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Talk at Politeia in London.
Stating the Issue.
The economics of the pension debate seem to me to have been bedevilled by
confusion between household and national savings. This was illustrated by the
First Report of the Pensions Commission ("FRPC"), which presented three solutions
to the perceived pension problem. (i) Taxes or national insurance contributions
devoted to pensions must rise. (ii) Savings must rise. (iii)
Average retirement ages must rise.
These were presented as if they are independent choices, which they are not.
If we have a pensions' problem, then national savings must rise. Furthermore
if a rise in national savings can be assured, it will only be possible if fiscal
policy is subordinated to that aim.
The issue can therefore be put into four parts: (i) What does a pensions'
problem mean? (ii) Do we have one? (iii) Can it be solved? (iv)
If so, how?
What Does a Pension Problem Mean?
A pension problem, for a nation as much as an individual, lies in whether
we save enough to meet our expectations about retirement incomes. If the answer
is no, we must adjust either our savings or our expectations. If we don't,
we will be faced with grief. This is likely to take the form of disappointment
and relative poverty for an individual and social strife for a nation.
Do We Have A Pensions' Problem?
This depends on our expectations. It is thus a political rather than an economic
issue. Nonetheless, it seems clear to me at least that British voters do not
favour a relative decline in the living standards of the elderly. I think that
it is also highly probable that this cannot be avoided at our current level
of savings. If these two assumptions are correct, then we do indeed have a
pensions problem.
Can it be Solved?
The answer is almost certainly yes, provided that the rate of national savings
rises. This is clearer for an open economy than a closed one. In the former
case there is no need for the growth in GDP to accelerate. A rise in UK savings
which was sufficient to offset our current account deficit would reduce living
standards by 2 to 3% p.a. in the short-term, but would increase our available
resources by around 60% of GDP over 15 years.
It is worth pointing out that this will not increase the net ownership of
international assets by the UK, it will merely prevent the large increase in
our net debts that would, on the same assumptions, otherwise occur.
A reduction in the growth of net foreign debt is not, however, possible for
the world as a whole. The problem of preserving the relative living standards
of the elderly is nearly universal and more pressing in the Eurozone and Japan
than it is in the UK. If a general solution is to be found, higher savings'
targets by individual countries are not a sufficient solution for two reasons.
The first is that a rise in investment is a necessary condition for a rise
in savings in a closed economy. The second is that this rise in investment
must, but will not necessarily, lead to an acceleration in the growth of world
GDP.
I will postpone for the moment a consideration of the problems involved in
raising savings in a closed economy. In practical terms, the UK can only deal
with its own problems, and as a relatively small part of the world economy,
it can increase its savings without the necessity of either increasing domestic
investment or running a current account surplus.
How.
National savings are the sum of the savings of different sectors of the economy
- households, companies and government. A rise in the savings of any one of
these sectors alone will not be a sufficient condition for a rise in the total.
For example, a rise in the household savings rate will have no effect on the
total if it is offset by either a rise in the budget deficit, or a fall in
business savings. The only one of these which the government can control is
its own budget balance. It follows that two conditions have to be satisfied
for a government determined rise in national savings to be achievable. First,
the fiscal balance must be set at a level which meets the national savings
objective. Second, this must be possible.
While some economists might dissent, nearly all would agree that fiscal policy
could be set at a level which would achieve the required level of national
savings. It is of course possible to argue for what is known as "Ricardian
equivalence". Households may adjust their savings to offset the improvement
in the budget balance. Most studies that I have encountered suggest that this
happens to some extent, but not sufficiently to make a target for national
savings an unachievable target for fiscal policy.
Interim Conclusion.
To summarise my argument so far:
(i) We have a large gap between the wish that the relative incomes of
the elderly will not fall and the rate of national savings needed to make the
achievement of that wish practicable.
(ii) This gap could be filled if and only if fiscal policy is subordinated
to achieving it.
Prospects.
It is possible, but not very easy, to be an optimist about the prospects for
the elderly income problem being solved, other than by accident.
The debate has started badly, due to the continuing confusion between household
and national savings. Discussion so far has concentrated on inessentials, such
as whether savings should be compulsory and whether the state pension should
be earnings or inflation related. This reduces discussion to the level of what
promises should be made without discussing whether they can be met; in short,
a discussion of ends while ignoring means. But this may be an example of a
problem being an opportunity and one that is being seized by our hosts today.
I hope that the debate will now improve and that this discussion will contribute.
The second reason for caution is the need to reform fiscal policy. To do this,
the faults of the present targets have to be accepted. It seems almost impossible
for politicians to admit error, but many manage to change direction without
seeming to do so. This is, however, easier for some than for others and our
current Chancellor does not seem to be well endowed with this particular skill.
The perception of fiscal inflexibility is also, I think, inhibiting the debate.
If the Pension Commission believe that a discussion of the fundamental issue
is taboo on political grounds, then the chances of raising the level of the
debate will remain low.
We Might Muddle Through.
Despite the problems, there is a reasonable chance that we might muddle through.
In saying this I am perhaps in danger of being the economists' equivalent of
Oliver Edwards, the sage, who is recorded in Boswell's Life of Johnson as remarking
that he 'wanted to be a philosopher, but cheerfulness kept breaking in'.
My hope is that we could witness a rise in household savings without a compensating
deterioration in the savings of business and government.
Household savings have fallen to an extremely low level. Because the figures
are presented differently - gross for the UK and net for the US, it seems seldom
appreciated that the level in both countries is almost the same and virtually
zero in both on a net basis. In both cases the driving force seems to have
been the rise in asset values, particularly in housing. As we have seen already
in the UK, a stabilization of house prices rather than an outright fall may
be all that is needed to cause household savings to rise.
If, in addition to this, pension savings are encouraged by some other means,
the level of household savings could easily rise by, say, five percentage points
of disposable income or three percentage points of GDP.
The impact of this on national savings will depend on the response of corporations
and government. Profits are high and a rise in household savings will, ceteris
paribus, cause them to fall. Things are not, however, likely to be fully equal.
For one thing, the impact of rising household savings will be heavily felt
in the government sector, since consumption is more heavily taxed than savings.
There is a reasonable chance therefore that the present fiscal rules, which
are highly unsuitable for an economy with a low household savings rate, might
help ensure that a rise in the household savings rate, were it to occur, was
not fully offset by deteriorating savings in the government sector and that
the overall impact would be to achieve a better level of savings at the national
level.
Problems of Adjustment.
I should perhaps discard my Oliver Edwards mood by noting the very considerable
problems of adjustment that we are likely to encounter in a move to a higher
savings environment.
If savings are going to rise, this must be accompanied with either a rise
in domestic investment, or a fall in our current account deficit.
If intentions to save rise in advance of these offsetting changes, then a
rise in national savings will be thwarted by a weak economy. An easy adjustment
is possible, but it is unlikely in almost any circumstances. It seems particularly
unlikely today when sterling is, by historic standards, expensive and when
external demand is far from robust.
The World Problem.
The lack of a robust world environment is, I believe, a reflection of the
fact that the world faces a problem which is similar and often worse than that
of the UK.
Dr Ben Bernanke's view that the world suffers from an ex-ante savings surplus
has been generally accepted. Indeed it is almost a tautology, in that the world
economy is far from robust despite the low level of real interest rates and
the high level of budget deficits. The importance of the point seems, however,
to me to be the persistence rather than the existence of this apparent surplus.
This suggests that the problem is structural rather than cyclical.
Since the problem of ageing is a worldwide rather than a peculiarly UK matter,
it seems reasonable to see demographic change as the key to this ex-ante savings
surplus. If the solution to the demographic problem is to increase savings,
as I have argued that it is, then one part of this is relatively easy. The
large budget deficits and low real interest rates, which have been used to
prevent the ex-ante savings from depressing demand, need to be ended. In their
place, however, some alternative source of demand is needed to prevent recession
thwarting the savings in a more unpleasant way than the fiscal and monetary
policies which have achieved this so far.
On a world view, the only viable way forward that I can see is for the cost
of capital to be reduced, so that investment is boosted rather than savings
thwarted. This cannot be achieved by low real interest rates, which serve to
reduce savings rather than boost investment. A possible answer is a major reduction
in corporation tax.
Reverting once again to my Oliver Edwards mood, I see a combination of international
competition and financial engineering as making the collection of corporation
tax increasingly difficult. It would be encouraging to think that governments
will increasingly recognize this, both with regard to the fact and to the benefits
that it should bring.
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