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Like a raging inferno engulfing a dry prairie, a rumor has been sweeping the
online financial community of late.
The rumor concerns the recent low made by the Dow Jones Transportation Average
and the supposedly bearish implication it has for the stock market in the coming
weeks and months.
It is being hailed by many as a "Dow theory sell signal" and is being talked
about across many financial publications and Internet sites as the latest in
a series of bad news for the broad market. The thinking behind this heavily
promoted fear is that the Dow Jones Transportation Average made a lower low
in November against its August correction low. Therefore a bear market is said
to be imminent.

Does this qualify as a legitimate Dow theory sell signal? Is a bear market
and economic recession coming our way? Before we can find the answers to these
questions, it might help to refresh our memories as to the meaning behind Dow
theory.
The Dow theory was developed by Charles Dow, founder and editor of the Wall
Street Journal, in 1897. Dow developed the two well-known broad market averages,
the Rails index (later the Transports) and the Industrials. The original rail
average was comprised of 20 railroad stocks.
The Dow Theory resulted from a series of articles published by Charles Dow
in the Wall Street Journal between 1900 and 1902 and later popularized by his
successor, William Peter Hamilton. Hamilton published a book on Dow theory
entitled "The Stock Market Barometer." Later authors such as Robert Rhea gave
further prominence to Dow's theory.
The basic tenets of the Dow theory are as follows:
- The two major averages (industrials and transportation) discount everything.
- The market has three trends: primary, secondary and minor.
- The averages must confirm each other.
- A trend is assumed to be in effect until it gives definite signals that
it has reversed.
With these rules in mind, let's have a look at what some of the pioneer Dow
theorists had to say about the theory and its interpretation.
First, it will do us well to remember that Robert Rhea, in his classic book "The
Dow Theory," gave the following disclaimer: "The Dow theory is not an infallible
system for beating the market. Its successful use as an aid in speculation
requires serious study, and the summing up of evidence must be impartial. The
wish must never be allowed to father the thought."
Referencing one of Hamilton's Wall Street Journal editorials, he writes, "The
market does not trade upon what everybody knows, but upon what those with the
best information can foresee. There is an explanation for every stock movement
somewhere in the future, and the much talked of manipulation is a trifling
factor." (Jan. 20, 1913)
Hamilton further wrote, "It is much harder to call the turn at the top than
at the bottom....The market, moreover, perhaps because of the complexity of
the situation and more truly because of the stability of the general prosperity
predicted by the barometer, may hold within a relatively small distance from
the top for an indefinite time. It might indeed be said that there are instances
of nearly a year with a range not far from the top, before an aggressive bear
market has been established." (Feb. 15, 1926)
These are important nuances to remember when approaching the Dow theory. A
sell signal is a major event that isn't to be treated lightly and Dow himself
would almost certainly disapprove at the way his theory has been misapplied
in making bear market predictions.
In further disclaiming the theory's infallibility, Hamilton said, "The task
of calling the exact top to a major movement is beyond the scope of any barometer.
It is additionally difficult where there has been no inflated speculation....Indeed,
it may almost be said that a bear argument understood is a bear argument discounted."
In "The Dow Theory," Rhea observes, "The movement of both the railroad and
industrial stock averages should always be considered together. The movement
of one price average must be confirmed by the other before reliable inferences
may be drawn. Conclusions based upon the movement of one average, unconfirmed
by the other, are almost certain to prove misleading."
This comment can be applied to the current discussion of the supposed Dow
theory sell signal. As we've already read in the above, the Dow Transportation
Average gives its best signals when it confirms the Industrials. Just because
one index makes a lower low while the other doesn't should not be interpreted
as a sell signal at face value. History shows many instances where the Transports
made a lower low at a correction bottom, only for the Dow Industrials to go
on to make higher highs.
The October 1998 correction low was one such instance. Back then, the Industrials
made a double bottom while the Transports made a lower low. If a trader was
looking at the Transports for a directional clue in October '98, he would have
been whipsawed as the broad market went on to recover its losses into December
'98.

Another instance of the Transports making a lower low against the Industrials
was in 1994. The DJTA actually made a series of lower lows between May and
December of '94 while the DJIA made slightly higher lows during that same period.

If an investor took his cue from the Transports (as many unfortunately did),
he'd have missed one of the most vibrant and sustained broad market rallies
of all time in 1995.
The broad market doesn't necessarily need the participation of the Transports
in order to experience a bull market. A recent example of lagging performance
on the part of the Transportation stocks would be the 2006 experience.
Last year, the Transports peaked in May and didn't recover its previous high
until February 2007. The Dow also peaked in May '06 but recovered its high
in September '06 and went on to make higher highs through February '07. That's
a lag of several months before the Transports eventually caught up with the
Industrials.
The granddaddy of Dow Theory non-conformation signals would have to be the
incident of the late 1880s through the early 1890s. Why bother to bring this
up since it was so long ago? Because it's precisely analogous to our own time.
You see, back then the 120-year Kress Cycle was bottoming into the mid-1890s.
We are heading into the Kress Cycle bottom of roughly 2014. That means the
period of 2007-2014 closely corresponds with the period of 1887-1894.
Let's look at what happened in 1887-1889. The equivalent of the Transportation
Index, namely the 20 Rails Index, peaked late in 1882 and declined sharply
until 1885. From there it fluctuated in a relatively narrow, lateral range
until the early 1900s. From 1887-1889 (equivalent to 2007-2009) the Rails went
sideways. (Source: A Century of Prices, by Sen. Theodore Burton and
G.C. Selden, 1919).
Compare this to the equivalent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average of 1887-1889.
The Axe-Houghton Industrial Stock Price Average took a hit in mid-1887 but
bottomed out by the fourth quarter and consolidated into early 1888. Then it
took off and had a stellar second half of '88 and continued rising into 1889,
peaking out at the top of a long-term uptrend channel in early 1890. The uptrend
in the Industrials didn't actually end until early 1893.
This shows there can be a multi-year lag between the Transports and the Industrials
in extreme cases.
Rhea himself called the confirmation of the two averages "the most useful
part of the Dow theory, and the part that must never be forgotten for even
a day."
Hamilton wrote, "Dow always ignored a movement of one average which was not
confirmed by the other, and experience since his death has shown the wisdom
of that method of checking the reading of the averages." (June 25, 1928)
What is the inference of a stock market movement where the averages don't
confirm each other? According to Hamilton, "Uncertainty still continues as
concerns the business outlook..." (May 24, 1924) It doesn't guarantee a bear
market or recession is around the corner, nor does it necessarily constitute
a bona fide sell signal. It just means the business outlook is "uncertain" in
pure Dow theory terms.
Hamilton went on to state, "There is one fairly safe rule about reading the
averages, even if it is a negative one. That is that half an indication is
not necessarily better than no indication at all. The two averages must confirm
each other.." (Aug. 27, 1928)
He states further, "Indeed it may be said that a new high or a new low by
one of the averages unconfirmed by the other has been invariably deceptive." (May
10, 1921)
Here are some further observations of Hamilton as recorded by Rhea:
"...when one breaks through an old low level without the other, or when one
establishes a new high for the short swing, unsupported, the inference is almost
invariably deceptive." (Feb. 10, 1915)
"...conclusions drawn from one average but not confirmed by the other, are
sometimes misleading, and should always be treated with caution..." (June 26,
1925)
"Once more it is worth while to emphasize that the movement of these two averages
is deceptive unless they act together." (June 9, 1915)
"They are frequently misleading where one group breaks through the line [of
support or resistance] and the other does not. When, however, the movement
is simultaneous there is a uniform body of experience to indicate the market
trend." (April 16, 1914)
"One of the shortest ways of going wrong is to accept the indication by one
average which has not been clearly confirmed by the other." (The Stock Market
Barometer)
There you have it, wisdom straight from the mouths of the Dow theory's founding
fathers.
The Dow theory as conceived by Dow and Hamilton was never intended to be a
standalone trading tool. It was simply a method for understanding overall business
conditions in the U.S. Modern day practitioners are sometimes inclined to make
entirely too much of Dow's theory in the way of stock trend predictions.
Dow theory is too cumbersome a tool to be used as a reliable trading system,
its signals often misleading. Indeed, those that have tried to do so have found
it wanting. To be useful to an investor it must be supplemented with other
forms of analysis, both technical and fundamental.
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