K crises - were all rationalisations
for inaction, as was the apparent conversion of the Fed Chairman to the nostrums
of a productivity miracle in the new economy. The irony of that is that the
so-called productivity miracle may itself have been the product of new age
Government accounting rather than a genuine phenomenon and a prime example
of how bad or politically manipulated Government statistics can lead to bad
policy.
Implications for governments and the development agencies
The key global and regional development agencies including the IMF, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been involved with their member
countries improving the transparency and integrity of their members banking,
financial, legal and bankruptcy systems since the onset of the crisis. Whilst
there is room for debate about the effectiveness of some of the advice early
in the crisis, on the whole it has been productive. Credible progress has
been made in Korea and most South East Asian countries. The regional economies,
especially Thailand, are improving again and with their justly famed flexibility
have fared quite well in the present global economic downturn. But there
is also a tendency for countries to back off from sensitive reforms as their
economies improve. Thailand is no exception to this tendency, as indeed are
developed economies such as the United States. Whilst this may be an understandable
reaction, it is not helpful for the long run. Continued improvements in the
operations of the regulatory and legal systems will be needed throughout
the region.
In the private sector, the area of corporate governance stands out as an essential
area for reform in Asia as well as the developed world. The reforms, however,
need to be country specific. No global cookie-cutter, one size fits all will
work.
Within Asia, the level of corporate governance is generally recognised as
highest in Singapore and Hong Kong, as might be expected for these advanced
economies governed by the rule of law with independent regulatory authorities.
But per capita income is not the main criteria since India scores better than
Japan in average governance levels, as measured by researchers at CLSA Emerging
Markets, a regional brokerage house.
Around the region, the general level is much lower although even those economies
with low average levels usually have one or two companies that standout on
an international scale. Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia are in this
low average corporate governance category with the occasional beacon company.
The record since the Asian crisis shows that those stock markets with higher
overall corporate governance levels have fared better than those with poorer
levels and the same is true for individual companies. But much remains to be
done.
The good news is that the corporate governance trend has been improving since
the onset of the crisis and those markets that have done more - even if from
a low base - have benefited. Thailand, for instance, is one of the few markets
in the world to be up on the year. However, even there, investors maintain
a scepticism about markets generally, and business leaders, policy makers and
regulators alike must build upon recent gains if the stock market, which is
still 80 percent off its highs of 1994, is to fulfil its proper role in financing
the growth in the economy. The same applies throughout the region.
Lessons for the US
The United States has obvious lessons to learn with respect to corporate governance
as well as the conduct of monetary policy. Corporate governance is being
addressed through the legislative agenda - the Sarbanes-Oxley act and the
courts. It is clear that the Federal Reserve Board is belatedly attempting
to understand what has gone wrong in the management of monetary policy and
how to avoid it next time. Recent speeches by the Chairman and other Board
members indicate that they are now consumed, at all costs, with avoiding
the current deflationary fate of Japan and that of the US in the 1930s.
Unfortunately, their approach appears to be the 'hair of the dog' solution
favoured by alcoholics in the morning: "I feel so bad that another drink
- i.e., copious quantities of more money - will ease the pain". To date
it has largely encouraged consumption by the extraction of housing equity from
a newly created housing bubble. That has almost reached its limit as debts
have reached unsustainable levels, unless inflation takes off again. Creation
of inflation seems to be the Fed's intention and this obviously has adverse
implications for the external value of the dollar against other currencies
and commodities, including gold.
Bubbles appear fun when they are happening but, like all good parties, there
is a price to be paid and it takes time and pain to heal the wounds. Bubbles
are not good policy and should be avoided.
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