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The current economic situation brings to mind 1999 when worries about the
state of the US economy were piling up faster than rationalisations about the
country's alleged growth rate. There was less talk of a "new era" economy and
more about a "correction". What was it that brought about a more subdued assessment
in so many quarters? Commodity prices are the answer.
The problem with commodity prices is not their price falls but the squeezing
of their price margins, the difference between costs and prices. This is an
important signal to look for yet, like the Titanic's SOS, no one seemed to
have been listening. It's the same old problem of not seeing the trees because
of the wood. And in this instance, price margins were the trees.
We witnessed mood swings from overvalued stock to falling commodity prices
and back again. First, so we were told, the former could burst and send the
economy into recession; on the other hand, a continuing fall in commodity prices
would tip the world into a global recession. Well, which one was it? Neither,
is the answer. Falling commodity prices can no more cause a recession than
falling share prices can. And yet the two are closely linked just as some clusters
of mergers are. In economics, everything is connected to everything else and
prices are the means by which this is accomplished.
Distort prices and you discoordinate the whole economic process. This, unfortunately,
is precisely what the Fed did, and still is doing. What is equally unfortunate
is that the vast majority of economic and financial commentators are totally
oblivious to this fact. Loose monetary policy fuelled Clinton's stock market
boom and fuelled corporate mergers while having a malign influence on commodity
price margins. Commodities are inputs. As I explained in previous articles,
artificially lowering the rate of interest causes over-expansion in higher
stages of production.
Commodities are part and parcel of those stages, meaning that lower interest
rates also raise the demand for commodities, even though their secular price
trend is downward. Once the higher stages find themselves in a profits squeeze
as rising costs and falling demand puts them in a financial vice, this will
feed back into a reduced demand for these products which in turn reduces their
price margins. This is why commodity price margins rather than commodity price
trends should be followed more closely*.
But where do mergers enter the field? Two periods in American economic history
throw considerable light, at least in my opinion, on "corporate mega-mergers".
Readers will recall that I have referred several times to the 1920s economic "new
era". But the boom of 1896 to 1903 was also very much a "new era" phenomenon.
Now 1924 to1929 was characterised by considerable take-over activity, just
as the 1899-1902 period was.
These "new eras" were marked by 'cheap credit' and feverish stock market activity.
With ample credit available and stocks rapidly rising it becomes easier to
issue abundant securities, which made it easier to buy out other companies
and consolidate holdings. Once again, it is what fuels the action that counts
rather than the action itself. Each era of considerable merger activity was
fuelled by credit expansion.
Like the rest of the world, America is going through not a business cycle
but a cycle of ignorance. The belief that the so-called business cycle is a
natural and unfortunate feature of market economies is so ingrained that it
is rarely questioned. For nearly 2000 years Aristotle's assertion that heavier
objects fall faster than lighter objects held sway over the European mind.
Then one day Galileo completely demolished Aristotle by simultaneously dropping
from the top of the Tower of Pizza objects of different weights.
Regrettably it is not as easy to refute the fundamental belief that the trade
cycle is a sad by-product of capitalism, especially since the birth of Keynesianism.
But until we do our economies will continue to undergo periodic booms and depressions.
Even though the Austrian School of economics has provided an analytical refutation
of Keynesianism it has yet to receive the recognition it deserves. This means
that we shall continue to suffer the consequences of the public's economic
ignorance.
*This does not mean that commodity prices always rise during a boom. After
WW I commodity prices were depressed despite the post-war booms The reason
is that the war had created an excess supply that that took years to balance
out. On the other hand, current booms in China, the US, India have driven up
commodity prices.
One must also consider a situation in which improved technology could keep
commodity prices stable even as demand increased significantly. In the absence
of a rise in demand commodity prices would have risen. We can therefore say
that the difference between the boom price and the price that would have otherwise
prevailed amounts to an increased prices for commodities.
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