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On the back of both Ford [NYSE:
F] and General Motors [NYSE:
GM] having their credit ratings reduced to junk status this past week - I
thought it might be appropriate to take a closer look at why?
Some would have us believe that North American automakers simply don't build
them like they used to! Well, being a proud owner of a 1980 Cutlass Supreme,
with less than 100k original kilometers on the clock, I would concur with this
line of thought. But then again, who really does build them the way they used
to anyway? Others claim that automakers' woes are simply an issue of quality;
saying that North American automakers don't measure up to foreign competition?
They would have us believe that Japanese, Korean, English, German, Italian,
French and Swedes all build them better, ehh? Personally, I find this proposition
a little bit hard to swallow - hook, line and sinker.
So what then?
The most oft recited culprit, to these ears, seems to be "legacy costs," which
are more often than not identified as spiraling health care costs due auto
company employees and retired pensioners.
Let's investigate exactly what's at the root of these spiraling health care "legacy
costs":

n. pl. leg·a·cies
- Money or property bequeathed to another by will.
- Something handed down from an ancestor or a predecessor or from
the past: a legacy of religious freedom. See Synonyms at heritage.
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Firstly, many of the benefits that current UAW members enjoy were negotiated
into labor contracts in the heady days of the late 1990s - when returns in
the financial economy [as measured by the DOW and NASDAQ] were super charged
indeed. These giddy days in the investment arena were in no small part due
to the now infamous Rubin/Clinton "strong
dollar policy" of the 1990s. In reality, this was arguably a lot of smoke
and mirrors - nothing short of inflationary policies being consciously pursued
under the cover of hedonic manipulation/alteration of CPI, PPI and the rigging
of the gold price. The disguise allowed unusually low [negative in real terms]
interest rates to be established and maintained - creating dislocations like
new credit-driven asset bubbles in real estate and commodities - and this is
the same interest rate regime we are still saddled with even to this day. As
with most entitlements in life, the ones negotiated by the UAW on behalf of
its members in the late 1990s are still enjoyed by auto workers today. Once
attained, they are only reluctantly
given up.
So where is the disconnect? Sounds like a win - win, doesn't it?
Economic Dislocations
We all know that equity returns post 2000 have been negative to anemic at
very best. So it's reasonable to assume that the equity portion of GM's pension
fund investments have not done very well over the past 5 years or so. But then
again, this is exactly why investment professionals have historically advocated
diversification among asset classes that are not directly correlated, so mortal
damage is not inflicted on an investment portfolio during a downturn. General
Motors, for example, has pension
assets under management of roughly 100 billion. Their asset
mix is roughly considered to be along traditional lines of 55% - 65% invested
in equities and 35% - 45% invested in bonds [fixed income]. This means, by
extension, that GM's pension assets have roughly 40 billion invested in bonds
[fixed income] or equivalents.
Now, I'd like to take you through a mental exercise explaining what has happened
to these bonds, namely, the returns on these bonds over the past five years
or so.
With inflation being underreported [somewhere around 2% a year] to the tune
of perhaps one third of what it actually is [7.27% as reflected by GM's projected
increased health care costs this year alone] from Reuters;
"The largest private U.S. provider of health care, GM has estimated that
its U.S. health care costs for more than 1 million current and retired
workers and their families will grow to $5.6 billion this year from $5.2
billion in 2004 [7.27% annual increase]..." [RK emphasis]
This might lead one [like me] to the conclusion that nominal interest rates
are perhaps 5% lower than they otherwise might be in a world where inflation
was being measured and reported truthfully and accurately. Strangely, 5% increased
return on a 40 billion dollar bond portfolio comes in at a cool 2 billion a
year in foregone return. Amazingly, this "missing" two billion in unearned
interest income just happens to be the very same amount that GM's
cash flow is projected to slip into the red for 2005.
"...Standard & Poor has downgraded GM stock to negative (from stable);
insiders expect a downgrade to "junk" is in the works. The result will be
higher cost of borrowing to finance operating cash flow, which is projected
at a negative $2 billion for 2005; earlier forecasts had been for positive
$2 billion...."
This, dear reader, is also the very same 2 billion a year albatross that's
been hanging around GM's neck for quite a few years now - accumulating. It
amounts to a great many billions of cumulative lost [intended] revenue that
ultimately has had severe repercussions on the balance sheet.
The effect of this lost revenue has generally served to push some companies
into newer [and quite possibly more risky] areas of investing, as they struggle
to maintain their current obligations under diminished fixed income streams.
For some, this has meant forays into areas like real
estate and for others a move into non-traditional business lines like financially
engineered derivatives - now
wreaking havoc across the financial landscape. For many of these companies,
financially engineered products have actually now become their mainstays - contributing
more to their bottom lines than their traditional offerings - like building
cars.
It suggests that there was perhaps more thought and attention paid to the
fundamentals like asset allocation when these pension funds were established
and their benefits originally instated. How could the framers have ever known
that the golden rules governing natural investment law would be bent and twisted
so far? That this has occurred is a shame. It has, at bare minimum, at least
been partly responsible for the credit ratings at GM and Ford recently being
downgraded to junk status. Unfortunately, no private pension plan [particularly Defined-Benefit
Plan] is immune.
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