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There are times when in order to find out where we are we need to discover
how we got there. And this is certainly the case with economies, and the US
economy is no exception. This is why economic lessons are vitally important
and why they need to be constantly aired lest the public be led astray by demagogues
and economic illiterates. (Think Obama and Hillary Clinton). One of the most
important lessons that was largely disregarded in the 1990s is that booms are
always followed by busts. (The dishonest US mainstream media's response to
this fact is to blame recessions on Republicans and always credit Democrats
with the good times).
Rather than look to economic history and well-tried theory for guidance commentators,
and many economists too, interpreted the boom as a "new era", one that had "abolished
the business cycle". The very same things were said during the 1920s boom.
One should have thought that this would have alerted reasonably intelligent
commentators to the distinct possibility of another American recession. Not
a bit of it. Instead they blamed Bush for the recession even though it emerged
during Clinton's second term
By and large, during the 1990s the economic commentariat appeared to think
of the American economy as a mysterious beast capable of defying the laws of
nature in general and economic gravity in particular. But there is nothing
new or mysterious about the Clinton boom. It was an old story that has been
continually repeating itself since before the dawn of the industrial age and
will continue to do so until sound economic thinking makes a triumph return.
I have spent years stressing that the so-called boom-and-bust cycle is a monetary
phenomenon. It is not and never has been a product of market forces, greed
or mass mania's, which are only the visible signs of strong undercurrents of
monetary disturbances. We need only remind ourselves that money is neither
neutral nor passive. This is something that the Austrian school fully understands.
As Fritz Machlup put it:
... monetary factors cause the [business] cycle but real phenomena constitute
it, Essays on Hayek, Routledge, Kegan Paul 1977, p. 23).
And this will remain the case until the economics profession acquires a vastly
better understanding of the nature of money and interest rates. On numerous
occasions I have tried to explain that money is an incredibly active agent
that will create clusters of malinvestments by misdirecting production during
the course of a boom. Credit expansion is the means by which this is accomplished.
As credit expansion is part of the money supply it is the responsibility of
the Federal Reserve to control it. Instead it allowed a reckless if not criminal
expansion of credit to take place. Bernanke is now doing all he can to repeat
its mistake.
It was Greenspan's policy of credit expansion that fuelled the boom, triggered
the hi-tech stock mania, blew the current account out and encouraged reckless
borrowing. But it's a story I have told so many times I'm beginning to understand
how Cassandra felt when King Priam ignored her warning of Greeks bearing gifts.
But like treachery and deceit, the erroneous ideas that justify credit expansion
will always be with us, forever inserting their insidious presence into every
government's economic policy. And that includes governments of every political
persuasion.
Let's look at some figures. Dr Frank Shostak pointed out that in January 1980
the money base stood at $132 billion. By the end of April 2000 it stood at
$574.2 billion, a 335 per cent rise. No wonder the federal funds rate fell
from 17.6 per cent in 1980 to 3 per cent in 1993. Interesting enough, it was
estimated that the money base shrank by about $45 billion dollars once Greenspan
started to raise rates. But did credit shrink? No. (Most people still do not
understand that cash deposits and bank credit are not identical).
That consumer spending rose by 8.3 per cent in the last quarter of 2000 was
not evidence that credit was still expanding. To put it simply: the Fed flooded
America with credit. Credit has much in common with a house flooded by burst
water pipes. Even though the water is turned off it will still take time to
drain the remaining water out of the structure and dry the place out. In other
words, there is a time element. Nevertheless, even if credit when credit is
still expanding a shrinking cash base would eventually end the expansion it
and bring on a credit crunch. Moreover, as I have explained before, real forces
eventually move to burst the boom, no matter what happens to M1.
On final point needs to be considered. I have warned that it's possible that
encouraging consumption could retard the demand for labour in the higher stages
of production. Hence the demand for labour at the consumption stage and in
services could rise while the demand in manufacturing remained sluggish. Of
course, there is the possibility that even if manufacturing is expanding it
could lose labour to the lower stages of production if spending on consumer
goods is sufficiently intensive. This would be just another case of credit
expansion distorting the structure of relative prices.
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