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As the Clinton boom rolled on his media pals went into an orgy of praise,
declaring that the administration had discovered the Holy Grail of a recession-free
economy, that a "new epoch in economics had arrived and that the "the economy
has entered a new era". These Pollyanna statements were in part the result
of an inability to understand what was happening to the American economy. (There
was also the undisguised partisanship. This is why the same commentators do
not have a good word to say for the Bush boom).
The same sort of nonsense was said during the 1920s boom which was also hailed
as a "New Era", one, so it was thought, that heralded permanent prosperity
for the American people. A stable price level and booming output convinced
the likes of Sir Ralph Hawtrey, Keynes and Professor Fisher that the US economy
had indeed entered a "New Era", with Keynes describing the Federal Reserve
Board's monetary management as a "triumph" -- a triumph whose economic and
political denouement was the Great Depression. (Though Fisher was later ridiculed
for his optimism, Keynes was praised for his 'wisdom').
Let's take a look at the kind of figures that underpinned the optimism of
the time. Investment in the capital structure of about 6.4 per cent a year
caused manufacturing productivity per worker to rise by 43 per cent while prices
remained comparatively stable. By 1929 America was producing virtually as many
cars as in 1953, the sale of electrical products tripled, spending on radios
rose from about $10.7 million dollars in 1920 to more than $411 million by
1929, a prolonged building boom provided millions of Americans with their first
house.
That the period was marked by rapidly rising consumption was not disputed.
Like the 1990s, however, there was a dark side to this success story. Despite
the rise in productivity many workers found it difficult to maintain their
purchasing power. The increasing movement of married women into the workforce
at this time tends to lend support to this view.
Though the 1920s is considered by some to be greatest boom period in US history
the greatly neglected boom of 1896-1903 exceeded it, certainly in terms of
physical production though not in financial folly. Statistics show that nearly
half of the rise in productivity during the 1920s took place from 1921 to 1923.
US Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal that average real wages (excluding agriculture)
rose by just over 6 per cent from 1921 to 1929. Needless to say, this average
concealed considerable differences in pay rates.
The Fed's efforts to stabilise the price level succeeded in skewing consumption
and created an imbalance in production. (What the Austrian school would call
misdirected production or malinvestments). The rapid progress in productivity
should have seen the price level gently decline. Convinced by the likes of
Fisher, Gustav Cassel and Hawtrey that allowing prices to fall was a bad thing,
the Federal Reserve engaged upon massive credit expansion by forcing down the
discount rate.
The result was that though the number of dollar bills remained comparatively
stable ($3.68 billion in 1920 compared with $3.64 billion in 1929) credit grew
from $45.3 billion in June 1921 to $73 billion in July 1929, a 61 per cent
rise. It was this rapid expansion that fuelled the stock market frenzy and
created malinvestments by discoordinating the market process. However, by the
end of 1928 the inflation was over. Total money supply stood at $73 billion
on December 31, 1928 and $73.26 billion on the 29 June 1929. The result was
inevitable.
One argument advanced in support of the price stabilisation doctrine is based
on the fallacy that any general fall in prices is by definition deflationary
and will thus depress business activity and raise unemployment. This view makes
no distinction between a money induced fall in prices caused by a monetary
contraction and falling prices caused by rising productivity. Nonetheless, The
Australian Financial Review seriously argued (14 September 1998, p. 38)
that the period 1870-90 was a deflationary one in the US and that it was "excess
capacity" that drove prices down while "production boomed" [!]
It evidently did not occur to the author that booming output is incompatible
with 'excess capacity'. Moreover, he then admitted that the fall in prices
was caused not by a monetary contraction, i.e., genuine deflation, but by increasing
investment -- thus demonstrating how rife confusion is on this subject. As
Friedman and Schwartz discovered
Finally the price level fell to half its initial level in the course of
less than fifteen years and, at the same time, economic growth proceeded
at a rapid rate. The phenomenon was the seeded of controversy about the monetary
arrangements that was destined to plague the following decades; the other
was a vigorous stage in the continued economic expansion that was destined
to raise the United States to the first among the nations of the world. And
their coincidence casts serious doubts on the validity of the now widely
held view that secular price deflation and rapid economic growth are incompatible.
(Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United
States 1867-1960, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971,
p.15).
What is obviously not understood is that falling prices due to increased productivity
benefits everyone by spreading the fruits of increased investment. Attempts
to stabilise purchasing power of the monetary unit blocks this process, denying
to many rises in real income they would have otherwise enjoyed. And this is
precisely what happened during the 1920s boom. Credit expansion caused wage
rates in the capital goods industries to significantly outstrip those in the
consumer goods industries. By expanding credit capitalists were encouraged
to invest in lengthier and more complex stages of production causing them to
bid up wage rates at the expense of those in the consumer goods industries.
In addition, because the means (capital goods, i.e., savings) were not available
to finish these stages they eventually revealed themselves as malinvestments,
misnamed 'excess capacity'.
Put another way, labour employed in the capital goods industries had the value
of its services inflated by credit expansion, which in turn allowed it to bid
more goods away from other workers. It should also be clear that the credit
expansion imposed forced savings which kept real wages below the level that
a genuine free-market saving/consumption ratio would have dictated. And all
for the sake of stable prices. No wonder Phillips, McManus and Nelson were
driven to charge that "the end-result of what was probably the greatest price
stabilisation experiment in history proved to be, simply, the greatest depression".
(C.A. Phillips, T.F. McManus, and R.W. Nelson, Banking and the Business
Cycle, New York: Macmillan, 1937, p. 176).
Unfortunately it was the stock market frenzy that marked out the 1920s and
became the culprit for the depression instead of credit expansion. It is also
in the current stock market boom that we see shadows lurking from the financial
follies of the Roaring Twenties. By 1929 the average stock had tripled its
value in only 7 years. Alarmed at the apparent inexorable rise of the market
and the accompanying reckless speculation, Roger Babson, a Boston financial
adviser, was warning investors in September 1929 of an imminent crash. (Babson
was far from being a lone voice. Sound money men like Benjamin M. Anderson
and E. C. Harwood also warned that a crash was inevitable.
In early 1929 Hayek published a number of articles in the monthly reports
of the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, of which he was director, arguing
that the boom only had months to run. Felix Somary, another economist in the
Austrian school and Swiss banker, even warned Keynes against buying stock and
predicted an impending crash.
Keynes replied: "There will be no more crashes in our lifetime"). Convinced
that the price level proved that there was no inflation, Irving Fisher argued
that "stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau".
In his paper Is There Inflation in the United States?, 1 September 1928,
Keynes endorsed Fisher's optimism, only to admit in 1930 that he had been mistaken
about inflation.
As the French journalist Alphonse Karr observed: The more things change, the
more they are the same.
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