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As pundits on Wall Street want to hop on the next trade, they pronounce the
U.S. dollar is due for a bounce. In favor of a bounce speaks that popular media
cover the dollar's demise; and the Economist shows a burning dollar bill
on its cover page while discussing the "panic" out of the dollar.
While short-term currency moves are notoriously difficult to predict, it is
rather worrisome that contrarian indicators pose the best arguments for better
fortunes for the greenback. We also beg to differ with the Economist: there
is no panic out of the dollar, at least not yet.
Traders eager to jump on the "next" trade may be in for a disappointment.
It is the same disappointment the Federal Reserve ("Fed") has to
deal with: the issues weighing on the U.S. dollar and the U.S. economy don't
seem to want to go away. The markets tend to "look ahead" - but
rather than facing a recovery, the U.S. economy may be sliding further into
recession.
The forces for further credit contraction, and with it a slowdown in economic
activity, are firmly in place; and there may be little the Fed can do about
it. Over a decade ago, former Fed Chairman Greenspan gave his infamous warning
on 'irrational exuberance'; his market impact was rather short-lived
and the tech boom continued for years before the bubble burst. Ever since then,
Greenspan has said that the Fed should not try to prevent bubbles from occurring.
Alas, when homeowners created money by using their homes as ATMs, when hedge
funds, private equity firms and banks increased money supply by gearing themselves
up to make more leveraged bets, the Fed's rate hikes were rather timid.
This summer, when all those risk takers realized that world is not risk-free,
they pared down their leverage. Those who could not, e.g. those who had used
mortgage-backed securities as collateral, faced serious liquidity problems.
As leverage is pared down and more assets are sold than bought, prices adjust
downward. But because such downward price adjustments trigger further margin
calls (calls by lenders to provide more collateral for leveraged bets), the
most leveraged players have a vested interest in preventing price discovery
from occurring.
The Fed is trying to solve the current crisis with a textbook formula; trouble
is, the textbook was written by former Chairman Greenspan. The idea is that
the current crisis is just like the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s.
Let the Fed provide enough liquidity, and it will allow the troubled players
to move the trouble to special entities. While the problems may take a while
to work out, the financial system as a whole can move on once the special entities
have absorbed the bad loans. Except that the market doesn't play by the
Fed's rules: those in trouble are not taking advantage of the easy money
from the Fed to clean up their books. Sub-prime borrowers and holders of asset
mortgage securities continue to be shut out of the credit markets; the lowering
of the Fed Funds rate does not help those who would need access to credit the
most.
It's the market that has decided to reign in available credit. This
tightening by now extends far beyond the mortgage market, but has spread to
all sectors of the economy. Rumors make the rounds that stretched banks are
asking their customers not to draw on their lines of credit. Global credit
markets have seized, increasing the cost of borrowing to just about everyone.
The Fed's response is to simply make money even more easily available,
so that increased risk premiums still result in attractive effective interest
rates.
To make matters worse, the sub-prime "bailout" promoted by Treasury
Secretary Paulson is likely to tighten credit further. This bailout, in our
assessment, will not reverse the trend in the mortgage sector; the negative
headlines will persist. More importantly, though, the government has made it
clear that it is willing to modify mortgage terms to alleviate the hardship
on consumers. Paulson's claim that the bailout is a voluntary one is
little relief here, as Congress had made it clear that it is ready legislate
a solution should it be necessary. As a result, lenders will have to price
in the risk of government intervention on future loans. This has implications
far beyond the mortgage industry: foreign lenders may demand higher yields
when financing U.S. deficits. Given the choice of serving the elderly or paying
foreigners holding U.S. bonds, the U.S. government has made it clear where
its priorities are.
As a result, the forces for a weakening U.S. economy remain in place. Because
of its current
account deficit, the U.S. is dependent on daily inflows of about $3 billion
every single business day; in a slowing economy, a severe current account deficit
may cause a currency to plummet. Some say the dollar has fallen enough and
that the rate at which the current account deficit is worsening is improving.
As the dollar is weakening, the current account may indeed get some temporary
relief; but such relief may be of little help to the currency if primarily
driven by a weakening domestic economy. The boost in exports may not be able
to offset the reduced attractiveness of the domestic economy to investors.
Does this guarantee that the U.S. dollar will continue to fall? Of course
not; even if the problems worsen, as we expect, a technical bounce can not
be ruled out; if that bounce was to last a couple of months, the pundits will
once again tout the cyclicality of exchange rates. However, we are not faced
with mere cycles; the policies and forces in place have, in our assessment,
caused severe and long-lasting damage to the U.S. dollar; further, we do not
see any policies on the horizon that would revert this trend on a sustainable
basis.
Having said that, central banks in other countries are by no means eager to
see their currencies rise against the greenback. Asian economies with their
focus on exporting consumer goods to the U.S. are particularly vulnerable to
a rise in their currencies; not surprisingly, these countries have so far fought
successfully to keep their currencies weak. There is a lot of talk about the
speculative potential in these currencies. In our assessment, these currencies
do not qualify as "hard currencies" because we do not trust that
central banks there will not engage in irrational policies as they try to maintain
sales to American consumers in light of a slowing U.S. economy and upward pressure
on their currencies. Any momentum may well come from China as it tries to cool
down its economy; at this stage, it tries to reign in credit expansion through
a patchwork of regulation, when indeed a stronger Chinese yuan may well be
one of the more effective tools to induce a domestic slowdown; in our assessment,
any such move will come in small steps, and unlikely before the summer 2008
Olympics.
Canada and Australia, as resource based economies, have benefited from U.S.
and Asian efforts to overproduce at any cost. Australia has a significant current
account deficit itself and its currency may be vulnerable in a slowdown; because
of the high yield the currency provides, the currency has been a welcome destination
by speculators and is likely continue to experience elevated volatility. In
Canada, interest rates were recently lowered by its central banks to help exporters
that are highly dependent on serving the U.S. While Canada is thus one of the
first Western central banks to yield to the pressures caused by a strong currency,
the underlying Canadian economy remains strong; while the Canadian dollar is
no longer severely under-valued as it was a year ago, relative to the U.S.
dollar it continues to be attractive. At least that's our humble opinion:
given the choice of holding U.S. or Canadian dollar, we favor the Canadian
dollar.
In the past, we have called the euro the anchor of stability. This status
has not changed, as European Central Bank (ECB) president Trichet has made
it clear that while they will provide sufficient liquidity to allow credit
markets to function, they have no immediate need to lower interest rates. The
ECB can afford to have this hawkish view as the credit market problems are
imported from the U.S, and the underlying economies in Europe are - for
the most part - in good shape. There has been a surprising absence of
political meddling with ECB policy due to the strong euro; there certainly
have been some complaints by politicians, but very little given burden European
exporters are facing. This may well be because larger companies in Europe have
long-term hedges in place as exchange rate volatility is not a new phenomenon
to them. As these hedges run out, we will have to carefully monitor how political
pressure increases on the ECB, and how the ECB will react. Trichet believes
the European economies are reasonably well sheltered from a U.S. slowdown,
partially because of a strong intra-European market; partially because European
exports tend to be more higher margin products. While we are not as optimistic
as Trichet, understanding his thinking helps us in forecasting ECB behavior.
We manage the Merk Hard Currency Fund, a fund that seeks to profit from a
potential decline in the dollar. We provide exposure to a basket of hard currencies
without investing in equities; we also try to minimize interest risk.
To learn more about the Fund, or to subscribe to our free newsletter, please
visit www.merkfund.com.
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Axel Merk
Axel Merk is Manager of the Merk Hard Currency
Fund
The
Merk Hard Currency Fund is a no-load mutual fund that invests in a basket of
hard currencies from countries with strong monetary policies assembled to protect
against the depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. The
Fund may serve as a valuable diversification component as it seeks to protect
against a decline in the dollar while potentially mitigating stock market,
credit and interest risks - with the ease of investing in a mutual fund.
The Fund may be appropriate for you if you are pursuing
a long-term goal with a hard currency component to your portfolio; are willing
to tolerate the risks associated with investments in foreign currencies; or
are looking for a way to potentially mitigate downside risk in or profit from
a secular bear market. For more information on the Fund and to download a prospectus,
please visit www.merkfund.com.
Investors should consider the investment objectives,
risks and charges and expenses of the Merk Hard Currency Fund carefully before
investing. This and other information is in the prospectus, a copy of which
may be obtained by visiting the Funds website at www.merkfund.com or calling
866-MERK FUND. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.
The Fund primarily invests in foreign currencies and
as such, changes in currency exchange rates will affect the value of what
the Fund owns and the price of the Funds shares. Investing in foreign instruments
bears a greater risk than investing in domestic instruments for reasons such
as volatility of currency exchange rates and, in some cases, limited geographic
focus, political and economic instability, and relatively illiquid markets.
The Fund is subject to interest rate risk which is the risk that debt securities
in the Fund's portfolio will decline in value because of increases in market
interest rates. As a non-diversified fund, the Fund will be subject to more
investment risk and potential for volatility than a diversified fund because
its portfolio may, at times, focus on a limited number of issuers. The Fund
may also invest in derivative securities which can be volatile and involve
various types and degrees of risk. For a more complete discussion of these
and other Fund risks please refer to the Fund's prospectus. Foreside
Fund Services, LLC, distributor.
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