|
The US yield curve is giving a lot of economic commentators the jitters. The
rule is that whenever the yield curve goes negative, i.e., short-term interest
rates exceed long-term interest rates, a recession emerges some 12 to 18 months
later. There was a great deal of hand-wringing in late 2005 when the yield
turned negative. Recently the curve has started to flatten, with some commentators
now predicting that it will once again go positive and give the US economy
another spurt of growth.
The odd thing here is that the economic commentariat do not seem to realize
that in a truly free market the yield curve would always tend to be flat. If
a difference between long-term and short-term rates emerged then arbitrage
would eliminate the difference. Say, for instance, short-term rates began to
rise, then investors would desert long-term rates in favour of short-term rates.
This would see short-term rates fall and long-term rates rise until the curve
was flat.
What the vast majority of commentators overlook is that it is the central
bank that manipulates short-term rats. When the economic consequences of this
manipulation forces the bank to slap on the monetary brakes interest rates
rise and the economy goes into recession. Note: it is the monetary tightening
that brings the boom to an end. The rise in short-term rates is just a symptom.
Some have it that the current movement in the yield curve is the result of
investors speculating that the Fed is about to loosen the monetary spigot to
rescue the housing market. This means that investors are selling long-term
bonds and buying short term notes that would benefit from a rate cut. Be that
as it may, this action, if it is occurring only serves to confirm our view
that in a free market arbitrage would ensure that the curve remained flat.
At the end of March the federal funds rates was 5.26, which is only about
2.5 per cent in real terms. On 9 April 3 month notes were 5.03 per cent while
30-year bonds stood at 4.92 per cent, a difference of 0.13 per cent. So what
does all of this tell us about recession? Not much really. Economic figures
have to be interpreted. Now many people would see these rates as stimulating
output and hence GDP. But there are other factors at work.
The effect of artificially lowering short-term rates is to mislead business
into thinking there are more savings available then actually exist. This leads
to a pattern of investment in the higher stages of production that cannot be
sustained by the real rate of savings. Eventually the process reverses itself
and the demand for consumer goods starts accelerating as real wages rise. It
is at this point that manufacturing output tends to slowdown and eventually
go negative. In the meantime manufacturing employment drops while aggregate
employment rises.
This is the classic pattern of boom and bust and the one that marked Clinton's
last term of office. When this pattern emerges commentators are likely to lament
the weakening of capital spending, thereby successfully confusing cause and
effect. But what they should be looking at is spending of fixed capital but
spending on 'circulating' capital, otherwise known as intermediate goods. Therese
are the goods that pass from stage to stage. Now, having said that, do the
facts fit the theory?
During the last 9 months of 2006 inflation-adjusted expenditure on capital
goods, factories as well as machinery, grew by 3.9 per cent per quarter. The
previous three quarters witnessed an average of 8.2 per cent. Moreover, statistics
for January and February indicate a severe drop in orders for capital goods.
In addition, manufacturing has been shedding labour. Nevertheless, it is reported
that in March the economy generated an extra 180,000 jobs driving the unemployment
rate down to 4.4 per cent.
So where are all the jobs coming from? Austrian economic theory predicts that
the additional jobs will appear at the lower stages of production, those closest
to the point of consumption. As expected, we find that educational services,
leisure and hospitality companies, retailers and health care providers, etc.,
were among those occupations where the demand for labour rose significantly.
Clearly increased consumer spending is making itself felt. (It should be pointed
out that increased spending on consumption goods does nothing to raise the
marginal productivity of labour. Something that the classical economists fully
understood). All of this brings us to the money supply. From October 2005 to
the end of last March money supply (currency, demand deposits and other checkable
deposits) rose by 4 per cent.
Now to top it all off, it has been reported that businesses plan to increase
capital spending by 7 per cent during the next 12 months as against 4.9 per
cent in December. So what gives here? Off hand I'm inclined to think that the
Fed may be loosening money policy. Furthermore, large profits and low capital
gains taxes may very well have extended the boom.
For those of you who think I might be hedging my bets -- I don't blame you
for being suspicious. But let me draw your attention to three economic events
that illustrate why one should always exercise prudence in these matters. In
1923 the US economy began to experience a mild downturn. Left alone the market
would have easily liquidated the malinvestments. However, the Fed quickly reversed
the situation by rapidly expanding credit. Therefore those observers who were
led by the data to believe that a recession was imminent had to wait until
1928 to have their warnings about the state of the American economy confirmed.
In the 1920s the Fed used open-market operations to mop up 'excess' liquidity.
Yet credit kept on expanding. The reason was two-fold: firstly, open-market
operations were more than offset by a low rediscount rate that allowed banks
to replenish their reserves and so expand credit further. Secondly, new banking
rules not only allowed interest to be paid on time deposits it also reduced
their reserve from 7 per cent to 3 per cent. The result was that banks were
able to expand credit further by converting demand deposits into time deposits.
My third example comes from Australia. I had been predicting that the country
was heading for a recession. In early 1999 business investment dropped and
the current account deficit blew out to 5.2 per cent of GDP. Things were looking
grim. Then the March quarter for 2001 showed that manufacturing output had
fallen by 2.2 per cent, a figure that exceeded industry predictions and which
followed successive falls in the December and September quarters. Furthermore,
output had been falling during the previous 12 months. Firms were cutting back
on investment, shedding labour, introducing short-time working, and profits
were declining.
Naturally I declared that the jury was in that Australia was in recession.
The Reserve Bank of Australia then did what I should have expected it to do
and let the money supply rip. It cut rates from 6.25 per cent to 4.25 per cent,
a full two per centage. M1 rocketed by 22 per cent and credit exploded by 25
per cent.
So before readers start making predictions at this stage about the US economy,
I strongly suggest that they recall their economic history and continue to
bear in mind the monetary power of central banks.
Note: The Austrian definition of the US money supply is currency outside
Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks and the vaults of depository institutions.
Demand deposits at commercial banks and foreign-related institutions other
than those due to depository institutions, the U.S. government and foreign
banks and official institutions, less cash items in the process of collection
and Federal Reserve float.
NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) and ATS (automatic transfer service)
balances at commercial banks, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks,
and Edge Act corporations. NOW balances at thrifts, credit union share draft
balances, and demand deposits at thrifts.
AMS definition therefore equals cash plus demand deposits with commercial
banks and thrift institutions plus saving deposits plus government deposits
with banks and the central bank.
|