Daniel Yergin, in the prologue to his award winning book, uses the language of anthropology to describe what the human species became in the past century: Hydrocarbon Man. While the search continues for alternative fuels and millions are spent on research and development, modern man will continue for some time to come to be dependent on Persian Gulf oil: the strategic prize. This essay focuses on the terrorist threat to oil pipelines in the region.

The question is, given the strategic importance of Middle East oil to the West and its economic and technological dependence on oil: Why have pipelines in that part of the globe not been primary targets of international terrorism to date?

It is puzzling why terrorists have not chosen Middle East oil structures as targets. One terrorist expert puts it this way:

"Trying to find out why terrorists do what they do is a bit like trying to solve a good fictional murder in that one is dealing with the elements of motive, method, and opportunity. However, the plot is reversed. With the classic murder one starts with a victim, and has to determine the motive, methods, and opportunity involved in order to discover the perpetrator. With target selection on the other hand, the motives are known, the means can usually be estimated, and the opportunities are fairly plentiful. What one has to determine is who or what is likely to be the victim."

Like a good, fictional murder mystery, the task of explaining silence, why something does not happen, gives a double twist to a plot and makes solving a mystery much more complicated. Sherlock Holmes, the master detective, solved a classic murder in The Hound of the Baskervilles when he learned that the dog was silent when it should have been barking. But, it is unlikely that in the process of answering the basic question, we will find a single clue to unwrap the mystery surrounding the silence of oil terrorism in the Middle East. For unlike in Holmes' time, it is not hounds but jackals that have captured our attention in the 21st Century drama, the non-state actors who for most members of the world-audience will always remain a mystery: terrorists.

In looking for clues, our investigation will sift the evidence found in open sources and evaluate the Middle East silence by methods, scientific and otherwise.

Although the focus is on the security of Middle East oil pipelines, globalization and the throughput character of the oil industry require brief consideration of threats to the oil infrastructure of the entire industrialized world, from Australia to the United States and from China to Turkey. In this respect, the vulnerability of oil pipelines in the United States is discussed with one eye on critics who see real danger in pointing out soft targets to terrorists' cells with the technical means to terrorize multinational oil companies and the US public. Nevertheless, Maynard Stephens over 20 years ago did not hesitate to diagnose the Achilles heel of Hydrocarbon Man in the United States:

"Established petroleum and natural gas operations, their pipeline interties, and associated tankage and storage are the most attractive targets of dissidents. But there is no part of the industry that is immune to being seriously damaged by someone who has a little knowledge of it or makes an effort to learn its frailties. It is no wonder that security personnel and management become almost 'paranoid' at the thought of having attention drawn in publications to the vulnerability of the industry... But how does one know what dangers and threats to guard against?"

As will be shown, the dangers and threats to oil pipelines are real. The author makes no apology for calling the attention of US policy and police officials to the threat that continues to exist from individuals wanting to hamstring the United States by interdiction of oil flows with which the economy runs and the military rolls.

The Silence

While Stephens had to deal with the silence of domestic inaction, our attention turns to the silence of terrorism. For analyzing patterns of global terrorism, specifically against oil pipelines, we turn to reports on terrorism by the US Department of State. The total number of terrorist attacks between the years 1981 and 2000 declined from 429 in 1981 to 423 at the end of the millennium and a high of 666 attacks in 1987. The Middle East region saw a decline in such incidents from 45 in 1995 and 1996 to 16 in the year 2000 with a total of 199 for the period. Only North America had fewer attacks than the Middle East. During the same five-year period, business facilities were attacked on 1,842 occasions; diplomats, 200; governments, 97; military, 48 and other facilities, 571. Thus, terrorists attacked worldwide businesses twice as frequently as all other targets combined, 916.

Turning another page in the Department of State report, we discover in the year 2000, that of the total attacks (557), oil facilities were singled out only 10 times, and, of this number, none were in the Middle East! We therefore conclude, that of the 384 business facilities struck in 2000, none were leveled against oil facilities in the Middle East.

Going back further in time, we discover that terrorists infrequently attacked pipelines. From 1968 to 1979 there were 63 transnational terrorist incidents among nine Middle Eastern states: Bahrain (2), Iran (43), Iraq (4), Kuwait (10), Oman (0), Qatar (0), Saudi Arabia (3), UAE (1), and Yemen (0). These oil-producing countries are located atop huge oil reserves and astride a tangle of oil pipelines and oil shipping lanes. Of the total number of incidents five were related to the oil business and of these only two incidents involved oil pipelines or facilities. In January 1972 facilities of the Kuwait Oil Company, partially owned by US firms, were damaged twice. The second incident occurred on May 11, 1997, when saboteurs set fire to the Aramco-operated Abqaiq production center, causing $100,000 damage to a network of pipelines.

Led by Illich Ramirez Sanchez (aka "Carlos, the Jackal"), a significant terrorist attack occurred on the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) headquarters in Vienna Austria on December 21-23, 1975. The terrorist group -- The Arab Revolution -- seized 70 hostages, including 11 oil ministers, and barricaded themselves in OPEC offices. Extortion was thought to be the purpose of the raid. Saudi Arabian and Iranian governments paid perhaps as much as US$50-million to the terrorists who took themselves and 42 hostages back to Algeria. Huge sums of money were transferred to a bank in Aden. Although this attack was not against oil pipelines, the incident serves to remind us that terrorists of two and three decades ago viewed the oil industry as a profitable target, and that the jackals of today are ready, willing and able to deal in a new brand of eco-terrorism.

Definitions

Generally speaking, the petroleum industry is segmented into geological exploration and drilling, construction and operation of production facilities, crude oil transportation and gathering, crude oil refining and storage, product transportation, and retail distribution. Our interest is in the pipelines located in the first three segments and specifically those in the Middle East. Both oil and gas pipelines are found in these segments and both are implied in the single use of the word "pipelines" unless otherwise noted. This word therefore is more or less synonymous with the front-end infrastructure of the petroleum industry. As will become clear below, the term "Middle East" refers to the oil producing states surrounding the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.

Many observers, writers and commentators have noted that no one definition of ""terrorism" has gained universal acceptance. This paper will attempt to consistently use the US Department of State definition of terrorism in use since 1983 for statistical and analytical purposes:

"The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The term 'international terrorist' means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

The term 'terrorist group' means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism."

Transnational terrorism has the same meaning as international terrorism and is further defined as nonmilitary threats that cross borders and threaten either the political, social or economic integrity of a nation or the health of its inhabitants. As discussed below, inclusion of economic prosperity, dependent as it is on the flow of oil from the Middle East, in the defense policy of the United States means that significant acts of transnational terrorism will attract US forces.

Global Oil Targets

Transnational jackals do not lack oil target prey. The abundance is seen in the importance of oil in the world economy and is driven home by eye-opening statistics and spectacular claims.

The terrorism from the sky of September 11, 2001, impacted the minds of all who heard and saw the events. Since then people see the possibilities for terror everywhere. Technology is now the enemy rather than the comforter it appeared to be. Squeezed along the paths of energy systems, we are unable to escape the final destinations of flight paths, fluid tunnels, and electrical circuits. The homeland of the self seems unable to locate the off switch just beyond its reach.

The "new victims" fix their minds on vulnerability to the world's energy systems and find themselves more curious about sources of power and light. Because the most recent and violent terrorism comes from Middle East countries, the energy coming from these countries in the form of "crude", the precious black ooze is again of special interest as it has been periodically in each of the past three decades.

World energy consumption remained stable during the latest years reported, 1996, 1997, and 1998. The US ranks either first or second in the production of world energies: crude oil, (2); natural gas plant liquids, (1); dry natural gas, (2); coal, (2); hydroelectric power, (2); and nuclear electric power, (1). Petroleum once constituted almost 50 percent of the world's energy; it now accounts for less than 40 percent. The difference is made up of mostly natural gas and nuclear power. Production of petroleum (crude oil and its by-products) reached an all time high of 75 million barrels per day (MMBD) in 1998. Three states accounted for 31 percent of the oil production -- US, Russia, and Saudi Arabia -- or 20 MMBD.

One observer of the Middle East stated, "Oil is not the only source of energy, but it has been and will remain the single most important fuel. It constituted 47 percent of world energy use in 1970 and 39 percent in 1997. And it is projected to provide 38 percent in 2020." Another writer noted, "At the end of 1997, the market capitalization of each of the top 10 companies in the world exceeded the gross national product of over 150 of the 185 members of the United Nations." Oil provides 79 percent of the total revenue for Venezuela, 84 percent for Saudi Arabia and 95 percent for Nigeria. Seventeen of the Fortune 40 companies of the world are in the petroleum business and the annual revenue of each company exceeds the Gross Domestic Product of half the nations of the globe. Oil accounts for 5 percent of all the commodities traded in the world, and it far outranks the commodity in second place. By any measure oil is vital to the world economy and critical to the prosperities of many nations.

The Moving Target

The processing and flow of oil from wellhead to the ultimate consumer is complicated and continuous, but points along the way may be simplified and discussed without comprising the analysis of their vulnerability to terrorist attack. Critical oil facilities in the Middle East may be summarized under four headings: crude oil pipelines, loading terminals, tankers and waterways.

Pipelines: The Middle East has three basic pipelines: the Iraqi, the Saudi Arabian and the Caspian. The Iraqi system is the "most extensive, complex and exposed to uncertainties". Decades of conflict disrupted the area and finally closed the line that ran from near Kirkuk and divided into two 12-inch pipelines running to Haifa, Israel and Tripoli, Lebanon. A new 590-mile, 40-inch pipeline went into operation in 1977, which linked the Iraqi fields with the terminal in Dortyol, Turkey on the Mediterranean Sea. A second parallel Turkish line was constructed in 1987. Due to sanctions following the Gulf War, the Turkish lines were also closed.

As a safety measure Iraq constructed in 1977 a 42-inch "strategic pipeline" that linked Kirkuk to the Persian Gulf terminal at Fao. This "strategic line" was constructed with a reversible flow allowing oil to be directed northward to Haditha. Construction of another strategic line of 42-48 inches in diameter was started but not completed before the Gulf War. Looking for a safer alternative, larger throughput, and increased production, Iraq constructed in 1985 and 1990 two pipelines around Kuwait to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis shut down both lines when Iraq attacked Kuwait in August 1990.

Four types if pipelines traverse Saudi Arabia: crude oil (6,400 km), natural gas (2,200 km), gas liquids (1,600 km), and petroleum products (150 km). Its oil fields are located in the Eastern Province close to the coast of the Persian Gulf. Abquiq is the major processing center for crude oil in the southern area about 40 miles south west of Dhahran. The northern area is headquartered in Ras Tanura, forty miles north of Dhahran. Most of the crude oil and refined products from the Ras Tanura refinery is delivered to tankers at Ras Tanura or Ju'aymah also on the coast. Offshore fields are at Safaniya and Zuluf. Located in Saudi Arabia is Ghawar, the largest oil field in the world.

In the early 1950s a 30-31-inch line of about 750 miles, the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), was constructed along the border with Iraq, through Jordan, Syria and ending on the Lebanese coast south of Beirut, in Zahrani, next to Sidon. Following the Lebanese civil war, the Tapline was mothballed.

Because of the dangers of shipping oil by tankers through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia constructed the 48-inch "Petroline" from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province with Yanbu on the Red Sea, a distance of 747 miles. This pipeline is known as the Iraqi-Saudi Pipeline. It and a second parallel were closed indefinitely following the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Parallel to the Petroline is the Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline that serves the petrochemical plants at Yanbu. Saudi Arabia has sought alternative export routes because of conflicts and its pipelines lack adequate security.

Altogether, Saudi Arabia has about 77 oil and gas fields, 1,430 wells, and seven refineries. Its 2001 budget called for drilling 246 more wells (208 onshore and 38 offshore) at a cost of US$1-billion. Another 292 wells are planned for 2002. The Saudis were expected to earn in 2001 about US$62.6-billion in crude oil export revenues, double their 1998 revenues.

Pipelines of the Caspian Sea Basin typify the complexity of pipeline construction and the difficulties of protecting them, or from the terrorist's perspective, how easy it might be to interrupt the flow of black gold, eg: the Caspian Pipeline of 460-miles that will connect western Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea Port of Novorossiysk. This pipeline will allow maximum development of the Tengiz field with potential reserves of six -to nine- billion barrels of recoverable oil. Planned production peaks at 700,000 BD in 2010. After construction and testing, the pipeline must be maintained and protected. Security of the pipeline, as noted below, will come from governmental and non-governmental sources.

Construction of the global oil and gas infrastructure will continue at a healthy and sustained rate through 2003 and beyond. One survey indicates 60,000 miles of oil and gas pipelines are in various stages of construction or planned for construction. Planned pipelines and those under construction in the Middle East total 8,092 miles. Several are more than 1,500 miles in length. What armed forces will be called upon to protect these new initiatives?

Loading Terminals: Throughout the continuous process of petroleum production and transport, oil enters storage tanks at various stages along the way, near wells, at refineries, and near seashores. Oil is moved from shore to oil loading terminals located either on shore at fixed docks reachable by oil tankers or at offshore terminals, circular moorings for one or more ships. Construction of underwater pipelines is a costly and difficult job. The pipes are made of steel and laid from special barges only in good weather. The underwater pipes are from 20 to 36 inches in diameter and made up into 39- foot lengths. It may cost more than US$1.5-million to lay a mile of underwater pipe. Oil is moved through these underwater lines by pump stations resting on floating platforms to the terminal and into large oil cargo tankers. Most oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf are offshore in deep water where the terminals can handle supertankers. Fixed deep-water ports are located at Kharg (Iran); Khor-al-Kafka and Khor-al-Amaya (Iraq); and Mina-al-Ahmadi (Kuwait). The only terminals able to accommodate super tankers of 400,000 to 500,000 deadweight tons (DWT) are those of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. Controlling depths in the Mediterranean Sea are too shallow for berthing and maneuvering supertankers.

Tankers: Oil tankers range in size from 30,000 DWT to 500,000 DWT and their oil capacities from 200 MMBD to 3,700 MMBD. Oil tankers of all sizes carry about 60% of the world's oil out of the Persian Gulf. Tankers at oil terminals or in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are vulnerable to attacks from shore batteries, small arms fire, surface-to-sea missiles, air attacks, and sea mines. To obtain an idea of possible consequences and the disruption of the flow from a multiple terrorist attack on oil tankers, no worse case scenario is better than that of the Iran-Iraqi War. Iran attacked 173 ships and Iraq did the same to 283 vessels, however oil supplies during this so-called "Tanker War" from 1980-87 were only marginally affected.

In fact, tankers large and small have not been to date favorite targets of maritime terrorism. Attacks are very difficult to execute and terrorists are at high risk. Payoffs are low; the killing of crews and large oil spills are not as spectacular as other land targets. An analysis of hijackings on high seas reveals no regular pattern and no geographical cluster. The primary danger comes to ships when they are in port where they accessible to terrorist bombing or mining. The bombing in Yemen of the USS Cole in 2000 is a recent reminder.

Waterways: Crude oil is threatened as it moves from its source in a Middle Eastern country to its ultimate destination: the consumer. Terrorists may attack pipelines on land or sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Tankers carrying crude from the Middle East are especially vulnerable at oil transit choke points around the world: Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bab el Mandeb, Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline, Bosporus/Turkish Straits, and the Panama Canal. It is not only the United States and Europe, which are dependent on the oil sailing through these choke points but also countries like the Peoples Republic of China and Japan. The US Department of Energy estimates that the Middle East countries exported an average of 17.7-MMBD in 1995.This amount was 47% of the world total of 37.7-MMBD. Projections are that by 2020 these exports will reach 40-MMBD and be 60% of the world's total.

Target Selection

When will terrorist cells attack Middle East pipelines? Attacks will begin when the petroleum infrastructure satisfies target criteria. The process of target selection is complicated and constantly undergoing change. Target selection in an armed conflict between states is a science and an art, and it is equally true for terrorist groups who select their targets on the basis of many factors. While it is relatively easy to imagine and theorize about factors that enter into target selection, the dynamics among and between non-state actors and selection factors is complicated, fast moving, and stealthy like terrorists themselves.

Contrary to popular opinion, terrorists are not free to do anything they want. Every potential target is not available to every terrorist cell, and these cells face a number of constraints. Pipelines themselves are complicated systems. Terrorists may simply lack resources to attack pipelines, although given the technical sophistication of today's transnational terrorists, the resource criterion does not appear to be much of an impediment to action.

Furthermore, protection of pipelines has high priority among oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, and damage is quickly repaired. Also, other targets, such as civilians, may be of more interest to terrorists than are pipelines. Media impact is frequently crucial in the thinking of terrorists. Destruction of remote pipelines may not make the evening news on CNN for any number of reasons. Terrorists with the objective of making a statement to the world would probably not want to risk not having their activities reported, especially in countries where state control of media exists. Other constraints with examples are international opinion (UN, OPEC), security environment (Saudi Arabia National Guard-SANG, NATO), protective measures (electronic, number of control valves), current situation (FBI teams, diplomacy of sponsoring state), and leadership (planning and organization).

Oil pipelines in the Middle East may not be targets for terrorists because they are selected out during the target selection process.

Global Target Incidents

Of the five categories of transnational threats -- transnational crime, transnational terrorism, international migration flows, disease and international pandemics, and global environmental degradation and climate change -- the focus here is on terrorism. It is not as though terrorists avoided pipelines elsewhere around the world. In the year 2000, Latin America alone experienced 193 attacks, up from 121 the previous year. There were 10 oil related, significant, terrorist incidents: Colombia, four; Indonesia, one; and Nigeria, five. The four pipeline incidents were all in Colombia. What lies behind the four "incidents" in Colombia is the fact that Colombia's second-largest crude oil pipeline, the Cano-Limon Covenas, was attacked 152 times. This record number of attacks was blamed on the National Liberation Army, one of two large guerilla groups. As a result, Occidental Petroleum halted exports through most of August and September. Terrorists in these oil-related attacks attempted to obtain funds through extortion and ransom.

All acts of violence have an element of terrorism. For this reason, the terrorist label attached to acts of violence may cloud our understanding of transnational terrorism. Aggressive acts in wartime are often termed terrorism. For example, Iraq is said to be guilty of ecological terrorism in Kuwait, when in 1991 it deliberately torched or sabotaged more than 500 Kuwaiti oil wells, storage tanks, and refineries. It dumped an estimated six-million barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf, the largest oil spill ever. The oil fires were the worst ever: three- to six-million barrels of oil daily went up in smoke and flames during peak times. After visiting the area, the head of the US Environmental Protection Agency said, "If hell had a national park, it would be those burning oil fires." Whether caused by a government leader or a terrorist, pipeline destruction is the same no matter what terminology is used to describe the perpetrator.

Pipeline Security

One or a combination of agents protects oil pipelines: (1) the oil-producing state, (2) a foreign state, (3) a multinational oil corporation, (4) a non-state armed actor, and (5) a private contractor. Non-state actors include religious movements, revolutionary insurgents, warlords, guerrilla groups, drug cartels, international criminal organizations, and mercenary forces.

Military Forces. Armed forces and public safety officials of oil producing states are the first line of defense against terrorism, but many of the Middle East countries do not have the forces to effectively protect their pipelines from terrorists or aggressor states. In such situations, the United States or another strong nation-state is relied upon to protect the economic assets of weaker oil-producing states. Protection of oil production in the Middle East is clearly within national and global security interests of the US.

The emerging tendency, if not established trend, is for nation-states to turn to military forces to deal with security threats that are transnational and not state-centered. Previously, nations in modern times deployed armed forces directly against one another, and states were expected to handle their own internal problems, such as terrorism. The recent trend will likely continue in the coming decades and is expected, if terrorist should attack oil targets in the Persian Gulf states, eg: in Kuwait or Qatar. The US military exercise, Operation CENTRAZBAT 97, sent a message to all states in the Caspian Sea region that the US is prepared to assist the oil states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan against invasion or terrorism.

Middle East states are reluctant to have the US involved directly in their internal security affairs. One exception is US assistance to the Saudi Arabia National Guard. For some time the US has been advising and training the Guard in infantry tactics and the use of up-to-date NATO equipment. The original objective of US help was to develop Guard forces capable of handling urban disorders, border problems with Yemen, and oil field security. The Guard's effectiveness in its oil field security mission is enhanced with airborne assets and C3I links. US policy and practice leave little doubt that United States does and will continue to assist friendly Middle East states in fighting oil pipeline terrorism.

An analysis of the threat parameters for operations other than war identified five categories of threat forces: government forces, insurgent or factional forces, terrorists, criminal organization and armed populace. What is striking about the correlation of threats with mission activities is that a large number of activities across all threat categories are or could be identified as terrorist activities and could cause massive destruction to oil pipelines. One study of energy security risks concluded that the oil logistical system in the Middle East is "indefensible by conventional military means and that the United States and its allies must find another strategy for lowering the risks of politically inspired attacks on key oil operations."

Private Security. There are forces other than national armies to protect pipelines. Public or governmental security in the world is becoming increasingly privatized in part because of globalization and the inability of weak states to provide state security structures that protect citizens and properties. A new security paradigm is said to be emerging. These private security groups are categorized as mercenaries, private military companies, and private security companies. In many instances these categories tend to be mixed. Users of private security groups are non-state actors, governments in conflict regions and supplier countries, multilateral peacekeeping organization, humanitarian agencies, and corporations in extractive industries, for example, oil and gas. Oil corporations hire private contractors to secure their pipelines.

Financial Incentives. The financing of terror is widespread in the Middle East. In so doing, oil producing Arab states receive various degrees of protection from attacks on oil infrastructures. All terrorists must acquire income, buy arms, and achieve international recognition. They must find safe havens where they may escape and store arms and cash. "The countries of the Middle East have contributed most of the cash and arms that are given to the different terrorist groups and have ensured their growth." Oil wealth finds its way to terrorists through a variety of practices: governmental corruption, contract offsets, bribes, blackmail, direct payments, indirect purchases, and any number of other ways. Terrorists realize oil monies are sponsoring many of their activities. The reason nation-states sponsor terrorism is not solely for protecting pipelines:

"Terrorism-sponsoring states have interests ranging from ideological and theological aspirations to pragmatic and practical strategic and economic goals. They commit to terrorism sponsorship to further these interests. States use terrorism in order to attain objectives they cannot and/or would not attain through regular and conventional instruments of international relations, from negotiations to economic disputes to waging major wars. And as the potential costs and price of war grows, so does the penchant to use terrorists in war-by-proxies in order to solve national problems and/or realize national aspirations through the use of force but without much of the risk entailed."

Private oil companies are accused of yielding to demands for oil dollars to fund terrorists' activities; therefore, retaliation is thought to be less likely against these companies that also have the further incentive of keeping governments from interfering with daily operations. The extent of this practice is unknown but is suspected in the Middle East because of the private/governmental ownership of companies supplying oil. Although strenuously denied in public, industry-related bribery by Western oil giants in major energy deals appears to be frequent. "Show me the money" is a major theme between Arab nations, big oil, and producers of terrorism.

Casualty Insurance. Pipelines are secure if they may be reconstructed rapidly. The speed of reconstruction increases rapidly if funds are available to repair damage to facilities. Governmental and private insurance agencies are in the business of covering risks to the Middle East oil infrastructure and providing the dollars to pay for reconstruction. An outstanding example of a governmental agency that underwrites damage done by political violence is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the United States.

The mission of OPIC is to facilitate the investment of private capital from the US to emerging markets as part of US foreign policy. It carries out this mission by selling political risk insurance and long-term financing to US businesses. It invests in projects in over 140 developing countries. OPIC claims to operate on a self-sustaining basis with no net cost to the taxpayer. Over its thirty-year history, OPIC has supported US$138-billion worth of investments. Interestingly, OPIC insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the US Government. Oil and gas coverage is one of eight special insurance programs of the agency. Political violence coverage compensates for property and income losses caused by violence undertaken for political purposes.

OPIC also can provide financing for construction, ownership and operation of oil and gas pipeline, and other large and small energy and non-energy related projects. The Caspian Office of OPIC has facilitated development of energy projects such as the Baku-Ceyhan main export oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. To date, OPIC has provided more than US$2-billion in project finance and political risk insurance support in Turkey, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

Oil companies with billions in net revenue and the assistance of OPIC, Export-Import Bank, and the US Trade and Development Agency are insulated in varying degrees from short-term and long-term destruction due to political violence. The terrorist's events of September 11, 2001, did not deter oil firms from moving ahead with new construction. One energy analyst affirmed after the attacks, "They [terrorists] could delay (the projects), but in general, there's no inclination to change their [international oil companies] investment outlook based on political changes." A spokesman for BP said it was not scaling back on a US$15-billion natural gas project in Saudi Arabia's South Ghawar region in partnership with ExxonMobil, Shell, and Phillips.

The resiliency of oil companies to move forward may also be seen in the action of shareholders of Shell Pakistan who three days after the terrorist attacks of September 11 approved investment of US$3-million in the Pak Arab Pipeline Co. which plans to build a US$480-million, 817-km pipeline oil pipeline that will carry five-million tons of oil a year from northern Pakistan. The managing director of Air Security International, a Houston-based security and intelligence firms, has confidently gone on record with the statement that radical fundamentalists who oppose oil companies being in their countries do not care what happens to these oil projects and international relationships.

Repair of Pipelines. The amount and timeliness of funds to repair broken pipelines and other facilities are not the only factors to consider in estimating the time when oil will again flow. Pipelines are constructed and maintained with only little regard to their vulnerability to terrorism, and they are vulnerable at several points. An estimate of the time to repair a US pipeline system, for example, gives some indication of the time required to repair the Middle East system.

"The time required to repair damage to any pipeline varies, depending on the size of the damage, its complexity, weather conditions during repair, required safety measures, and the availability of skilled repair crews. For example, damage to a Tapline [The Alaskan Pipeline System: TAPS] pump station could take nine months to fix. Some booster pumps are constructed to each system's specifications and might require six months to a year to replace. Damage to pump stations or to the automated control facilities could result in as much as a one-third reduction in throughput."

The TAPS is a four-foot pipe running 800 miles between Prudhoe Bay to Port Valdiz, Alaska. It is estimated that attacks along the pipeline would require over a year to clean up. On October 4, 2001 a single rifle bullet entered the Tapline near Livengood, Alaska. The "terrorist" was a single drunken hunter with a .338-caliber rifle. Pressure spewed 286,000 gallons of oil 75 feet into the air. The pipeline shut down for three days before workers of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. fixed the leak. Vulnerability to oil pipeline attack is reduced by having skilled repair and operating personnel and easily obtainable critical spare parts.

Worldwide data over a 10-year period shows that oil and gas pipelines are the fourth most popular energy targets for terrorists, but that damages are only temporary. Even with more than 150 attacks on the Cano-Limon Covenas pipeline in Colombia, terrorists were unable to seriously disrupt the energy supply. However, under certain conditions, damage can be significant and long-term. Multiple attacks on the Beira-Mutare pipeline in Zimbabwe were highly significant, because it was the sole conduit for refined petroleum products to Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Consequences to peoples of the two countries were compounded because of a stressed economy.

Terminals: Oil loading terminals in the Middle East, and by inference oil drilling platforms, are "sitting ducks" for an air attack. "The exposure of oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf suggests that the most effective way to cripple oil trade from the Middle East would be aerial attack on the principal oil ports and offshore loading terminals up and down the Gulf." Terminal repairs range from upwards of one year or more. Pipelines may be repaired relatively quickly, but destruction of pumping stations could put the entire system out of action for weeks or months depending on the factors mentioned above.

Loss of oil supplies may be offset because of the ease of handling oil, the ability of producers and consumer states to swap oil, and the use of alternative pipelines. Loss of gas supplies is another matter. Reconnection and restoration of gas supply after a terrorist disruption is far more complex than for oil.

If the length of repair time on land is uppermost in a terrorist's mind, would he/she select pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks, or oil terminals? Probably, none of the above, for if he/she has good, oil system intelligence he/she would more likely target key points in the electrical control systems for petroleum and water pumping stations. Such a choice and follow-through would affect most other facilities. The best way to cripple Hydrocarbon Man is to pull the plug on Kilowatt Man.

Conclusions

Where does the evidence lead that might answer why terrorists do not attack oil pipelines in the Middle East? What is to be made of the silence? What conclusions may be drawn?

Conclusions are only as valid as information is available and reports of terrorist incidents are accurate. Corporations for any number of reasons are reluctant to report losses to the public. Governments may not want to report incidents, and if they do, they want to determine how incidents come across to the public. Incidents may be reported one way for domestic consumption and another for international listeners or readers. Middle East states may be much more concerned to have incidents attributed to transnational terrorists than to domestic dissidents. Middle East officials, like those of the West, know how to "wag the dog".

Much of the literature assumes that all energy infrastructures are vulnerable to terrorist attack, not only oil. But "vulnerability" is an oil-slick word. Because no energy system is 100% safe from terrorist attacks, are such systems therefore vulnerable? Pipelines by their length alone make them appear vulnerable to terrorists, but pipelines under the right conditions may be the least vulnerable physical targets. What is needed is a definition of vulnerability that measures the notion at all segments and points in the system. Elements to be measured would include redundancies, alternative throughputs, interchangeable parts, numbers of repair crews, and armed protection of critical stations. Therefore, "total vulnerability" of a system is not as important as segmented vulnerability. Saying that an entire system, at least in the case of oil, is vulnerable is probably inappropriate, except in those rare instances where alternatives are nonexistent. Statements in the record about the vulnerability of Middle East oil facilities need to be examined carefully.

Another idea pervading the thinking on pipeline protection is that the system is vulnerable, if there is not a continuous throughput of the product. The argument follows along these lines: The system that directs oil flowing through pipelines from wellhead to storage field to on-load shipping terminal to tanker to off-load terminal to storage tank to refinery to truck to the consumer is vulnerable unless the flow of oil is continuous, that is without interruption of any kind. This idea is supported by the otherwise fine writing of Lisa Maechling and Yonah Alexander who remark: "While the flow of oil from fields to tankers can be slowed down, it cannot be stopped without bringing to a halt the flow of oil from the wellhead."

Granted, there may be segments where pipeline pressure and continuous flow are necessary, but accidents happen, full storage tanks may not be available, and other wells may be put on line only at great expense. Continuous flow and vulnerability are often joined in order to press the need for action, be it armed intervention or financial assistance. Alarms about this type of vulnerability are more appropriate, if at all, in the long-term.

There is no single answer to whether Hydrocarbon Man is the next terrorist target. Answers are a function of the point of view of the intelligence analyst, corporate or government official, terrorist leader, or other interested party. The literature reviewed, the evidence as it were, leads to the following conclusions as to what is of primary importance to the oil corporation and to the terrorist.

Corporate Protection

Oil companies must deal with multiple threats to the flow of oil. When the terrorist is the perceived threat, the primary concern is whether the flow of oil is protected from interruptions. The issues are those of safety and security to pipelines in the broadest sense of the word. Protection is the operative word in their war against terrorism, and it comes in many guises:

Superpower protection of Middle East oil flow is the most obvious protection available to states surrounding the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.

The enormous wealth and influence of multinational oil companies allows actions to be taken that make oil pipelines less desirable targets of terrorists

Oil companies and governments are able to augment armed forces with proxies -- private security armies -- to protect vulnerable oil targets.

Oil firms are able to reduce risks to investments from terrorism because insurance is available to fund the rapid replacement of destroyed or damaged pipelines.

Complexity of the oil network makes the petroleum infrastructure more secure from terrorist attack than other sectors of the world economy.

But the ultimate argument for protection against terrorist attacks on the Middle East oil structure reportedly came from a senior Western oil executive who said: "Terrorism? Who's going to blow up their own pipeline?"

Terrorist Selection

Selection is the operative word for terrorists. At this point it would be worthwhile for a group of analysts to draft a scenario by selecting oil facilities and terrorist organizations and then go through the target acquisition process to determine which facilities would filter to the bottom as prime candidates for a terrorist attack. Such an exercise is of course beyond the scope of this paper and must be left to government agencies with the resources to carry off such an undertaking. The most that can be done is to review the materials presented and make judgments based on them. Consequently, factors in the target selection process lead to the following conclusions when viewed, in so far as possible, from the terrorist perspective:

The oil infrastructure of the Middle East with its various protective measures has made oil pipelines less attractive targets.

As oil targets and other potential targets make their ways through the terrorist target selection process, other targets emerge with more appeal.

The complexity of the oil infrastructure, while in many ways appealing as a target, removes oil pipelines from consideration.

The funding of terrorists' activities by the oil-producing states effectively removes oil pipelines from initial consideration in the target selection process.

Both corporations/governments and terrorists have reasons to believe, as in the past, that oil pipelines will not experience long- or even short-term disruptions.

Corporations have the protective wherewithal to support their belief; terrorists have more important targets in sight. In battle, it is a mistake to underestimate the enemy. Constraints, capabilities, and conditions are constantly in flux. There is no one answer from open sources or silent caves surrounding Middle East oil kingdoms as to whether Hydrocarbon Man is the next terrorist target or not, but if an answer is required, it would be, "unlikely in the near future".

All forms of vulnerability create various degrees of stress, fright and terror in the minds of employees, shareholders, and directors of the firms involved. The venue of the oil production business is permeated with a degree of danger and terror perhaps unknown to other companies. Do company related individuals think differently about risk, exposure, and vulnerability when faced with the organized and resourced cells of state sponsored terrorism? Or, is a terrorist incident an accident with a different name, and therefore it is business as usual? It's a curious idea, this conducting the oil business as usual in a terrorist environment. It requires a look beyond the points already discussed.

A Strategic Framework

Pipelines are always vulnerable. The absence of a history of terrorism or lack of an acute terrorist threat does not make them any less vulnerable. They are always vulnerable to a terrorist attack, because terrorists have the ability to insert the element of surprise. The inability to calculate surprise results in costly overreaction by governments and corporations when taken by surprise.

In the course of explaining why terrorists have given Middle East oil pipelines "the silent treatment," answers have touched upon a number of components: infrastructure, threats, vulnerabilities, protections, targeting, and analysis of risk. None of these topics by themselves explain the silence. What explanations have lacked up to this point is a broader strategic framework that would pull together and connect as many of the components as possible. Fortunately, such a framework exists in systems theory and was applied to an energy strategy study conducted in the early 1980s by the Rocky Mountain Institute for the US Department of Defense. Now available in a new 2001 edition on the Web, the study has many implications for protection of oil pipelines in the Middle East.

The crude oil throughput infrastructure is designed on the principle of efficiency. Petroleum stays in the ground until needed, because, "oil appreciates faster in the ground than it does in a Swiss bank". It takes about three months for oil to get from the wellhead to the end user. Nearly two months of world oil use is in the pipeline during the three months. "The oil system is rather 'tightly coupled' without large reserves of storage to draw upon in an interruption. This money-saving (but vulnerability-increasing) practice is most striking in the case of refineries, which normally keep only a three to five day' supply on hand and thus wither rapidly if the crude supply is interrupted." It is not just refineries, but all components of the oil business are designed for efficiency: wellheads, drilling rigs, pipeline, storage tanks, tankers, offshore production platforms, plans, methods, and people. Oil components are currently designed for the kind of reliability that makes them efficient, but therefore vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

The most effective strategic principle in the terrorist arsenal is surprise, and to extend the metaphor, terrorists have surprise secreted in millions of barrels per day. Surprise is the unknown risk factor. This is why oil pipelines can never be 100 percent safe, but why they should be made as resilient as possible. Thus, it is the surprise principle vs. the efficiency principle. In using surprise the terrorist in asymmetrical warfare employs economy of force by necessity. Surprise is a force multiplier due to the inherent vulnerability of efficiently designed and maintained pipelines. The resilient properties sought in response to surprise are functions of causes inside and outside the system. The Lovins identified from bio- and eco-systems the resilient properties necessary for oil and gas systems. These properties are reduced to principles and applied to the problem of designing resilient energy systems. Thus, "The more resilient, slightly less 'efficient' strategy wins an even richer prize: minimizing unexpected and disastrous consequences which can arise when the causal structure of a real system turns out to be qualitatively different than expected."

To compensate for the lack of inside design resiliency, private and government owned pipelines require a greater degree of external protection than would otherwise be necessary. The greater protection comes at a high cost, eg: in the form of foreign military forces, private armies, financial incentives, and insurance. To say that NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and US provide protection to efficient oil system misses the point. Its seems reasonable that fewer armed forces would be required in the Middle East, if the oil infrastructure were designed with more resilient properties. Furthermore, one of the thirteen properties sought in resilient energy systems is that of limited demands on social stability. This property is particularly apropos to the presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia and to tensions between social classes in the country, for as one observer has noted:

"It should not be necessary to deploy force to protect (an energy technology. It) ... should be able to survive and recover from periods of political breakdown, civil unrest, war and acts of terrorism. The system should be unlikely to become a target of protest; should enhance, not threaten social stability."

Summary

It was George Bernard Shaw, British playwright and critic, who said: "Silence is the most perfect expression of scorn." The deafening silence surrounding oil pipelines in the Middle East expresses the scorn of transnational terrorists who are currently strapped by target selection constraints, the need for financial assistance, and the manifold protection available to big oil corporations and Arab governments. The forbearance of terrorists is due to their greater open dislike and disrespect for modern Western nations whose civilians make richer targets. The armor of Hydrocarbon Man may protect him a little while longer against the chilling terror that lies behind the crescent smiles of the new jackals.

Source: http://www.globalintelligencereport.com/articles/Is-Hydrocarbon-Man-the-Next-Terrorist-Target

By. Global Intelligence Report Staff

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