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IN
THE DEC. 12, 2007, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Alan Greenspan warned readers
that the mortgage crisis was "an accident waiting to happen." This was already
true and obvious when he was Federal Reserve chairman. He chose not to act.
His recent article rationalizes the inactivity of the Fed during both the stock
market and housing bubbles:
"After more than a half century observing numerous price bubbles evolve
and deflate, I have reluctantly concluded that bubbles cannot be safely defused
by monetary policy or other policy initiatives before the speculative fever
breaks on its own. There was clearly little the world's central banks could
do to temper this most recent surge in human euphoria, in some ways reminiscent
of the Dutch tulip craze of the 17th century and South Sea Bubble of the
18th century."
When he was chairman, Greenspan testified before Congress as the voice of
the central bank ("We at the Federal Reserve..."). Yet several members of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would have acted aggressively to attack
asset inflation and prick the stock market bubble in 1998. The chairman dismissed
both activities as beyond the mandate of central bank policy. Transcripts of
the Federal Open Market Committee tell the story of committee members with
an understanding of the terrors to come. (Since FOMC transcripts after 2001
have not been released to the public, Greenspan's behind-the-curtain discussion
of the housing bubble has yet to be revealed.)
By late 1997, the chairman was convinced stock market prices simply reflected
improved productivity. Given this, there was no stock market bubble. Thus,
the markets did not need to be considered when surveying inflation. (As background,
the NASDAQ rose 21.6% in 1997, 39.6% in 1998 and 85.6% in 1999.)
At the Dec. 16, 1997, FOMC meeting, Jerry Jordan, president of the Cleveland
Fed, had a different opinion: "Some board members referred earlier to the dichotomy
between the prices of services and the price of goods. That clearly is the
case, but the notion of dichotomy also has to be applied in the case of asset
prices... I was reading some material about the operations of the FOMC in the
early 1930s."
Jordan then draws a conclusion from the Fed's myopic concentration on the
steady price level of goods and services during the 1920s: "I think it's a
useful reminder of what can go wrong if we are too narrow in thinking about
the words 'inflation' and 'deflation'... What do we mean by the word 'inflation'?
Clearly, it cannot refer simply to the current price of goods..."
Greenspan, speaking a few minutes after Jordan, thought, "Something very different
is happening." The "something" Jordan identified was never addressed by the
chairman: "[W]e keep getting reams of ever-lower CPI readings that seem outrageous
in the context of clearly accelerating wages and an ever-tighter labor market...
I was startled by this morning's CPI report. We cannot keep getting such numbers
and continue to say that inflation is about to rise." Jordan had just told
Greenspan that inflation was out of control: It was Microsoft, rather than
mayonnaise, that was inflating.
At the March 31, 1998, FOMC meeting, Michael Prell, a Federal Reserve staff
economist, reviewed current conditions:
"The gravitational pull of valuation may no longer be operating. The P/E
ratio for the S&P 500 recently reached 27, based on trailing 12-month
earnings, even as companies were issuing warnings and analysts were lowering
their 1998 profit forecasts. In the prevailing psychological environment...the
market can keep going appreciably higher on its own momentum."
Jerry Jordan reminded the chairman: "I also continue to be concerned that
we may never see the effects of monetary excesses in output prices, but rather
we will see them in asset prices."
Cathy Minehan, president of the Boston Fed, was also worried: "This speculation
is fed by financial markets, which are extremely accommodative. From every
perspective that we can see in our region and nationally, monetary policy is
not tight; it is not even neutral. It is accommodative to an increasingly speculative
environment."
Nor was board member Susan Phillips attuned to the productivity miracle: "The
situation is starting to feel a bit surreal, perhaps even unbelievable... The
stock market may be too good to be true, and I must say this is the first time
I have felt really uncomfortable about the market."
The chairman's response was mixed. He seemed to understand the economy was
now driven by the stock market: "We have an economic policy that is essentially
unsustainable... There is no credible model of which I am aware that embodies
all of this." Then he decided to sit on the fence: "I do not think it is appropriate
to move, at this stage. Were we to do so, I believe we would create too large
a shock for the system, which it would not be able to absorb quickly." ("To
move" meaning to reduce the speculative money flows by raising the fed funds
rate.)
This to-and-fro continued from meeting to meeting. In March 1999, board member
Alice Rivlin warned, "There is the risk that the stock market's apparently
unwarranted continued upward price march may accelerate again to even more
bubbly heights, leading to a devastating crash when the bubble bursts."
Greenspan's reference in the Journal to the Dutch tulip craze and South
Sea Bubble is interesting. Michael Prell warned the FOMC of exactly that when
the stock market bubble was still inflating. At the Dec. 21, 1999, meeting,
the Fed economist read from a recent prospectus in which VA Linux stated it
lost $14.5 million in 1999 and expected to continue incurring significant expenses.
Yet it rose 700% on the first day of trading. Prell went on: "The warning language
I've just read is at least an improvement in disclosure, compared with the
classic prospectus of the South Sea Bubble era, in which someone offered shares
in 'A company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody
to know what it is.'"
Prell wondered "whether the spirit of the times isn't becoming similar to
that of the earlier period." He then described how impervious speculators were
to the Fed's rate hikes:
"Earlier this year, those stocks supposedly were damaged when rates rose,
because people said, quite logically, that the present values of their distant
earnings were greatly affected by the rising discount factor. At this point,
those same people are abandoning all efforts at fundamental analysis and
talking about momentum as the only thing that matters."
Prell might as well have read a laundry list. The enlightened members of the
FOMC had lost their spark by now. Greenspan had hopped off his fence a year
earlier, claiming, at the Dec. 22, 1998, meeting: "I do know that the presumption
we have discussed in the last year or so that we can effectively manage a bubble
is probably based on a lack of humility. As I've said before, a bubble is perceivable
only in retrospect."
If he had said this before, it is unrecorded. A reading of the FOMC transcripts
shows this was an entirely new theory. Perhaps the FOMC meeting was his off-Broadway
rehearsal. On June 17, 1999, he took his claim public, this time before Congress: "Bubbles
generally are perceptible only after the fact. To spot a bubble in advance
requires a judgment that hundreds of thousands of informed investors have it
all wrong. Betting against markets is usually precarious at best."
There was only scattered resistance. A New York Times editorial expressed
concern: "The new Greenspan is brimming with self-assurance. Let us hope the
market does not test his new confidence." The Maestro could do no wrong. Whatever
he said must be. The stock market bubble, probably the greatest in the history
of such bubbles, would burst in early 2000. It was negligible, compared with
the brewing mortgage bubble. But Greenspan had learned nothing from VA Linux
and was just as blind to the speculative fury engendered by negative-amortizing
mortgages. He can keep writing, but nothing will stop the popping of credit
bubbles blown so large by Greenspan's Fed.
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