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This past week saw already unsettling rhetoric between the U.S. and Venezuelan
leader Hugo Chavez 'kick it up a couple notches,' so to speak, when it was
revealed on Friday, Sept. 30 - that Venezuela had moved its central bank foreign
reserves out of U.S. banks, liquidating its holdings in U.S. Treasury securities
- moving
the proceeds to Europe.
"We've had to move the international reserves from U.S. banks because
of the threats from the U.S.," Chavez said during televised remarks from
a South American summit in Brazil.
Anyone ever wonder what the Venezuelans might be purchasing with those proceeds?
While it's perhaps somewhat difficult to view this development in a positive
light - it did shed some light on what might have been motivating the Fed's
aggressive actions 'behind the curtain' where their Open
Market Operations are concerned:

Charts compliments of: www.omo.co.nz
The chart above depicts changes to the aggregate monetary balances in the
financial system resulting from Fed Open Market Operations from Sept. 19/05
thru to Friday, Sept 30/05. The extent of the bloating of liquidity [cash]
in the financial system is perhaps better appreciated when viewed in the context
of this graph below:

In viewing the chart above, one can clearly see the recent obscene parabolic "add" of
liquidity thru open market operations by the Fed thru their daily activity
in the context of the year to date. To the uninitiated, what this graphically
depicts - categorically - is the Fed responding to "systemic stress" on
the financial system. My guess that the action depicted above was the Fed's
response to a Venezuelan 'liquidation' of their U.S. obligations is pure conjecture
on my part. It is my sincere hope that my conjecture on this matter proves
to be accurate, because if I'm wrong - systemic problems in the financial system
still exist - and we, the great unwashed, simply do not know what the cause
really is.
While I have grown to be suspect of most Fed data - the above scenario seems
to be somewhat plausible given this August 12, 2005 amendment to the Venezuelan
Central Bank Act - where
it was reported:
The National Assembly has passed the amendment to the Central Bank of Venezuela
Act, making changes to the system to be followed for delivery of oil income
in foreign currency and authorizing the transfer of part of the international
reserves when they climb above the appropriate level of US$20 billion.
The money will be deposited in the National Development Fund (Fondem), to
be created by presidential decree, in order to provide the resources to be
used by the Executive Branch in financing investment projects, education
and health plans, and payment of the foreign debt.
It has yet to be seen how these new rules will affect the country's monetary
policy and financial system, especially once the rules governing the Fondem
have been defined.
On my planet, this seems to be highly indicative that Venezuela's U.S. dollar
holdings were already being somewhat curtailed given that U.S. dollar balances
would naturally [and necessarily] have been accruing at an ever increasing
pace - arising from the ever increasing price of crude oil exports that--currently--all
settle in U.S. dollars.
The only question that I'm left with - another conundrum inducing head scratcher
- why didn't Venezuela's [former] 20 odd billion of U.S. obligations ever get
them included on this illustrious TIC
data list:?
| MAJOR FOREIGN HOLDERS OF TREASURY SECURITIES |
(in billions of dollars)
HOLDINGS 1/ AT END OF PERIOD |
| Country |
2005
July |
2005
June |
2005
May |
2005
Apr |
2005
Mar |
2005
Feb |
2005
Jan |
| Japan |
683.3 |
681.3 |
686.2 |
685.7 |
680.5 |
680.3 |
679.3 |
| Mainland China |
242.1 |
243.7 |
243.5 |
240.5 |
223.5 |
224.9 |
223.5 |
| United Kingdom 2/ |
160.0 |
144.9 |
132.5 |
125.2 |
122.2 |
111.6 |
101.1 |
| Caribbean Banking Centers 3/ |
103.4 |
107.2 |
125.9 |
124.6 |
137.2 |
104.7 |
94.2 |
| Taiwan |
72.3 |
71.2 |
70.9 |
70.6 |
71.1 |
68.5 |
68.3 |
| Germany |
61.9 |
61.1 |
61.2 |
60.8 |
56.0 |
53.0 |
53.8 |
| Korea |
59.2 |
59.6 |
58.7 |
55.9 |
57.1 |
53.1 |
53.6 |
| OPEC |
52.8 |
57.3 |
62.6 |
60.6 |
62.2 |
67.6 |
67.0 |
| Hong Kong |
48.5 |
48.2 |
47.6 |
47.2 |
45.2 |
45.2 |
45.3 |
| Canada |
46.7 |
43.6 |
41.1 |
42.1 |
38.4 |
38.0 |
35.4 |
| Norway |
43.8 |
45.3 |
37.7 |
29.8 |
16.9 |
33.8 |
35.1 |
| Luxembourg |
41.1 |
38.5 |
44.6 |
45.3 |
42.2 |
42.9 |
41.7 |
| Switzerland |
37.4 |
39.4 |
42.0 |
43.3 |
44.1 |
44.3 |
40.8 |
| Mexico |
35.0 |
31.9 |
31.2 |
31.6 |
32.5 |
33.0 |
33.5 |
| Singapore |
28.6 |
28.9 |
30.3 |
30.0 |
30.7 |
29.2 |
29.9 |
| Brazil |
23.2 |
20.8 |
16.8 |
16.2 |
14.7 |
13.6 |
13.8 |
| France |
22.2 |
19.0 |
28.0 |
22.3 |
25.1 |
27.1 |
21.2 |
| Sweden |
19.0 |
19.4 |
17.9 |
16.8 |
16.9 |
16.3 |
15.8 |
| India |
17.6 |
16.1 |
16.9 |
18.0 |
18.3 |
18.1 |
15.9 |
| Belgium |
16.1 |
16.0 |
15.8 |
15.7 |
15.3 |
16.7 |
16.8 |
| Italy |
15.8 |
14.6 |
14.4 |
14.7 |
14.5 |
13.8 |
13.1 |
| Turkey |
15.2 |
13.8 |
10.1 |
10.7 |
11.4 |
10.4 |
12.9 |
| Netherlands |
15.1 |
14.7 |
15.2 |
17.0 |
18.1 |
16.5 |
16.8 |
| Ireland |
14.7 |
14.0 |
17.7 |
13.3 |
17.2 |
17.8 |
15.6 |
| Thailand |
12.1 |
12.8 |
13.3 |
11.1 |
12.1 |
13.0 |
13.3 |
| Poland |
11.2 |
11.4 |
11.8 |
11.9 |
11.4 |
10.6 |
10.2 |
| Israel |
9.2 |
10.0 |
10.3 |
11.6 |
14.6 |
14.3 |
14.9 |
| All Other |
127.3 |
122.7 |
124.6 |
128.6 |
128.1 |
128.0 |
125.8 |
| Grand Total |
2034.8 |
2007.4 |
2028.8 |
2001.1 |
1977.5 |
1946.3 |
1908.6 |
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Of which: FOI |
1235.5 |
1233.8 |
1241.7 |
1236.1 |
1227.9 |
1242.5 |
1238.3 |
| Treas Bills |
203.2 |
205.2 |
229.0 |
230.1 |
235.8 |
235.5 |
242.6 |
| Notes&Bonds |
1032.3 |
1028.7 |
1012.8 |
1006.0 |
992.0 |
1007.0 |
995.7 |
| |
Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board
9/16/2005 1/ Estimated foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury marketable and
non-marketable bills, bonds, and notes reported under the Treasury International
Capital (TIC) reporting system are based on annual Surveys of Foreign Holdings
of U.S. Securities and on monthly data.
2/ United Kingdom includes Channel Islands and Isle of Man.
3/Caribbean Banking Centers include Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Netherlands
Antilles and Panama. |
| Data compliments: U.S.
Treasury |
It sure looks to me that if Venezuela truly was invested in U.S. obligations
to the tune of 20 billion - OPEC totals in the TIC data above should have perhaps
been greater than the 53ish billion in the table above. After all, OPEC is
a ten-country club now - isn't it? [Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Venezuela]. Oh
well, I guess that's what happens in the world of high finance - it's easy
come, easy go.
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